^{Page 404 note 1} Spio-Garbach, Ekwow, ‘A Strategy for Africa's Financial Management’, in Africa Report (New Brunswick), 29, 5, 09-10 1984, p. 76. I have updated the number of adjustment programmes reported in this article as a result of information received from the I.M.F.'s African DepartmentGoogle Scholar. For the I.M.F. and the Paris Club, see Aronson, Jonathan David, Money and Power: banks and the world monetary system (Beverly Hills, 1977), pp. 167–8. Lowconditionality loans place fewer and less particular burdens on the requesting government, thereby giving it more freedom to determine its economic policies.Google Scholar

^{Page 404 note 2} Payer, Cheryl, The Debt Trap: the International Monetary Fund and the Third World (New York, 1974), p. x.Google Scholar

^{Page 404 note 3} Brett, E. A., in Bureau, Latin America (ed.), The Poverty Brokers: the IMF and Latin America (London, 1983), p. 26.Google Scholar

^{Page 404 note 4} Overall authority within the I.M.F. rests with the Board of Governors, which meets annually and (usually) consists of all the members' Finance Ministers. They consult together on broad policy issues, mostly reports, and do not exercise any effective decision-making power. Ibid.

^{Page 405 note 1} In 1979, for example, Spain represented Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, though the latter had a larger quota than Spain.

^{Page 405 note 2} Brett, loc. cit. pp. 26–8.

^{Page 405 note 3} Abdala, Ismail-Sabri, ‘The Inadequacy and Loss of Légitimacy of the International Monetary Fund’ in Development Dialogue (Uppsala), 2, 1980, p. 37.Google Scholar

^{Page 406 note 1} Brett, loc. cit. p. 28.

^{Page 406 note 2} ‘The Terra Nova Statement on the International Monetary System and the Third World’, in Development Dialogue, 1, 1980, p. 30. See also the Report of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, ‘Towards the New International Economic Order’, New York, United Nations, 1982, p. 18; and Parkinson, F., ‘The IMF in Economic Development: equality and discrimination’, in Journal of African Law (London), 26, I, Spring 1982, p. 22.Google Scholar

^{Page 406 note 3} ‘Background Notes on the International Monetary Fund’ in Development Dialogue, 2, 1980, p. 103. The monthly meeting of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, provides an opportunity for the central bank governors of the Group of Ten to maintain regular contacts.

^{Page 406 note 4} Cohen, Benjamin J., Organizing the World's Money: the political economy of international monetary relations (New York, 1977), p. 151. S.D.R.s were created in 07 1969 as a form of international reserve asset to replace the dollar as the Fund's official unit of account. They are allocated to members as a supplement to other reserves, and they function as credits in their accounts with the I.M.F., which can be used to buy hard currencies in times of debt or balance-of-payments problems. Members pay interest to the Fund on the balance of their holdings below their allocation, and they receive interest when their holdings are above their allocation.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 407 note 1} Saladin, Peter, ‘The Link Between the Creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and Development Finance’ in Development Dialogue, I, 1981, pp. 38–46.Google Scholar

^{Page 407 note 2} Cooper, Richard N., ‘Monetary Reform in Jamaica’ in Bernstein, Edward M. et al., ‘Reflections on Jamaica’, in Essays in International Finance (Princeton), 115, 04 1976, p. 12.Google Scholar

^{Page 407 note 3} Brett, loc. cit. p. 29.

^{Page 408 note 1} Kwitny, Jonathan, ‘Going Along: how IMF overcame political issues to vote a loan to South Africa’, in Kojm, Christopher A. (ed.), The Problem of International Debt (New York, 1984), pp. 117–18.Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 2} Southard, Frank A. Jr, ‘The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund’, in Essays in International Finance, 135, 12 1979, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 3} Cohen, op. cit. p. 206.

^{Page 408 note 4} Kwitny, loc. cit. pp. 44–5.

^{Page 409 note 1} ‘The Arusha Initiative’, in Development Dialogue, 2, 1980, p. 14.

^{Page 409 note 2} Sutton, Mary, ‘Introduction’, in Killick, Tony (ed.), The IMF and Stabilization: developing country experiences (New York, 1984), p. 14.Google Scholar

^{Page 409 note 3} The United States has historically opposed loans to numerous left-wing governments. For a description of such positions taken against e.g. Grenada, Chile, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, and Uganda, see Kwitny, loc. cit. pp. 120 and 127–30. American activities at the Fund continue to be influenced, of course, not only by both Executive and Congressional strategies, but also by the important rôle played by domestic politics.

^{Page 409 note 4} Brett, loc. cit. pp. 44–5.

^{Page 410 note 1} Ibid. pp. 45–7.

^{Page 410 note 2} Farnsworth, Clyde M., ‘A Dramatic Change at the IMF’, in Kojm (ed.), op. cit. pp. 101–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 410 note 3} Foreign Policy Association Editors, ‘How the IMF Works’, in ibid. p. 94.

^{Page 411 note 1} Peter T. Kilborn, ‘Tough Talk by U.S.: new development for IMF’, in ibid. pp. 131–2.

^{Page 411 note 2} Farnsworth, loc. cit. p. 103. In 1983, the Reagan Administration supported the western European consensus on a second five-year term for Jacques de Larosière after his achievements concerning the debt crisis. Paul Volcker, Chief of the Federal Reserve Board, also voiced strong support for the Director's new activism. De Larosière turned over the helm of the I.M.F. to a fellow Frenchman, Camdessus, Michel, on 16 January 1987.Google Scholar

^{Page 411 note 3} Southard, op. cit. pp. 7 and 10.

^{Page 412 note 1} Sampson, Anthony, The Money Lenders: bankers and a world in turmoil (New York, 1981), p. 304.Google Scholar

^{Page 412 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 413 note 1} de Larosière, Jacques, IMF Survey (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 35,Google Scholar quoted by Dell, Sidney, ‘On Being Grandmotherly: the evolution of IMF conditionality’, in Essays in International Finance, 144, 10 1981, p. 27.Google Scholar

^{Page 413 note 2} Southard, op. cit. p. 8.

^{Page 413 note 3} Sampson, op. cit. p. 296.

^{Page 414 note 1} I.M.F. Press Release No. 84/35 in Finance and Development (Washington, D.C.), 21, 1 03 1984, p. 7, a joint publication of the I.M.F. and the World Bank.Google Scholar

^{Page 414 note 2} ‘Background Notes on the IMF’, p. 102.

^{Page 414 note 3} Deane, Marjorie, ‘Financial Missions and Missionaries’, in Kojm (ed.), op. cit. pp. 98–100.Google Scholar

^{Page 415 note 1} Williamson, John (ed.), IMF Conditionality (Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1983), p. 666.Google Scholar

^{Page 415 note 2} Dell, op. cit. p. 10.

^{Page 415 note 3} SirGold, Joseph, quoted in Dell, op. cit. p. 11. See also I.M.F. Staff, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C., 1982), Occasional Paper No. 9, p. 25.Google Scholar

^{Page 416 note 1} Dell, op. cit. pp. 16 and 28.

^{Page 416 note 2} Sutton, loc. cit. p. 14.

^{Page 416 note 3} Williamson, op. cit. p. 667. See also Dell, op. cit. pp. 18–19.

^{Page 416 note 4} ‘Towards the New International Economic Order’, p. 20.

^{Page 416 note 5} ‘The IMF's Role in Developing Countries’ in Finance and Development, 21, 3 September 1984, p. 26. This is an exchange between Tony Killick, Director of the Overseas Development Institute, London, and Nowzad, Bahram, Editor of Finance and Development.Google Scholar

^{Page 418 note 1} Ibid. pp. 21 and 23. See also Dell, Sidney, ‘Stabilization: the political economy of overkill’, in Williamson, (ed.), op. cit. pp. 17–18 and 27–8.Google Scholar

^{Page 418 note 2} Nyerere, Julius, ‘No to IMF Meddling’, in Development Dialogue, 2, 1980, pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

^{Page 419 note 1} Cohen, op. cit. p. 114.

^{Page 419 note 2} Bernstein, op. cit. p. 6.

^{Page 419 note 3} Kafka, Alexandre, ‘The International Monetary Fund: reform without reconstruction?’, in Essays in International Finance, 118, 10 1976, p. 15. See also Cohen, op. cit. p. 133.Google Scholar

^{Page 419 note 4} Kafka, loc. cit. p. 18.

^{Page 420 note 1} Parkinson, loc. cit. p. 38;Google Scholar and Browne, Robert S., ‘Conditionality: a new form of colonialism?’, in Africa Report, 29, 5, 09-10 1984, p. 133.Google Scholar

^{Page 420 note 2} Cohen, op. cit. pp. 117 and 123.

^{Page 420 note 3} Ibid. p. 132.

^{Page 420 note 4} ‘Background Notes on the IMF’, p. 106. See also Cohen, op. cit. p. 150.

^{Page 420 note 5} ‘The Arusha Initiative’, p. 17.

^{Page 420 note 6} Bernstein, op. cit. p. 8.

^{Page 421 note 1} Cf. Callaghy, Thomas M., ‘The Ritual Dance of the Debt Game’, in Africa Report, 29, 5, 09–10 1984, pp. 22–5.Google Scholar

^{Page 421 note 2} Gran, Guy, Development by People: citizen construction of a just world (New York, 1983), pp. 128 and 130.Google Scholar

^{Page 421 note 3} Callaghy, loc. cit. p. 22.

^{Page 422 note 1} Gran, Guy, ‘An Introduction to Zaïres’ Permanent Development Crisis, in Gran, (ed.), Zaire: the political economy of underdevelopment (New York, 1979), p. 13: the average yearly income of 2,350 top-ranking Zaïrians is more than $10,000, while the majority of the 27 million population earn only $25–50;Google Scholar See also Nzongola-Ntalaja, , ‘Crisis and Change in Zaire, 1960–1985’, in Nzongola-Ntalaja, (ed.), The Crisis in Zaire: myths and realities (Trenton, N. J., 1986), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 422 note 2} Callaghy, loc. cit. p. 23.

^{Page 422 note 3} Gran, Guy, ‘Zaire 1978: the ethical and intellectual backruptcy of the world system’, in Africa Today (Denver), 25, 4, 1978, p. 19.Google Scholar

^{Page 422 note 4} Crawford, , Young, and Turner, Thomas, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, 1985), pp. 379–82; and Gran (ed.), Zaire, p. 18.Google Scholar

^{Page 423 note 1} Callaghy, loc. cit. pp. 23–4. Cf. ‘Erwin Blumenthal is Zaire's Last Hope’, in Euromoney (London), 02 1979, pp. 9–11. For more complete descriptions and comments on this series of Zaïre-I.M.F. dealings, see Gran, Development by People, pp. 130–4; Young, op. cit. pp. 383–4;Google Scholar and Kömer, Peter et al., ‘Zaire: the work of the cleptocrats and the importance of the IMF’, in The IMF and the Dept Crisis: a guide to the third world's dilemma (London, 1986), pp. 97–105. According to ‘How the IMF Works’, in Kojm (ed.) op. cit. p. 96, the team was first offered briefcases full of money; later I.M.F. officials were threatened with sub-machine guns.Google Scholar

^{Page 423 note 2} Callaghy, loc. cit. p. 25.

^{Page 424 note 1} Gran, Development by People, pp. 127–8.

^{Page 424 note 2} Ibid. p. 138.

^{Page 424 note 3} Young, op. cit. pp. 179–82; and Gran, ‘Zaire 1978’, pp. 11–12.

^{Page 424 note 4} Gran, (ed.), Zaire, pp. 3–4.

^{Page 425 note 1} Gran, ‘Zaire 1978’, p. 7.

^{Page 425 note 2} Katwala, Ghifem J., ‘Export-led Growth: the copper sector’, in Gran (ed.), Zaïre, pp. 130–4; also Gran's introduction, pp. –8.Google Scholar

^{Page 425 note 3} Gran, Development by People, p. 128.

^{Page 425 note 4} Gran (ed.), Zaïre, pp. 8–9.

^{Page 425 note 5} Ibid. p. 10.

^{Page 426 note 1} See Kanda, Ciamala, ‘Éléments de blocage du développement rural au Zaïre (Cas Luba du Kasai)’ in Cahiers économiques et sociaux (Kinshasa), XV, 3 09 1978, pp. 334–71.Google Scholar

^{Page 426 note 2} Financial Times (London), 9 07 1985, quoted by Ntalaja, Nzongola, loc. cit. pp. 3–4 and 9;Google ScholarAfrica South of the Sahara (London, 1987), p. 1074; Gran, Development by People, p. 129; and ‘Zaire 1978’, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{Page 426 note 3} Gould, David J., Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: the case of Zaire (New York, 1980), p. xiii.Google Scholar

^{Page 426 note 4} Callaghy, loc. cit. p. 26. See also Gould, op. cit. pp. 93–4.

^{Page 426 note 5} Gran, Development by People, pp. 128–9.

^{Page 427 note 1} Gran (ed.), Zaïre, pp. 10–11.

^{Page 427 note 2} Gran, Development by People, p. 140.

^{Page 427 note 3} Gran, ‘Zaire 1978’, p. 16.

^{Page 427 note 4} Callaghy, loc. cit. p. 26.

^{Page 427 note 5} Gran (ed.), Zaïre, p. 7.

^{Page 428 note 1} Gran, Development by People, p. 137.

^{Page 428 note 2} Gran, ‘Zaire 1978’, p. 6.

^{Page 428 note 3} Ibid. p. 13.

^{Page 428 note 4} Kömer et al., ‘The Instruments of the “Financial Policeman”: meaning and content of IMF stabilisation Programmes’, in The IMF and the Debt Crisis, pp. 54–6; and Gran, Development by People, p. 126.Google Scholar

^{Page 429 note 1} Browne, loc. cit. p. 16.

^{Page 429 note 2} Helleiner, G. K., ‘The IMF and Africa in the 1980s’, in Essays in International Finance, 152, 07 1983, pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

^{Page 429 note 3} Ibid. pp. 3 and 5.

^{Page 430 note 1} Gran, ‘Zaire 1978’, p. 9.

^{Page 430 note 2} Director-General of the International Labour Organisation, ‘The Impact of the Debt Situation on Employment and Human Conditions in Developing Countries’, Geneva, 1984, p. 3.

^{Page 430 note 3} Gran, Development by People, pp. 135–6.

^{Page 430 note 4} Helleiner, loc. cit. pp. 8–9 and 22.

^{Page 430 note 5} Feinberg, Richard E., ‘The Stand-by Arrangements of the IMF and the Basic Needs’, Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown University, 1980.Google Scholar

^{Page 431 note 1} de Larosière, Jacques, ‘Does the Fund Impose Austerity?’, in IMF Survey, 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 431 note 2} Helleiner, loc. cit. p. 16.

^{Page 431 note 3} Camps, Miriam and Gwin, Catherine, Collective Management: the reform of global economic organizations (New York, 1981), p. 233.Google Scholar

^{Page 432 note 1} Mtei, E. I. M., ‘Africa and the IMF: an evolving relationship’, in Africa Report, 29, 5, September–October 1984, p. 21; and Parkinson, loc. cit. pp. 28 and 40. See also Saladin, loc. cit. pp. 39–41 and 45.Google Scholar

^{Page 432 note 2} Haq, Mahbub ul, The Poverty Curtain (New York, 1976), pp. 71–4, discussed in Gran (ed.), Zaire, pp. 21–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 432 note 3} Helleiner, loc. cit. pp. 15 and 20.

^{Page 432 note 4} Gran, Development by People, p. 140.

^{Page 432 note 5} Helleiner, loc. cit. pp. 12 and 14.

^{Page 432 note 6} See ‘The Terra Nova Statement’, p. 30.

^{Page 433 note 1} World Economic Outlook, p. 25. Total Fund quotas fell from 12 per cent of world imports in the early 1960s to 4 per cent in the 1980s after an increase. The decline is also dramatic in view of the fact that the sum of the current account imbalance in 1980 of a group comprising the majority of I.M.F. member-states was ten times the level recorded during the early 1960s, while quotes, by ways of contrast, increased by a factor of less than four.

^{Page 433 note 2} ‘Towards the New International Economic Order’, p. 27.

^{Page 433 note 3} World Economic Outlook, p. 24.

^{Page 433 note 4} Sutton, loc. cit. p. 12.

^{Page 433 note 5} Several African governments continue to make efforts to move Commonwealth Finance Ministers towards an L.D.C. perspective on the need for the I.M.F. to be reformed, particularly as regards its structure and style of management. At present, for example, attempts are being made to ensure that member-state ‘negotiations’ with the Fund are more meaningful, because as regards Africa these often seem to be ‘completed’ in Washington before the I.M.F. mission arrives in the host country.