^{page 575 note 1} Widstrand, Carl Gösta (ed.), African Boundary Problems (Uppsala, 1969);Google ScholarTouval, Saadia, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Mass. 1972);CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Person, Y., ‘L'Afrique noire et ses frontières’, in Revue française d'études politiques africaines (Paris), 80, 1972, pp. 18–43.Google Scholar

^{page 576 note 1} Unless otherwise stated, information on Tolimo is derived from interviews with the movement's leaders, conducted in Lomé and Palimé during August 1979, and from various activists and sympathisers who were interviewed in the Volta Region between August 1971 and August 1973. Where information was given in confidence, names have not been stated. Also, care has been taken to mention only those Tolimo activists known as such to the Ghanaian Government.

^{page 576 note 2} See Coleman, J. S., ‘Togoland’, in International Conciliation (New York), 509, 09 1956;Google ScholarAligwekwe, I., ‘The Ewe and Togoland Problem’, Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State University, 1960;Google ScholarWelch, Claude E., Dream of Unity: pan-Africanism and political unification in West Africa (New York, 1966),Google Scholar chs. 2 and 3; Amenumey, D. E. K., ‘The Pre-1947 Background to the Ewe Unification Question: a preliminary sketch’, in Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana (Legon), 10, 1969, pp. 65–85,Google Scholar and ‘A Political History of the Ewe Unification Problem’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 576 note 3} In the context of the politics of unification, the term ‘Ewe’ includes various sub-groups. notably the Ouatchi and Mina, which had been excluded from this ethnic category in French Togo censuses. The ‘Ewe cluster’ constitute about 44 per cent of the Togo population and about 13 per cent of the Ghanaian population. The 1970 censuses in both countries give Ewe population figures of over ri million on each side of the border. The problems of defining and estimating the number of Ewes are discussed in Hodder, B. W., ‘The Ewe Problem: a reassessment’, in Fisher, C. A. (ed.), Essays in Political Geography (London, 1968), pp. 271–85.Google Scholar

^{page 577 note 1} The 1890 line, separating British Togoland and the Gold Coast, became a national boundary only, since Southern Togoland (the Ewe-dominated area) became part of the Eastern Province of the Gold Coast.

^{page 578 note 1} This article deals only with the Ewes. It should be noted, however, that various other peoples were divided by the Anglo-French boundary; for example, the Konkomba and the Buem-Akposso groups. The Buem, in particular, have been active in protesting about the border because of their cocoa-producing interests in retaining trade links with Palimé, and they played a significant rôle in the Togoland Congress. Several Buem chiefs and elders have been involved in Tolimo, and Kofi Odame, from Boroda, was an active leader during 1972–3.

^{page 578 note 2} Restrictions on trade and travel began soon after the demarcation of the border, but were not effective until much later. The impact of restrictions is discussed in J. T. Furley, ‘Report of an Enquiry on Togoland, 1918’, Ghana National Archives, Accra, ADM/11/1621; see also Prothero, G. W., Togoland (Historical Section of the Foreign Office, London, 1920)Google Scholar The effect of German rule in Togo is discussed in Amenumey, D. E. K., ‘The Ewe People and the Coming of European Rule’, M.A. thesis, University of London, 1964;Google ScholarKnoll, A., ‘Togo Under German Administration, 1884–1910’, Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1964;Google Scholar and Buhler, P., ‘The Volta Region of Ghana: economic change in Togoland, 1850–1914’, Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1975.Google Scholar

^{page 578 note 3} The 1940 closure is discussed in Welch, op. cit. pp. 64–5; Amenumey, , ‘The Pre-1947 Background’, pp. 76–7;Google Scholar and Brown, D., ‘Politics in the Kpandu Area of Ghana: a study of the influence of central government and national politics upon local factional competition’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1977, pp. 242–3.Google Scholar The border disputes of the 1960s are outlined in Saffu, E. O., ‘Nkrumah and the Togoland Question’, in The Economic Bulletin of Ghana (Accra), XII, 2/3, 1968, pp. 37–48.Google Scholar

^{page 579 note 1} Cf. Decalo, Samuel, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: studies in military style (New Haven and London, 1976), pp. 87–91;Google ScholarAustin, Dennis, Ghana Observed: essays on the politics of a West African republic (Manchester, 1976), p. 125;Google Scholar and Welch, op. cit. p. 42.

^{page 579 note 2} See Brown, D., ‘Anglo-German Rivalry and Krepi Politics, 1886–1894’, in Transactions of the Historical Socity of Ghana, 15, ii, 1974;Google Scholar and Report of Anglo-German Boundary Commissioners, 1892, P.R.O./CO/879/37, section 434, no. 8.

^{page 579 note 3} Amenumey, , ‘The Pre-1974 Background’, pp. 70–1,Google Scholar and Welch, op. cit. p. 57.

^{page 580 note l} See Saffu, loc. cit.

^{page 581 note 1} See Brown, , ‘Politics in Kpandu’, p. 242;Google ScholarDecalo, Samuel, Historical Dictionary of Togo (Metuchen, N.J. 1976), P. 39;Google Scholar and Welch, op. cit. pp. 58–9.

^{page 581 note 2} Decalo, , Historical Dictionary, pp. 48–50,Google Scholar and Coleman, op. cit. pp. 27–37.

^{page 581 note 3} Local community issues dominated both the 1951 indirect National Assembly elections and the 1952 Local Council elections in Ghana. It was not until the 1954 and 1956 general elections, the 1956 U.N. plebiscite, and the 1958 local elections that party alignments on the border issue were dominant. Although universal adult suffrage was introduced in Togo in 1956, the election that year was ‘rigged’ by the French, and the first free voting took place during the U.N.-supervised election of April 1958.

^{page 582 note 1} The figures for the 1956 British Togoland plebiscite and the 1958 French Togo election are remarkably similar; the estimated percentage of the total adult population voting was 54·2 and 55·2 per cent, respectively. The participation rates in the Ewe areas were statistically significant:58·5 per cent in British Togoland, compared to 52·2 per cent in the non-Ewe north; and 58·9 per cent in Togo, compared to 51·4 per cent in the north. The highest rates of all were in the cocoa growing/trading areas, where concern over the border issue was greatest: 71·3 per Cent in the Kpandu-Hohoe part of British Togoland, and 88·9 per cent in the Klouto cercle of Togo.

^{page 582 note 2} Both Coleman, op. cit. and Welch, op. cit. have noted that the voting in British Togoland in 1956 was predominantly in community blocs, with Coleman suggesting that the populace was primarily interested in local matters. My own conclusion in ‘Politics in Kpandu’, pp. 227–9, and ch. 12, based on a detailed study of the area, was that a high degree of political consciousness had developed concerning the ‘wider’ border issues, precisely because the parties managed to establish their relevance to local community problems.

^{page 583 note 1} Saffu, loc. cit. pp. 41–2, and Welch, op. cit. pp. 134–7.

^{page 583 note 2} Decalo, , Coups and Army Rule in Africa, pp. 95–9.Google Scholar

^{page 584 note 1} National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland, ‘A Petition to the Secretary-General, O.A.U.: Togoland Unification’, dated 10 11 1972.Google Scholar

^{page 584 note 2} At constant 1970 market prices; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa (Addis Alaba, 1973), pt. 1, P. 22.Google Scholar

^{page 584 note 3} Boateng, E. O., Inflation in Ghana: problems and prospects (Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana, Legon, 1978), pp. 5–10.Google Scholar

^{page 585 note 1} Ewusi, K., Rural Urban and Regional Migration in Ghana (I.S.S.E.R., University of Ghana, Legon, 1977), pp. 15–16 and 3,Google Scholar also Table 7.

^{page 585 note 2} At constant 1970 marked prices, U.N. E.C.A., Survey (Addis Ababa, 1973), pt. I, p. 22.Google Scholar

^{page 585 note 3} Given that the Ewe communities are probably the poorest in Ghana apart from the Northern and Upper Regions, while the Ewe parts of Togo are the wealthiest, it is likely that living standards have in fact been higher in the Togo Ewe areas. This is certainly the impression gained from an examination of the standard of public amenities and the availability of goods in the small towns of the two parts of Eweland.

^{page 586 note 1} In 1979, for example, when the producer price of cocoa in Ghana was ¢120 per load, a smuggler could get 6,000 C.F.A. francs in Togo, which could be exchanged for ¢300 on the black market.

^{page 587 note 1} Columns (a) and (b) are from Kumar, A., ‘Smuggling in Ghana: its magnitude and economic effects’, in Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies (Ibadan), 15, 2, 07 1973, pp. 285–303.Google Scholar Figures in column (c) are those for Volta Region exports provided by S. Wakeling, Cocoa Department, Cadbury Schweppes, Birmingham. The cocoa-growing areas of the Volta Region all lie within ex-British Togoland, and it is assumed that no significant amounts of cocoa are smuggled into Togo from other Regions.

^{page 587 note 2} Decalo, , Historical Dictionary of Togo, p. 150.Google Scholar

^{page 587 note 3} After a brief closure in 1969, the border was re-opened, but a further closure was threatened in early 1970. Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents, 1969–70 (London, 1970), p. B609;Google Scholar and West Africa (London), 18 04 1970, p. 442.Google Scholar

^{page 588 note 1} Border campaigns of varying intensity and effectiveness have been staged by Ghana Governments almost every year between 1971 and 1979, especially during the period June to September, the main cocoa-trading season.

^{page 588 note 2} Ghana agreed to supply electricity to Togo and Dahomey in 1969, but supplies did not actually commence until December 1972. Initially, Togo was purchasing just over one-third of its electricity from Ghana.

^{page 588 note 3} N.L.M.W.T. ‘Petition, 1972’; see also Jeune Afrique (Paris), 659, 25, 08 1973, pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

^{page 588 note 4} Including A. K. Odame's visit to the O.A.U. Conference in Ethiopia in 1973, and at least two journeys during 1975 and 1976 by I. B. Bawa and others to the U.N. headquarters in New York.

^{page 589 note 1} At least four Tolimo leaders are paid teachers' salaries, while several others receive annual allowances/pensions of about 15,000 C.F.A. francs. Interviews, August 1979.

^{page 589 note 2} As a result of plans to export Libyan oil for refining in Togo the two Heads of State met in But most Libyan aid for Tolimo seems to have come after the 1976 visit by activists of the movement to Tripoli. Sékou Touré's sympathy for the movement was apparent when he (together with Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Léopold Sédar Senghor) met its leaders in Toga in 1975; his most overt statement of support was made in June 1978. Houphouët-Boigny may have given some assistance, but the only ‘evidence’ for this seems to be his relationship by marriage with the Olympia family.

^{page 589 note 3} The production of various propaganda leaflets in January 1973, and the distribution of funds to several of the chiefs who attended the Palimé rally of March 1973 – planned with the active help of Assila and Voulé – suggest that Tolimo began receiving financial support from the Togo Government from about December 1972 onwards. Interviews in Lomé, August 1979.

^{page 589 note 4} Initially, Tolimo had no formal organisational structure, and Dumoga's influence was dominant. But in November 1974 an executive committee was formed with Awuma as the leader, Dumoga as the general secretary, and Simpson as an assistant secretary.

^{page 590 note 1} Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents, 1974–75 (London, 1975), pp. B643–4 and B774–5;Google Scholar and Jeune Afrique, 689, 23 March 1974, p. 24.

^{page 590 note 2} Several Tolimo activists had been arrested on their return to Ghana after a meeting in Palimé in November 1974. A further rally was held at Ahamansu the next month, and a delegation went to Lomé to hand a resolution to the Ghanaian Ambassador there, calling upon the two Heads of State to resume discussions on the border issue (last held in September 1973 in Ho), and threatening to take hostages if the Tolimo members were not released within one month. The Ghanaian Times (Accra), 24 02 1975;Google Scholar and Africa Research Bulletin: political, social, and cultural (Exeter), 1975, p. 2525.Google Scholar

^{page 590 note 3} It looked as if Eyadema and Acheampong might make a good start to their relationship in 1972, because of Togolese opposition to Busia's anti-alien policy, and the camaraderie that existed between the two military régimes. Although the activities of Tolimo and the Ghanaian anti-smuggling campaigns led to strained relations, there was some improvement after the September 1973 meeting in Ho. Tensions were, however, revived by what appear to have been unfounded rumours in November that Komla Gbedemah had been involved with the Togolese Chief of Defence Staff in an Ewe secession plot. Jeune Afrique, 26 August 1973, p. 19; and West Africa, 19 November 1973, p. 1623.

^{page 590 note 4} The Border Demarcation Commission decision was announced on 14 July 1975. The amnesty for ‘self-exiled persons’, and for Tolimo members within Ghana, was promulgated on 7 August 1975 to last for three months. It was later extended to January 1976, but was almost totally ignored, basically because it was not believed.

^{page 590 note 5} Assila and Voulé initiated the moves for a change in the leadership of Tolimo at a rally of the movement in Palimé. Of the pre-1975 leaders only Kofi Odame had been non-Ewe, and all had been ex-Togoland Congress, now in their 60s or 70s. Of the four key leaders of the new committee, all were under 50 years of age, and none had links with the Togoland Congress (Bawa was, in fact, an ex-C.P.P. District Commissioner). Two were Ewe, including Denyo who had been born, brought up, and employed at Kadjebi, in Buem. Various attempts have been made, by both factions, to resolve the cleavage which has developed, but as of September 1979, none of these had been successful, and an atmosphere of mutual suspicion still prevailed.

^{page 591 note 1} The coup was supposed to be planned for November 1975, and its discovery was announced the following month. The trial of those allegedly involved took place during May and June 1976. West Africa, 31 May to 9 August 1976.

^{page 591 note 2} Prior to this, the Ghanaian Government had repeatedly denounced Tolimo, but had sought to avoid creating ‘martyrs’; thus it had decided not to prosecute those arrested in March 1973, and had introduced the amnesty in 1975. The new approach was signalled when the S.M.C. banned the movement in March 1976, and announced the death penalty on 15 September. The massive campaign associated with ‘Operation Counterpoint’ did not result in the arrest of any Tolimo leaders, but caused several sympathisers to flee to Togo and become more closely involved in the movement, so that the net effect was probably to strengthen, rather than weaken, the organisation. The campaign involved the use of land-rovers and helicopters to distribute pro-government leaflets, and the holding of numerous rallies to ‘educate’ the people. A ‘Ghana Association of Rationalists’ was also established by ‘loyal’ Ewes to supplement these activities. The other aspect of the campaign was the increase in the activities of the border guards, and the arrest of smugglers as well as secessionists.

^{page 591 note 3} The Times (London), 13 01 1976, p. 13.Google Scholar

^{page 592 note 1} ‘Sur invitation du président ghanéen, le colonel Acheampong, [Eyadema] s'est rendu à Ho, ville de la partie ewe rattachée au Ghana. Toute la population de la région a clamé son désir de retour au Togo.’ Jeune Afrique, 21 January 1977, Supplement, p. 5. See also ibid. 9 September 1977, p. 26.

^{page 592 note 2} The Ghana Government denied all allegations, including Bawa's claim, which had in fact been openly admitted by some members of the Government, that ‘Operation Counterpoint’ was aimed at the secessionists rather than at smugglers. Africa Diary (New Delhi), 1976, p. 8245.Google Scholar

^{page 592 note 3} Three Tolimo leaders visited the headquarters of the United Nations, and placed an advertisement in the New York Times. See Africa Contemporary Record, 1976–77, p. B583.

^{page 592 note 4} Bawa states that the Togo Government was not initially informed of Tolimo's plans for an ‘armed struggle’. Interview, Lomé, August 1979.

^{page 592 note 5} Interviews with Bawa and Dumoga, August 1979. Also Africa Contemporary Record, 1977–78, pp. B650 and B792–3; Africa Research Bulletin, 1977, p. 4555; Africa Diary, 1977. pp. 8732 and 8748; and Africa (London), 76, 12 1977, pp. 88–9.Google Scholar The Ghanaian statements accused a ‘North African country’ of giving military training and ‘a considerable amount of money’ to the secessionist movement. General Akuffo, the Army Chief of Staff, also stated that some arrested secessionalists had been given ‘large sums of money by some non-African countries’.

^{page 593 note 1} Africa Research Bulletin, 1977, p. 4555; and Jeune Afrique, 14 October 1977, p. 68.

^{page 593 note 2} Jeune Afrique, 25 November 1977, p. 56.

^{page 593 note 3} Africa Research Bulletin, 1977, p. 4612.

^{page 593 note 4} Interview with Bawa, August 1979.

^{page 593 note 5} Interviews with Tolimo activists. The last two Palimé rallies were held in 1977. in November the Border Demarcation Commission met again and ‘called for a better atmosphere between the two countries’. Africa Contemporary Record, 1977–78, p. B793.

^{page 593 note 6} Sékou Touré visited both Ghana and Togo in June 1978. He openly supported the latter's claim, and there were rumours that he had persuaded Acheampong to meet Eyadema to discuss some form of ‘union’ between the two countries.

^{page 594 note 1} See, for example, the outline of Tolimo's case by Bawa, I. B., Togoland Must Reunite (Lomé, 1978)Google Scholar, a well-printed booklet, produced for free distribution in both English and French, and modelled on the earlier ‘Livre blanc sur la réunification du Togo’, reproduced in Revue français d'études politsques africaines, 121, 01 1976, pp. 21–57.Google Scholar See also the petition by Denyo, C. K. to the Ghana Constituent Assembly, ‘Ghana's New Constitution and Western Togoland’, 12 02 1979.Google Scholar

^{page 595 note 1} Dowse, Robert, ‘Military and Police Rule’, in Austin, Dennis and Luckham, Robin (eds.), Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966–1972 (London, 1975), p. 25.Google Scholar Dumoga was a member of the N.L.C.'s Political Committee, and submitted a memorandum on the unification issue that he claims to have previously discussed with Eyadema. Interview, Palimé, August 1979. Several ex-Togoland Congress activists were appointed in the Volta Region to the local management committees which replaced the C.P.P. councils.

^{page 595 note 2} In the 1969 elections, Dumoga had been the organiser for the Progress Party for the Volta Region, and Antor was the (defeated) P.P. candidate for the East Dayi constituency. Both Antor and Dumoga were appointed as Ambassadors in July 1970, but according to Dumoga, it was he who had originally been chosen for the Togo job. He was edged out of this, however, allegedly because of Antor's friendship with the then Regional Commissioner, A. S. Kpodonu. Antor was probably preferred because he was known to be more ‘moderate’ on the unification issue.

^{page 595 note 3} Busia's Government was alleged to be ‘anti-Ewe’ in its treatment of the civil service (notably the ‘Apollo 568’ sackings of February 1970), the army officers (notably its action against Lt.-Col. Kattah), and the police. In terms of economic policy, there is some evidence that the Volta Region fared badly in the allocation of resources. See Kwaku, K., ‘The Political Economy of Peripheral Development: a case study of the Volta Region (Ghana) since 1920’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975, pp. 234–44.Google Scholar

^{page 596 note 1} Dumoga had, in fact, been dismissed from his post for alleged financial wrongdoing, just prior to the coup, and fled to Palimé, where his family had land. Antor also stayed in Togo after the coup, and has since concentrated on his own business activities in Lomé.

^{page 596 note 2} For this reason alone, it makes little sense to argue that the Ewe vote in 1969 was ‘pro-secession, anti-Ghana’, as claimed by Tolimo in several of its documents.

^{page 597 note 1} These quotations are representative of views widely expressed by Ewes sympathetic to Togoland unification, in interviews conducted both in 1973 and 1979. See also Kwaku, op. cit. p. 304.

^{page 597 note 2} It is indeed the case that all communal identities are subjective phenomena and intrinsically fluid; but it is the particular influence of the territorial boundaries across Eweland which makes the identity problem of the Ewes so politically salient. See Young, Crawford, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison, 1976), pp. 34–49Google Scholar and ch. 4.

^{page 598 note 1} West Africa, 11 January 1969, p. 43.

^{page 598 note 2} The three chiefs, all from the Palimé area, were Togbe Esally of Yoh (the senior chiefdom), Togbe Afeto of Palimé, and Togbe Pebi of Agu-Nyodbo. Palimé is the commercial centre for the cocoa and coffee trade, and its key rôle in the history of the Ewe unification movement is directly related to its strong trade links with British Togoland.

^{page 599 note 1} Several participants have been interviewed, and estimates of attendance vary from over 100 to under 1,000! Several Togolese chiefs were present, as well as activists from the V.Y.A. and the ex-Togoland Congress, but the majority were British Togoland chiefs and elders.

^{page 599 note 2} The March 1973 meeting in Palimé was attended by a Ghana Government ‘informer’, acting as an adviser to one of the British Togoland chiefs. As a result, at least 15 of the participants were arrested as they returned to Ghana; several others were warned of the danger and remained in Togo. In November 1974 also, arrests were made of those returning from another Palimé meeting, although several escaped, including Bawa and Simpson. See West Africa, 5 and 12 April 1976, for details of those further arrested that month.

^{page 601 note 1} The Ewes had formed the largest single ethnic grouping in the National Liberation Council in 1966, i.e. three out of the eight members, in Busia's 1969 Government, however, not a single senior or even junior Minister was an Ewe. In Acheampong's National Redemption Council, two out of the 13 (later 16) members were Ewes, and when the Supreme Military Council was formed in 1975 one out of the seven members was an Ewe.

^{page 601 note 2} This trend is examined, in relation to the Kpandu area of ex-British Togoland, in Brown, D., ‘Political Participation: factors influencing behaviour and consciousness in a locality of rural Ghana, 1948 to 1973’, Annual Conference of the Political Science Association, University of Warwick, 03 1978.Google Scholar

^{page 602 note 1} Kadjebi is a small town in the Buem cocoa-growing area north of Eweland. It contains a cosmopolitan population, attracted there by the farming and trading opportunities, with a large pool of underemployed Sons of the immigrants. Most of the 8–12 young educated Ewes who began the V.Y.A. were discontented either with their jobs or lack of work, and they blamed this on discrimination against the Ewes and the Volta Region.

^{page 602 note 2} Denyo states that many of his fellow police and border guards were antagonistic to the Ewes, and used their jobs as a pretext for discrimination against those living in British Togoland. He was apparently approached by one of the Kadjebi chiefs concerning the problems facing the area, and went to discuss these with Antor, then the Ghana Ambassador in Lomé. It was his lack of help that led Denyo to initiate the Volta Youth Association.

^{page 602 note 3} It is clear that the idea of linking demands for a better deal for the area with questions about the status of the British Togoland–Gold Coast relationship came, directly or indirectly, from the Togoland Congress. The V.Y.A. did not have any initial interest in questioning the status of the Ghana–Togo border.

^{page 602 note 4} The letters from the V.Y.A. leaders asked for the legal documents relating to the rule of British Togoland by Ghana, and during 1972 they were sent copies of the pre-1957 U.K. Orders in Council.

^{page 602 note 5} The V.Y.A. leaders met the Standing Committee of the House of Chiefs in January 1973, as well as chiefs and elders in the Kpandu, Ho, Hohoe, Kadjebi, and Jasikan areas. An application was made to the District Office to hold a rally in Kpandu in March 1973.

^{page 603 note 1} The V.Y.A.'s initial position is most clearly outlined in an unsigned leaflet headed ‘Volta Youth Association’, circulated in the Kpandu area during February 1973: ‘This is not politics or subversion… we are only fighting for our birth, civic and legal rights as true citizens of our fatherland’. The nature of their initial grievances and demands were well understood by the government administrators in the area, who obtained copies of most of the various pamphlets circulated. Interview with C. E. Seneya, Kpandu District Office, 7 March 1973.

^{page 603 note 2} Copies of two such letters, dated 2 February 1973, allegedly from the people of Juaben to the Asantehene, were handed to me by a V.Y.A. activist in March 1973; although ambiguous as to what form of authority should be given to the Ewe/British Togoland area, there is no mention of Togoland unification.

^{page 603 note 3} The Volta Regional Development Association (Vorda) formed at Ho in 1972 subsequently split the following year when a prominent businessman, V. W. K. Agbodza of Kpandu, formed a rival Volta Youth Association (Voya). Both bodies had the backing of the Government, and Agbodza is alleged to have visited Eyadema in Palimé in mid-1973 to ask for funds. Voya was active in stating its opposition to secession, and was widely mistaken for the V.Y.A., which was assumed to have ‘reformed’. In mid-1974 Voya and Vorda came together again in a Volta Regional Development and Youth Association (Vordya). This soon lapsed, and re-emerged in mid-1976 as the ‘Ghana Association of Rationalists’, led by Agbodza and G. K. Agama. Interviews, Lomé, August 1979; see also Kwaku, op. cit. pp. 284–92.

^{page 605 note 1} Hodder, B. W., Africa Today (London, 1978), pp. 32–5.Google Scholar

^{page 605 note 2} See, for example, Leys, Colin, ‘Political Implications of the Development of Peasant Society in Kenya’, in Gutkind, Peter C. W. and Waterman, Peter (eds.), African Social Studies: a radical reader (London, 1977), p. 353.Google Scholar The point is made with reference to the Ewes by Kwaku, op. cit. pp. 303–4. See Marx, Karl, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in Selected Works (London, 1968), p. 172.Google Scholar

^{page 606 note 1} Rathbone, Richard, ‘Ghana’, inDunn, John (ed.) West African States — Failure and Promise: a study in comparative politics (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 32–3.Google Scholar

^{page 606 note 2} Brown, D., ‘The Political Response to Immiseration: a case study of rural Ghana’, in Genève-Afrique (Geneva), XVIII, I, 1980, p. 57.Google Scholar