^{page 293 note 1} Ward, Michael, ‘Economic Independence for Lesotho?’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 5, 3, 09 1967, pp. 355 and 368.Google Scholar

^{page 293 note 2} For alternative views stressing politics more than economics, see Weisfelder, Richard F., ‘Lesotho: changing patterns of dependence’, in Carter, Gwendolen M. and O'Meara, Patrick (eds.), Southern Africa: the continuing crisis (Bloomington, 1979),Google Scholar and ‘The Basotho Nation-State: what legacy for the future’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 19, 2, 05 1981, pp. 221–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 294 note 1} For a further discussion and references, see Cobbe, J. H., ‘Growth and Change in Lesotho’, in South African Journal of Economics (Braamfontein), 46, 2, 06 1978, pp. 135–53.Google Scholar

^{page 294 note 2} See Palmer, Robin and Parsons, Neil (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Cental and Southern Africa (London, 1977).Google Scholar

^{page 294 note 3} Leistner, G. M. E., Lesotho: economic structure and growth (Pretoria, 1966), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 295 note 1} ‘South Africa's 10 o'clock Trap’, in The Economist (London), 4 09 1982, p. 76.Google Scholar

^{page 295 note 2} Great Britain, Commonwealth Relations Office, Economic Survey Mission to Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. Report (London, 1960).Google Scholar

^{page 296 note 1} Compiled from various offical and unofficial sources, as well as the author's estimates, none of which should be regarded as likely to be completely accurate.

^{page 296 note 2} Ward, loc. cit.

^{page 297 note 1} Growth of G.D.P. is believed to have continued at about a 6 to 8 per cent per annual real rate in 1980 and 1981, but to have fallen to almost zero in 1982.Rakhetla, K. T. J., ‘Budget Speech Presenting the 1983/84 Estimates of Revenue and Expendinture’, Maseru, 1983, p. 2.Google Scholar

^{page 299 note 1} Compiled from a variety of Lesotho, South African, and secondary sources.

^{page 300 note 1} Supposedly in 1975 a target of 50 per cent South African blacks was adopted.‘Manning the Mines’, in Mining Survey, supplement to Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 22 10 1982, pp. 23–4.Google Scholar

^{page 300 note 2} Contracts were very short in 1976, reflecting not only the slow adjustment of expenditure to greatly increased wages, but also the abolition of the Masters and Servants Act, permitting blacks to quit before the end of their signed contracts.

^{page 300 note 3} On the Customs Union, see Cobbe, James, ‘Integration among Unequals: the Southern African Customs Union and development’, in World Development (Oxford), 8, 4, 04 1980, pp. 329–36.Google Scholar

^{page 301 note 1} Kingdom of Lesotho. First Five-Year Development Plan, 1970/71–1974/75 (Maseru, 1970), p.252.Google Scholar

^{page 301 note 2} In 1979–80, the top 10 per cent of crop farmers in the lowlands and foothills of Lesotho produced crops with an average value well under M400. See Cobbe, James, ‘Labour-Related Aspects of Rural Development in Lesotho’, Institute of Labour Studies, Discussion Paper No. 6, Maseru, 1982, p. 10.Google Scholar

^{page 302 note 1} World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 146.Google Scholar

^{page 302 note 2} Kingdom of Lesotho, Second Five-Year Development Plan (Maseru, 1976).Google Scholar

^{page 303 note 1} These are World Bank figures; the Lesotho Minister of Finanace estimates total aid in 1982–3 at M115 million, or about $74 per capita, which suggests an increase of perhaps 20 per cent in real terms since 1979, although the figures may not be comparable. Rakhetla, op. cit. pp. 6–7.

^{page 304 note 1} The Lesotho Government's views on South Africa's actions of this kind are well decumented in the offical Lesotho Weekly (Maseru). Although the December 1982 attack on Maseru (which killed 42 persons, 12 of them Lesotho citizens) is the best-known incident, substantial violence continues; in the last week of March 1983, armed clashes with the Lesotho Police and Paramilitary Force, allegedly involving South African Defence Force personnel, were reported in six differernt places in the country, “An Emeny Strikes Again’, in ibid. 1 April 1983, p. 1. A detailed discussion of Pretoria's policy, its possible motivations, and its implications, from a South African viewpoint, is found in Geldenhuys, Deon, ‘Recrossing the Matola Threshold: the “terrorist factor” in South African's regional relations’, in South Africa International (Pretoria), 13, 3, 01 1983, pp. 152–71. Geldenhuys seems to support the view that economic pressures to achieve political goals –e.g. restricting migration from Lesotho – should be used more actively by the South African Government. Pertoria is also refusing to renegotiate the Customs Union revenue formula, apparently also to put pressure on Lesotho (among others).Google Scholar

^{page 305 note 1} See Rakhetla, T. J., ‘Budget Speech Presenting the 1982/83 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure’, Maseru, 04 1982.Google Scholar Interest charges alone have increased from less than 1 per cent of government revenue in 1979–80 to 8 per cent in 1982–3, and a projected 12 per cent in 1983–4; Rakhetla, 1983 Budget Speech, op.cit p. 8.

^{page 306 note 1} See Wellings, Paul A. and Crush, Jonathan S., ‘Research into Tourism in southern Africa, with Particular Reference to Lesotho’, Institute of Southern African Studies, Roma, 1981.Google Scholar

^{page 306 note 2} This tendency, which would exist anyway because of more developed infrastructure and easier availability of inputs and services elsewhere, is exacerbated by the very generous investemnt promotion package for the Homelands in South Africa, introduced after the so-called Good Hope Conference of April 1982, and South African's establishment of the Development Bank for Southern Africa (to begin operating in September 1983).

^{page 307 note 1} For a discussion of these ‘exposure’ effects, first explicitly proposed by Sandra Wallman, see Cobbe, James, ‘Emigration and Development in Southern Africa, with Special Reference to Lesotho’, in International Migration Review (New York), 16, 4, Winter 1982, pp. 837–68;Google Scholar also Wallman, Sandra (ed.), Perceptions of Development (Cambridge, 1977).Google Scholar

^{page 307 note 2} Broadcast by the Commissioner of Sales Tax on Radio Lesotho in early 1983, reported in a personal communication from David Ambrose, 3 April 1983.

^{page 307 note 3} Rakhetla, 1983 Budget Speech, op. cit. p. 7.

^{page 308 note 1} A fuller discussion, with illustraive numbers, is found in Cobbe, ‘Labour-Related Aspects of Rural Development in Lesotho’ pp. 16–17. The 1983–4 budget allocates over M9.5 million of capital funds for this Food Self-Sufficiency Programme, although plans call for planting only 40,000 acres, and if the drought continues, none may be planted. Rakhetla, 1983 Budget Speech, p. 10. Lesotho's exchange of Ambassador with the poeples Republic of China, resulting in the withdrawal of Taiwna's Embassy and technical assistance in May 1983, may lead to a de-emphasis of this programme, which was supported strongly by Taiwan.

^{page 310 note 1} The constraints placed on the Government's policy by domestic, as well as by the international situation, should not be underestimated. The Prime Minister has been promising elections for some time; migrants are generally believed to be mostly opposed to the Government, whereas the urban élites and the beneficiaries of the T.O.U. very probably include more supporters. However, no date has been set for elections and Chief Leabua Jonathan has said that these ‘should be held in an atmosphere free of violence and bloodshed’, which may indicate that they can hardly be expected soon. ‘Boold of Basotho more Precious than Elections — P.M.’, in Lesotho Weekly, 7, 1, 1 04 1983, p. 1.Google Scholar