Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2020
Existing literature argues that the tactics of Cameroon foreign policy have been conservative, weak and timid. This study refutes that perspective. Based on extensive and previously unused primary sources obtained from Cameroon's Ministry of External Relations and from the nation's archives in Buea and Yaoundé, this study argues that Cameroon's foreign policy was neither timid nor makeshift. Its strategy was one of pragmatism. By examining the nation's policy toward Nigeria in the reunification of Cameroon, the Nigerian civil war, the Bakassi Peninsula crisis and Boko Haram, the study maintains that, while the nation's policy was cautious, its leaders focused on the objectives and as a result scored major victories. The study concludes by suggesting that President Paul Biya invokes the same skills he used in foreign policy to address the ongoing Anglophone problem, a problem that threatens to unravel much of what the country has accomplished.
I extend my gratitude to Dr Paul Benson, Provost of the University of Dayton, and Dr Jason Pierce, Dean of College of Arts and Sciences, at the same university, for their financial support of my research in Cameroon. My thanks also go to the anonymous reviewers of JMAS for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript.