Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
The failure of the African state, capitalist or socialist, to induce successful economic transformation has led to attempts by neo-liberal institutions and scholars to jettison it out of the business of economic development except in the form of ‘night watchman’.1 The minimalist strategy which is at the heart of such efforts ignores the historical evidence that sustained accumulation and development anywhere has been the product of either a capitalist class, conscious of its interest, pushing the state to foster capitalist development, or a state leading the way where such a conscious class did not exist. Successful capitalist development in either of these scenarios entailed the protection of the common class interest against the narrow schemes of individual members, or the demand and needs of other classes.
1 Morrison, Stephen, ‘Dilemmas of Sustaining Parastatal Success: the Botswana Meat Commission’, in IDS Bulletin (Brighton), 17, 1, 01 1986, pp. 30–8, reveals the fallacies of mono-theories which make broad and ahistorical generalisations about the failure of the African state.Google Scholar
2 For the importance of such a class in the development of capitalist economy, see Moore, Barrington Jr's classic study, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world (Boston, 1966).Google Scholar Recent work on the success of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) point to the critical rôle played by the state in nurturing capitalist development in the absence of a bourgeoisie. See, for example, Amsden, Alice, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and late industrialization (Oxford, 1989),Google Scholar and Wade, Robert, Governing the Market: economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization (Princeton, 1990).Google Scholar
3 Iliffe, John, The Emergence of African Capitalism (London and Basingstoke, 1983), notes that the inability of African states to develop alternative forms of productive economy to capitalism is at the heart of the crisis, but appears not to recognise the failure of the dominant classes as well.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Parson, Q. N., ‘“Khama & Co.” and the Jousse Trouble, 1910–16’, in The Journal of African History (Cambridge), 16, 3, 1975, pp. 383–408, reveals how Khama III saw the need to create an economic base for his chieftainship.Google Scholar
5 The near absence of corruption during the first two decades of independence, and the discipline of the political leadership, is in sharp contrast to more recent years, as noted in the critical articles by Good, Kenneth, ‘Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 30, 1, 03 1992, pp. 69–95,Google Scholar and ‘At the Ends of the Ladder: radical inequalities in Botswana’, in ibid. 31, 2, June 1993, pp. 203–30. See also, Government of Botswana, Report of the Presidential Inquiry into Land Problems in Mogoditshane and Other Peri-Urban Villages (Gaborone, 1991),Google Scholar and Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Operations of the Botswana Housing Corporation (Gaborone, 1992).Google Scholar
6 Other effective institutions include the state-owned utility corporations for power, water, and telecommunications, the Botswana Development Corporation, the Bank of Botswana, and most important of all, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.
7 According to the former executive chairman of the BMC, beef exporters to the EEC/EU must satisfy more stringent standards than member producers are required to meet. Interview, David W. Finlay, Gaborone, November 1994. See Jefferies, Keith, ‘Public Enterprises and Privatization in Botswana’, in Clarke, Thomas (ed.), International Privatization Strategies and Practices (New York, 1994), pp. 380–96.Google Scholar
8 Government of Botswana, The Laws of Botswana (Gaborone), Vol. 10, 1987 revised edn., ch. 74:04.Google Scholar
9 This issue has been partially treated by Isaksen, Jan, Macro-Economic Management and Buraucracy: the case of Botswana (Uppsala, 1981);Google ScholarParson, Jack, Botswana: liberal democracy and the labor reserve in Southern Africa (Boulder and London, 1984);Google Scholar and Molutsi, Patrick P., ‘The Ruling Class and Democracy in Botswana’, in Holm, John D. and Molutsi, (eds.), Democracy in Botswana: the proceedings of a symposium held in Gaborone, 1–5 August 1988 (Athens, OH, 1989), pp. 103–16.Google Scholar
10 A classic example of this was Tshekedi Khama who used missionaries, lawyers, and anticolonial, anti-slavery voices to block the British and South African agenda for the Tswana. See Crowder, Michael, ‘Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 1, 03 1987, pp. 25–42,Google Scholar and The Flogging of Phinehas McIntosh: a tale of colonial folly, Bechuanaland 1933 (New Haven, 1988).Google Scholar
11 According to the Governor of the Bank of Botswana, the Government made excellent use of qualified and knowledgeable expatriates after independence in the absence of a skilled citizen cadre. Interview, Hermans, Quill, Gaborone, 6 July 1994.Google Scholar
12 Molutsi, Patrick P. and Holm, John D., ‘Developing Democracy when Civil Society is Weak: the case of Botswana’, in African Affairs (London), 89, 356, 07 1990, pp. 323–40.Google Scholar
13 See Schapera, Isaac, Tribal Innovators: Twsana chiefs and social change, 1795–1940 (London, 1970);Google ScholarTlou, Thomas, ‘The Nature of Batswana States: towards a theory of Batswana traditional government – the Batawana case’, in Botswana Notes and Records (Gaborone), 6, 1974, pp. 57–75;Google ScholarParsons, Neil, ‘The Economic History of Khama's Country in Botswana, 1844–1930’, in Palmer, Robin and Parsons, (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 113–43;Google Scholar and Peters, Pauline E., ‘Cattlemen, Borehole Syndicates and Privatization in the Kgatleng District of Botswana: an anthropological history of the transformation of a Commons’, Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1983.Google Scholar
14 The ensuing description of the morafe is based on the work of Tlou, loc. cit.
15 Wylie, Diana, A Little God: the twilight of patriarchy in a Southern African Chiefdom (Hanover, NH, and London, 1990), pp. 19 and 25–6.Google Scholar
16 Tlou, loc. cit. pp. 58–9.Google Scholar
17 Ibid. p. 65.
18 Ibid. p. 67.
19 Schapera, Isaac, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom (Oxford, 1939).Google Scholar
20 According to Wylie, op. cit. p. 184, the first real popular vote in a Botswana morafe was that which removed Tshekedi Khama from office in 1949.
21 Parson, Jack, ‘Cattle, Class and the State in Rural Botswana’, in Journal of Southern African Studies (Oxford), 7, 2, 04 1981, pp. 236–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22 Tlou, loc. cit. pp. 70 and 72.
23 Hubbard, Michael E. V., ‘Botswana and the International Beef Trade, c. 1900 to 1981’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, Brighton, 1983,Google Scholar Table A1. See also his Agricultural Exports and Economic Growth: a study of the Botswana beef industry (London, New York, and Sydney, 1986).Google Scholar
24 Hitchcock, R. K., ‘Tradition, Social Justice and Land Reform in Central Botswana’, in Journal of African Law (London), 24, 1, 1980, pp. 1–34,Google Scholar and Solway, Jacqueline S., ‘Commercialization and Social Differentiation in a Kalahari Village, Botswana’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1987.Google Scholar
25 This section draws heavily on Peters, op. cit.
26 Hitchcock, loc. cit. pp. 16–20.Google Scholar
27 See Government of Botswana, The Rural Income Distribution Survey in Botswana, 1974–75, (Gaborone, 1975)Google Scholar and Bank of Botswana, Report on Rural Economic Survey, 1986 (Gaborone, 1987).Google Scholar See also, Colclough, Christopher and McCarthy, Stephen, The Political Economy of Botswana: a study of growth and distribution (Oxford, 1980);Google ScholarCentral Statistical Office, Population Census Data (Gaborone, 1991);Google Scholar and UNDP and Unicef, Planning for People: a strategy for accelerated human development (Gaborone, 1993).Google Scholar
28 Ministry of Agriculture, Annual Agricultural Statistics (Gaborone), 1979 and 1993.Google Scholar According to a British study, the proportion of both the rural and the total population living under the poverty datum line increased significantly between 1974 and 1989: from 51 to 64 per cent and from 45 to 55 per cent, respectively. See Natural Resources Institute, ‘Natural Resources Sector Review, Botswana: a strategy for ODA technical assistance’, Chatham, 1993, p. 27.Google Scholar
29 Quoted in Hubbard, op. cit. p. 122.
30 Ibid. p. 139.
31 Ibid. p. 146.
32 Ibid. pp. 138–9.
33 Ibid. pp. 146–7.
34 Finlay, David, interview, Gaborone, 22 November 1993. Note that these numbers add to more than 52 since some members dabbled in more than one activity. Anyone with less than 40 head of cattle is considered to be a poor or small farmer, according to Solway, op. cit.Google Scholar
35 Landell-Mills, Pierre, interview, Gaborone, 19 October 1993.Google Scholar
36 Parson, op. cit. 1984. It should be noted that the heavy BDP losses in urban areas in 1994 marks the waning of its hegemony as regards the fastest growing population centres in the country.Google Scholar
37 Hubbard, op. cit. 1986, p. 176.
38 In a response to a question raised by one of the Commissioners, the managing director of the BMC office in London explained in a memorandum that farmers’ compensation for the so-called ‘fifth quarter’ is built into the price which they get. O.K. Nielsen, London, memorandum of 15 October 1990.
39 Hubbard, op. cit. 1986, pp. 180–1.
40 Interview with Finlay, loc. cit. 1993. More recent figures are not available.See Hudson, Dereh J., ‘The Taxation of Income from Cattle Farming’, in Harvey, Charles (ed.), Papers on the Economy of Botswana (London, 1981), pp. 66–83.Google Scholar
41 Republic of Botswana, Government Paper No. 1 of 1973 (Gaborone, 1973), and interview with Finlay, loc. cit. 1993.Google ScholarPubMed
42 According to McDonald, Iain's ‘Report on Cattle Marketing in Botswana’, Department of Animal Production, Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone, 1982,Google Scholar the development of produced marketing co-operatives – which then charged 2·5 to 5 per cent of the gross value of the animals — helped ameliorate some problems faced by small producers. As confirmed by Hitchcock's, R. K., ‘Comment’, in Botswana Notes and Records, 19, 1987, p. 173, ‘there is on question that the majority of rural Batswana have access to relatively few livestock’. And it needs to be remembered that if animals have to be driven long distances to market, many of them will lose ‘condition’.Google Scholar
43 Botswana Meat Commission, Annual Report, 1992–93, and ‘Beef Digest’, Lobatse, March 1995, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar
44 Ministry of Agriculture, Annual Agricultural Statistics (Gaborone), 1981–1993.Google Scholar
45 Fidzani, N.H., ‘Understanding Cattle Off-Take Rates in Botswana’, Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1993.Google Scholar
46 Interview: DrDiteko, Tsholofelo, Gaborone, 15 December 1993, and Bimbo, Philipe, Gaborone, 20 December 1993 and 17 August 1994.Google Scholar
47 Interview with MrsMoagi, Eva, who represented small producers in the BMC, Gaborone, 15 December 1993.Google Scholar
48 Picard, Louis A., The Politics of Development in Botswana: a model for success? (Boulder and London, 1987).Google Scholar See also the review of Colclough, Christopher in African Affairs (London), 90, 358, 01 1991, pp. 145–7.Google Scholar
49 These issues are more fully analysed in Abdi Ismail Samatar, The State Versus the Elite: capitalist development in Africa, forthcoming.