^{Page 401 note 1} Welch, Claude E. Jr, No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America (Boulder, 1987), p. 20.Google Scholar

^{Page 401 note 2} Although not attempted in this article, cross-national analysis also produces valuable insights. See, for example, Rothchild, Donald and Gyimah-Boadi, E., ‘Ghana's Return to Civilian Rule’, in Africa Today (Denver), 28, 1, 1981, pp. 3–16.Google Scholar

^{Page 402 note 1} These are Panter-Brick, Keith, ‘The Constitution Drafting Committee’, in , Panter-Brick (ed.), Soldiers and Oil: the political transformation of Nigeria (London, 1978), pp. 291–350;Google ScholarGboyega, E. Alex, ‘The Making of the Nigerian Constitution’, in Oyediran, Oyeleye (ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966–79 (London, Basingstoke, and New York, 1979), pp. 235–58;Google ScholarHerskovits, Jean, ‘Democracy in Nigeria’, in Foreign Affairs (New York), 204, 1, Winter 1979–1980, pp. 314–35;Google Scholar and Phillips, Claude S., ‘Nigeria's New Political Institutions, 1975–9’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 18, 1, 03 1980, pp. 1–22.Google Scholar

^{Page 402 note 2} See Welch, op. cit. p. 20. The institutionalisation of a civilian political system usually concomitantly requires a fundamental transformation of domestic and transnational economic relations. When transition leaders act in a manner which precludes such changes, the new régime is likely to exhibit few differences from its predecessor in terms of class composition and accumulation strategies.

^{Page 403 note 1} The two latter categories of military involvement in transition policy-making are suggested by Bishop, Vaughn F., ‘Prospects for the Return to Civilian Rule in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Upper Volta’, African Studies Association, Los Angeles, 31 October — 3 November 1979, pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

^{Page 404 note 1} Dent, Martin J., ‘Corrective Government: military rule in perspective’, in Panter-Brick (ed.), op. cit. p. 114.Google Scholar See also, Ian Campbell, ‘Army Reorganisation and Military Withdrawal’, in ibid. p. 80.

^{Page 404 note 2} Dent, loc. cit. pp. 114–20; Campbell, loc. cit. pp. 81–2; and Bennett, Valerie P. and Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., ‘Back to the Barracks: a decade of marking time’, in Panter-Brick (ed.), op. cit. p. 24.Google Scholar

^{Page 404 note 3} Dent, loc. cit. pp. 123–4.

^{Page 404 note 4} Campbell, loc. cit. pp. 82–95.

^{Page 404 note 5} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 326, and New Nigerian, (Kaduna), 1 01 1980, p. 1.Google Scholar

^{Page 405 note 1} Yahaya, Ali D., ‘The Creation of States’, in Panter-Brick (ed.), op. cit. p. 201.Google Scholar

^{Page 405 note 2} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 318. The Federal Military Government rejected two other panel proposals concerning the establishment of additional states and six of its 12 recommended boundary adjustments. Yahaya, loc. cit. pp. 216–19.

^{Page 405 note 3} Campbell, loc. cit. p. 81, and Salau, Ademola T., ‘A New Capital for Nigeria: planning, problems and prospects’, in Africa Today, 24, 4, 1977, pp. 11–18.Google Scholar

^{Page 405 note 4} See International Planning Associates, A New Federal Capital for Nigeria: draft master plan for the capital city (Lagos, 1978); A. Y. Aliyu and P. H. Koehn et al., ‘First Report on the Establishment of a Unified System of Administration for the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja)’, Department of Research, Management, and Consultancy, Ahmadu Bello University (A.B.U.), Zaria, 1979;Google Scholar and Aliyu, A. Y. and Koehn, P. H., ‘Proposal for a Unified System of Admimistration for the New Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria’, in Nigerian Journal of Public Affairs (Zaria), 9, 05 1980, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 405 note 5} See Phillips, loc. cit. p. 12, and Elaigwu, Jonah Isawa, ‘Federal-State Relations in Nigeria's Presidential Federalism: problems and prospects’, National Conference on the Return to Civilian Rule, Institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 26–30 May 1980, p. 21. The 1976 local government reforms must be added to the list of issues addressed by the military which resurfaced immediately after the transfer of power. Demands for the creation of additional jurisdiction and enhanced local autonomy, as well as conflicts over the röles performed by traditional rulers, escalated dramatically in 1980. See New Nigerian, 11 May 1979 and 14 July 1980; A. Y. Aliyu, P. H. Koehn, and R. A. Hay, ‘The Involvement of Local Governments in Social, Political and Economic Development in the Northern States: 1976–79’, National Seminar, Institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 28–30 April 1980; andGoogle ScholarAliyu, A. Y. and Koehn, P. H., Local Autonomy and Inter-Governmental Relations in Nigeria: the case of the Northern States in the immediate post local government reform period, 1976–79 (Institute of Administration, A.B.U., Zaria, 1982).Google Scholar

^{Page 406 note 1} Campbell, loc. cit. p. 81, and Phillips, loc. cit. p. 1.

^{Page 406 note 2} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 328.

^{Page 407 note 1} The alternatives included appointing a civilian caretaker government prior to the elections, and holding state and national elections before a new constitution was drafted.

^{Page 407 note 2} See chart in Koehn, Peter, ‘Prelude to Civilian Rule: the Nigerian elections of 1979’, in Africa Today, 28, 1, 1981, pp. 22–3.Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 1} Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 3–4; Falola, Toyin and Ihonvbere, Julius, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979–84 (London, 1985), p. 24;Google ScholarJackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., Personal Rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1982), pp. 275–6; and list in Gboyega, loc. cit. p. 244.Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 2} Bishop, op. cit. pp. 9–10; Gboyega, loc. cit. p. 245; and Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 4–5.

^{Page 408 note 3} Phillips, loc. cit. p. 5.

^{Page 408 note 4} Bishop, op. cit. p. 10, and Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 3–9. Two C.D.C. members dissented from the majority over this issue and submitted their own minority report, which the full committee never officially published. See Audi, Mohammed and Goonesekere, R. K. W., ‘Legal Background to the Nigerian Elections, 1979’, National Conference on the Return to Civilian Rule, Zaria, May 1980, pp. 4–5,Google Scholar and Joseph, Richard, ‘Political Parties and Ideology in Nigeria’ in Review of African Political Economy (Sheffield), 13, 05-08 1978, p. 79.Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 5} In a number of states, district-wide electoral colleges composed of successful primary-election candidates elected the final members of the councils from their own ranks. The military governors appointed the remaining members of the councils.

^{Page 408 note 6} Bennett and Kirk-Greene, loc. cit. p. 25; Aliyu, Abubakar Yaya, ‘As Seen in Kaduna’, in Panter-Brick (ed.), op. cit. pp. 270–1; and Phillips, loc. cit. p. 9.Google Scholar

^{Page 409 note 1} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 317, and Panter-Brick, Keith, ‘Nigeria: the 1979 elections’, in Afrika-Spectrum (Hamburg), 1979, p. 319.Google Scholar

^{Page 409 note 2} Fedeco disqualified a number of those who had been nominated on the grounds that they had not paid their past income taxes. Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 13–14, and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit.

^{Page 409 note 3} The breakdown by states can be found in Gboyega, loc. cit. p. 246.

^{Page 409 note 4} Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. pp. 6–7.

^{Page 409 note 5} Phillips, loc. cit. p. 10, fn. 1.

^{Page 409 note 6} Joseph, loc. cit. p. 79.

^{Page 409 note 7} Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 9 and 13–14; Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. pp. 6–7;Google Scholar and Nwabueze, Ben O., Nigeria's Presidential Constitution: the second experiment in constitutional democracy (New York, 1985), p. 7.Google Scholar

^{Page 409 note 8} Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 9–10, and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 7.

^{Page 410 note 1} Some members of the Constituent Assembly later argued that the legal draftsmen had distorted their intentions and disregarded the minutes of their proceedings. One member instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court in May 1979 — albeit later struck out for want of jurisdiction — on the grounds that the ‘clean’ copy failed to embody the Assembly's decision to uphold the C.D.C.'s provision for a second popular presidential election between the top two contenders in the event that no candidate had been elected on the first national ballot. New Nigerian, 21 August 1979, and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 10.

^{Page 410 note 2} On the other hand, as Billy Dudly pointed out, the 1979 Constitution was the first to be drawn up entirely by Nigerians, and a broader cross-section of the populace participated in its formulation than in the preparation of the First Republic's Constitution. Cited by Ignatius A. Ayua, ‘The Operation of the New Nigerian Constitution: its strengths and weaknesses’, National Conference on the Return to Civilian Rule, Zaria, May 1980, p. 2.

^{Page 410 note 3} A complete list of the amendments appeared in the New Nigerian, 5 October 1978. Several of them, such as the granting of constitutional status to major policies previously implemented by the F.M.G., including the Land Use Decree of 1978, can hardly be described as ‘minor’ as characterised by Phillips, loc. cit. p. 10.

^{Page 410 note 4} Nwabueze, op. cit. pp. 6–7.

^{Page 410 note 5} Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. pp. 8–9.

^{Page 410 note 6} The full text of the Constitutional (Amendment) Decree No. 104 of 1979 can be found in New Nigerian, 1 October 1979, p. 3.

^{Page 411 note 1} See Bishop, op. cit. pp. 8 and 11.

^{Page 411 note 2} Fedeco, ‘Report on the Operation of the Federal Electoral Commission, 1976–79’, Lagos, September 1979, p. 67. Aliyu, A. Y. and Payne, T., ‘The 1979 Elections: a tentative assessment of conseqences and implications’, National Conference on the Return to Civilian Rule, Zaria, May 1980, p. 15, correctly criticised the January 1978 date in that 18 months subsequently elapsed between this one-time only exercise and the July/August 1979 elections. Moreover, Fedeco then only allowed voters to cast ballots by being physically present in the same constituency in which they had registered at the beginning of the previous year.Google Scholar

^{Page 411 note 3} Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 14, and Ekong, B. U., ‘The 1979 Elections: consequences and implications’, National Conference on the Return to Civilian Rule, Zaria, May 1980, pp. 25–6.Google Scholar

^{Page 411 note 4} New Nigerian, 5 October 1978, p. xxxvi; Fedeco, , The General Elections, 1979 (Lagos, 1979), passim; Phillips, loc. cit. p. 13;Google ScholarPanter-Brick, loc. cit. pp. 320–1; and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 15. For an Analysis of the apportionment of seats in the Senate and in the Federal and State Houses of Assembly based on estimated state-wide population figures, see Aliyu and Payne, op. cit. pp. 31–3, who note on p. 38 that 'a much greater degree of inequality of representation does exist among the various constituencies within each state than exists in the apportionment of seats among the several states’.Google Scholar

^{Page 411 note 5} Section 17(1) of the Electoral Decree, subsequently altered to conform in part to provisions in the C.A.'s constitution by the Electoral (Amendment) Decree No. 32 of 1978, also mandatd that writs for conducting the first elections to legislative seats in the Second Republic had to be issued to Fedeco by Head of the Federal Military Government. See Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. pp. 13–16. The last direct procedural decision taken by the F.M.G. under this provision involved determing the month the elections would commence.

^{Page 412 note 1} The F.M.G. later issued decrees on public security and public order that gave the military and police power to control the conduct of public meetings, assemblies, and processions at the state level. Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 12, and Phillips, loc. cit. p. 17.

^{Page 412 note 2} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 318; Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 12; and Phillips, loc. cit. p. 10.

^{Page 412 note 3} The prevailing opinion in policy-making circles held only that it would be imperative to avoid a proliferation of parties. Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 6–7, and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 16.

^{Page 412 note 4} Ibid. 16.

^{Page 413 note 1} For one analyst's assessment of the factors that proved decisive in Fedeco's determination, see Joseph, loc. cit. pp. 79–80. The Commission's guidelines for the registration of political parties placed considerable emphasis on the financial resources available to the organisations. New Nigerian, 29 September 1978, p. 1.

^{Page 413 note 2} Fedeco did not require that a party's candidates be spread across the country in order to qualify for this grant. For details, see Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 17.

^{Page 413 note 3} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 321; Aliyu and Payne, op. cit. p. 11; Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. pp. 17–18; and Ekong, op. cit. p. 9.

^{Page 413 note 4} See Koehn, ‘Prelude to Civilian Rule’, pp. 28–30.

^{Page 413 note 5} On the equally controversial rôle played by Fedeco in the 1983 elections, see Oyovbaire, Sam Egite, Federalism in Nigeria: a study in the development of the Nigerian state (New York, 1985), p. 23, and Nwabueze, op. cit. pp. 397–400.Google Scholar

^{Page 413 note 6} New Nigerian, 23 June 1979, p. 1; Bishop, op. cit. p. 9; and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 19.

^{Page 414 note 1} See Koehn, ‘Prelude to Civilian Rule’, pp. 31–3.

^{Page 414 note 2} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 325, and Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. pp. 26–7. In contrast to the 1979 exercise, the 1983 elections are widely held to have been rigged on a massive scale. For a particularly convincing presentation on this matter, consult Nwabueze, op. cit. pp. 400–26. See also, Oyediran, Oyeleye, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Elections in Nigeria’, National Electoral Commission Workshop, Badagry, 3–6 May 1988. 18. To reduce local pressures, the N.E.C. transferred electoral officers in 1989 so that they no longer served in their home state. West Africa, 3–9 July 1989, p. 1085.Google Scholar

^{Page 414 note 3} The announcement made by the cheif Returning Officer stated that ‘the candidate who scored at least one–quarter of the votes cast in 12states and one-quarter of two-thirds, that is, at least one-sixth of the votes cast in the 13th state satisfies the requirement’. Cited in Audi and Goonesekere, op. cit. p. 30. See also, Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 325.

^{Page 414 note 4} New Nigerian, 18 December 1979, p. 1.

^{Page 414 note 5} Ibid. 22 January 1980.

^{Page 415 note 1} See Herskovits, loc. cit. pp. 314 and 355.

^{Page 415 note 2} Gauhar, Altaf, ‘North-South Dialogue: Julius K. Nyerere’, in Third World Quarterly (London), 6, 4, 10 1984, p. 827.Google Scholar

^{Page 415 note 3} Welch, Clade E. Jr, ‘The Dilemmas of Military Withdrawal from Politics: some considerations from tropical Africa’, in Africa Studies Review (Los Angeles), 18, 2 1974, pp. 213–27;Google ScholarWelch, Claude E. Jr, and Smith, Arthur K., Military Role and Rule: perspectives on civilmilitary relations (North Scituate, 1974), pp. 140–1;Google Scholar and Koehn, Peter, ‘Ethiopian Politics: military intervention and prosects for futher change’, in Africa Today, 22, 2, 1975, p. 21.Google Scholar

^{Page 415 note 4} Cf. General Obasanjo's emphasis on the need for ‘continuity’ in defending the S.M.C.'s adoption of 17 amendments to the Constituent Assembly's ‘clean copy’ of the 1978 Constitution.

^{Page 416 note 1} Joseph, op. cit. pp. 89–90, and Welch, op. cit. pp. 24 and 116.

^{Page 416 note 2} See also Welch, Claude E. Jr, ‘Cincinnatus in Africa: the possibility of military withdrawal from politics’, in Lofchie, Michael F. (ed.), The State of the Nations: constraints on development in independent Africa (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1971), p. 228.Google Scholar

^{Page 416 note 3} Falola and Ihonvebere, op. cit. p. 28.

^{Page 416 note 4} Bishop, op. cit. pp. 10–11; Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 326; and Phillips, loc. cit. p. 20.

^{Page 417 note 1} Herskovits, loc. cit. p. 326. See also, Bishop, op. cit. pp. 7–21, and West Africa (London), 3 09 1979, p. 1619.Google Scholar

^{Page 417 note 2} It should be noted that some politically-minded individuals had already organised de facto parties before the official ban on such activities had been lifted by the F.M.G. See Phillips, loc. cit. p. 15.

^{Page 418 note 1} Bennett and Kirk-Greene, loc. cit. p. 14.

^{Page 418 note 2} Luckham, Robin, The Nigerian Military: a sociological analysis of authority and revolt, 1960–67 (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 201–2, and Welch, ‘Cincinnatus in Africa’, p. 219.Google Scholar

^{Page 418 note 3} Bishop, op. cit. pp. 7–10. For instance, Mohammed's, Murtala charge to the C.D.C. emphasised the rôle of constitutional provisions in developing census politics; eliminating cut-throat political competition; depoliticising the population census; establishing public accountability, free and fair elections, and an independent judiciary; reducing the concentration of power; and creating genuine and truly national political parties. See Phillips, loc. cit. pp. 3–4. The type of presidential system selected also had the concrete effect of burdening the country with an expensive set of national and state political institutions, as pointed out by Larry Diamond, ‘The Political Economy of Corruption in Nigeria’, African Studies Association, Los Angeles, October 1974, p. 56.Google Scholar

^{Page 418 note 4} See Bennett and Kirk-Greene, loc. cit. p. 14; Yahaya, loc. cit. pp. 220–1; Joseph, loc. cit. pp. 80–1;Google ScholarScarritt, James R. (ed.), Analyzing Political Change in Africa: applications of a new multidimensional framework (Boulder, 1980), pp. 1–39 and 344–51; and Report of Political Bureau (Lagos, 1987), p. 29.Google Scholar

^{Page 418 note 5} Welch, ‘Cincinnatus in Africa’, pp. 236–7; Bennett and Kirk-Greene, loc. cit. p. 14; Joseph, loc. cit. pp. 80–1; and Jackson and Rosberg, op. cit. p. 280.

^{Page 418 note 6} For example, see Diamond, op. cit. pp. 49–50.

^{Page 419 note 1} Oyovbaire, Sam Egite, ‘Propects for Democracy in Nigeria’, African Studies Association, Denver, November 1987, pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

^{Page 419 note 2} Akpaka, Amuzie, ‘On the Road Again’, in Thisweek (Lagos), 5, 4, 13 07 1987, p. 34.Google Scholar

^{Page 419 note 3} Oyovbaire, ‘Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria’, pp. 15–17.

^{Page 420 note 1} Government's Views and Comments on the Findings and Recommendations of the Political Bureau (Lagos, 1987), pp. 17–19, and Soji Omotunde, ‘Highlights of Whitepaper’, in Thisweek, 13 July 1987, p. 37.Google Scholar

^{Page 420 note 2} Government's Views and Comments, pp. 12–13.

^{Page 420 note 3} Ibid. p. 27.

^{Page 420 note 4} Oyovbaire, ‘Propects for Democracy in Nigeria’, pp. 19 and 24.

^{Page 420 note 5} National Concord (Lagos), 24 09 1987, p. 15.Google ScholarThe Political Bureau which recommended in op. cit. pp. 168–80 the creation of six new states, also proposed the enactment of ‘constitutional provisions barring the creation of new states for at least twenty five (25) years. This period is necessary for the country to settle down politically and tackle other more fundamentals issues of national development which have tended to be swept under the carpet by the issue of state creation’Google Scholar

^{Page 420 note 6} Government's Views and Comments, pp. 57–8 and 78.

^{Page 420 note 7} See, for instance, Ojo, Olatunde and Koehn, Peter, ‘Nigeria's Foreign Exchange Controls: an alternative to IMF conditions and dependency?’, in Africa Today, 33, 4, 1986, pp. 7–32.Google Scholar

^{Page 421 note 1} Government's Views and Comments, pp. 22–3, 30–1, and 46–7.

^{Page 421 note 2} Ibid. p. 30.

^{Page 421 note 3} Ibid. p. 43.

^{Page 421 note 4} Justice Adro served as deputy chairman of the Constituent Assembly formed during the first transition to civilian rule. Gboyega, loc. cit. p. 246.

^{Page 421 note 5} West Africa, 19 October 1987, pp. 2067–8.

^{Page 421 note 6} Report of the Political Bureau, pp. 203–7 and 220–1.

^{Page 421 note 7} Ibid. pp. 44–5.

^{Page 421 note 8} Ibid. p. 216. The A.F.R.C. accepted two important recommendations in this regard: (i)‘To ensure that the functioning of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal is not left to the discretion of political office holders…the establishment and operation of both bodies must be done during the transitional period when the first set of members should be appointed for a team of five years’; and (ii)‘As a show of good example and compliance…all present political office holders, including the military ones, should subject their declaration of assets to close scrutiny by this new Code of Conduct Bureau before they vacate their present offices’. On the implementation of the second recommendation, see West Africa, 8–14 May 1989, p. 744.

^{Page 422 note 1} Source: Government's Views and Comments on the Findings and Recommendations of the Political Bureau, p. 78.

^{Page 423 note 1} Babangida continued in mid-1989, in spite of student-led riots against the S.A.P., to insist that Nigeria possessed ‘no alternative’ to stuctural adjustment. West Africa, 12–18 June 1989, p. 950, and Daily Champion (Lagos), 25 July 1989. For a discussion of possible alternatives, see Koehn, Peter, Public Policy and Administration in Africa: lessons from Nigeria (Boulder, 1989), pp. 134–6.Google Scholar

^{Page 423 note 2} See the following papers that were presented to the National Electoral Commission Workshop, Badagry, 1988: Ojo, Olatunde J. B., ‘The 1987 Local Government Elections: perspectives from Port Harcourt, Owerri, Brass and Ikono’; Tony Edoh, ‘The 1987 Local Government Elections: the northern zonal overview’; Okwudiba Nnoli, ‘The 1987 Local Government Elections in Akwa, Enugu, Ihiala, and Isi-Uzo’; L. O. Dare, ‘The 1987 Local Government Elections: partisan support or political sponsorship in the western zone’; Elone J. Nwabuzor, ‘Perspective of the Electorate on the Electoral Process’; and 'Dokun Jagun, ‘Determinants of Voters' Preferences’.Google Scholar

^{Page 423 note 3} In another change, electors could opt to vote where they resided rather than in their ‘home’ areas. The majority in sampled Rivers State local governments still registered in their area of origin, even though most voters preferred to cast ballots in their place of residence. Ojo, Tunde explains this phenomenon in terms of feelings of ‘belonging to’ and ‘counting for more’ in one's place of origin; op cit. pp. 3, 8–9, and 43. See also Edoh, op. cit. p. 14.Google Scholar

^{Page 423 note 4} Dare, op. cit. pp. 4–12, also maintains that traditional rulers were heavily involved in identifying candidates, and ‘in determining who the local representatives would be’. See also Oyediran, op. cit. pp. 67–8 and 70.

^{Page 423 note 5} Oyovbaire, ‘Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria’, pp. 25–8; Report of the Political Bureau, pp. 217–18; Pita O. Agbese, ‘Politics Without ‘Old’ Politicians: transition to civil rule and the ban on politicians in Nigeria’, African Studies Association, Chicago, October 1988, p. 10; and National Concord, 24 September 1987, p. 14. In 1989, the Government specifically added teachers, including university lecturers, to list of public officers declared ineligible to seek elective office without first resigning from their jobs. West Africa, 19–25 June 1989, p. 1004.

^{Page 424 note 1} Nwabuzor, op. cit. pp. 14 and 27; Nnoli, op. cit. pp. 8–11 and 25; Edoh, op. cit. p. 20; Ojo, op. cit. pp. 12 and 15; Dare, op. cit. pp. 16 and 20–3; and Ibodje, S.W.E., ‘Local Government Election Studies in Akwa Ibom, Imo and Rivers States’, N.E.C. Workshop, Badagry, 1988, pp. 14 and 27.Google Scholar

^{Page 424 note 2} Ojo, op. cit. p. 15; Nwabuzor, op. cit. pp. 18 and 20; Nnoli, op. cit. p. 22; and Dare, op. cit. pp. 12–15.

^{Page 424 note 3} Andrew O. Oronsaye, ‘Future Political Ambitions of Candidates in the December 1987 Local Government Election in Bendel, Ondo, Ogun, Lagos and Kwara States of Nigeria’, N.E.C. Workshop, Badagry, 1988, pp. 3–4 and 15; and Ojo, op. cit. p. 19. These findings lend further support to Joseph Egwurube's argument that the intention and outcome of holding local government election first in case of control over the democratisation process by the centre and attainment of national political objectives, rather than building strong and independent units of government at the grass-roots. See Joseph O. Egwurube, ‘The Functionong of Local Governments During the Political Transition Period in Nigeria: 1987–1989’, National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, April 1989, p. 38, and his ‘Local Government and Demilitarisation in Nigeria: a theoretical exploration’, typescript, Zaria, 1989, p. 7.

^{Page 424 note 4} African Guardian (Lagos), 12 12 1988, p. 7.Google Scholar

^{Page 424 note 5} Ibid. pp. 7 and 44.

^{Page 425 note 1} West Africa, 27 March-2 April 1989, pp. 470–1, and 15–21 May 1989, pp. 783–4.

^{Page 425 note 2} Ibid. 22–8 May 1989, p. 845.

^{Page 425 note 3} Newswatch (Lagos), 31 07 1989, p. 22.Google Scholar

^{Page 425 note 4} West Africa, 15–21 May 1989, p. 784, and 3–9 July 1989, p. 1085, and African Guardian, 24 November 1988. p. 1. In related moves, the military rulers arrested Musa, Balarabe, the former Kaduna Governor, on charge of illegally organising a political party, and compulsorily retired Yusufu Bala Usman from his lecturership at Ahmadu Bello University. West Africa, 3–9 July 1989, p. 1105.Google Scholar

^{Page 426 note 1} Newswatch, 31 July 1989, p. 23.

^{Page 426 note 2} West Africa, 28 August-3 September 1989, p. 1437.

^{Page 426 note 3} Ibid. 29 May-4 June 1989, p. 863; Newswatch, 31 July 1989, p. 23; and Oyediran, op. cit. p. 28. Some charged that one of the best organised petitioning associations, the Nigerian National Congress, possessed ties to the Second Republic's National Party of Nigeria, an allegation denied by the N.N.C. See Daily Champion, 25 July 1989, p. 3. The A.F.R.C. is not likely to recognise a political party that would campaign against its unpopular Structural Adjustment Programme.

^{Page 426 note 4} See Report of the Political Bureau, p. 221.

^{Page 427 note 1} Cf. Akinola, Anthony A., ‘A Critique of Nigeria's Proposed Two-Party System’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, 1, 03 1989, pp. 109–23.CrossRefGoogle ScholarIndeed, President Shehu Shagari was elected twice on a widely distributed national base under the multi-party Second Republic. See Oyovbaire, Federalism in Nigeria, p. 247; Koehn, ‘Prelude to Civilian Rule’, pp. 39 and 42;Google ScholarOjo, Olatunde J. B., ‘The Impact of Personality and Ethnicity on the Nigerian Elections of 1979’, in Africa Today, 28, 1, 1981, pp. 47–58;Google Scholar and Ollawa, P.E., ‘The Nigerian Elections of 1979: a further comment’, in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (London), 19, 3, 11 1981, pp. 300–7.Google Scholar

^{Page 427 note 2} According to Oyovbaire, ‘Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria’, pp. 22–3, the Political Bureau expected that electoral contests would be between ‘a liberal democratic party and a social democratic party’. Oyediran, op. cit. p. 27, points to the urgent need to ‘make elections less of a “war for spoils” and more of a modality of popular expression’.

^{Page 427 note 3} In comments made at the ‘Democracy in Nigeria’ panel held at the 1987 African Studies Association meeting in Denver, Ibrahim Gambari criticised the top-down nature of transition planning, adding that ‘this is one reason why commitment to civilian government among people in Nigeria is so thin’. In contrast, Sam Oyovbaire had asserted in his paper on ‘Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria’, pp. 7–8, that among the core values in contemporary Nigerian society (including nearly all military leaders) are ‘commitment to democracy as an idea or a way of life and to the institution of constitutional structures and political processes’.

^{Page 428 note 1} See Koehn, Peter, ‘The Role of Public Administrators in Public Policy Making: practice and prospects in Nigeria’, in Public Administration and Development (Chichester, Sussex), 3, 1, 1983, pp. 1–26.Google Scholar

^{Page 428 note 2} Report of the Political Bureau, pp. 52 and 67. See also, Agbese, ‘Politics’, p. 24,Google Scholar and Agbese, Pita O., ‘The Demise of Nigeria's Forthcoming 3rd Republic’, Grinell College, Iowa, 11 1988, pp. 22–31.Google Scholar

^{Page 428 note 3} Report of the Political Bureau, pp. 29 and 203–5.

^{Page 429 note 1} Ibid. pp. 205–7. See also Shekwo, Joseph Amali, ‘Social Mobilization and the Transition to Democracy in Nigeria’, African Studies Association, Chicago, 28–31 10 1989, pp. 4–9.Google ScholarThe Political Bureau maintained on p. 203 of its Report that ‘the right political culture in Nigeria…can be achieved through a coherent, through a clearly guided and executed programme of social mobilisation and political education based on the new philosophy of government recommended in this Report’. On the other hand, the Bureau recognised on p. 207 that social and political mobilisation must be ‘a continuous exercise’, and that the Directorate must involve ‘the family, educational institutions, farmers’ cooperative societies, labour unions, professional and voluntary associations, women's organizatons, student's unions, youth clubs, religious organizations and the armed forces.’Its admission that the cultural changes required for a successful planned withdrawal cannot be effectuated in the time allotted raises serious questions about the long-term viability of whatever structural reforms are introduced. We are led back, therefore, to the same problems encountered at the end of the first transition.Google Scholar

^{Page 429 note 2} See Report of the Political Bureau, p. 29, for a lament about the absence of each of these factors during the Second Republic.

^{Page 429 note 3} Indeed, some of the popular associations which, according to Shekwo, op. cit. p. 11, the Directorate for Social Mobilisation intended to utilise as ‘engines of democracy’, particularly student unions, have been suppressed by the A.F.R.C. See Agbese, op. cit. pp. 23–5.

^{Page 429 note 4} National Concord, 24 September 1987, p. 14.

^{Page 430 note 1} Government's Views and Comments, pp. 51–2. Also, Koehn, Peter, ‘Political Developments in Nigeria — a Review Essay’, in Africa Today, 35, 1, 1988, p. 56.Google Scholar

^{Page 430 note 2} See Koehn, Public Policy and Administration in Africa, pp. 269–95.