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Tanzania's Fertiliser Factory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Andrew C. Coulson
Andrew C. Coulson
Affiliation:
Recently Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Dar es Salaam, and now at the Project Planning Centre for Developing Countries, University of Bradford1
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Extract

An underdeveloped country wishing to establish a fertiliser industry ought surely to begin by examining the locally available raw materials. In Tanzania, for example, a report in 1961 drew attention to an anhydrite deposit at Kilwa which could have been used to produce cement, gypsum, and sulphuric acid.2 The latter if combined with ammonia from the oil refinery would have given ammonium sulphate, the fertiliser most commonly used in Tanzania. The report also noted three deposits from which phosphatic fertiliser could have been made. However, the development of these local resources was rejected on the ground that for plants of an efficient size the local market would not be able to absorb all the fertilisers.

Type
Africana
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 119 - 125
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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References

Page 119 note 2 Arthur D. Little, Inc., Tanganyika Industrial Development (Boston and Dar es Salaam, 1961).Google Scholar

Page 120 note 1 Kloeckner has replied to this criticism that the technological choices were explicit in the equipment list which was part of the contract. But the fact remains that no one in Tanzania queried this list, so that in practice the decision on what technology to use waspassedto the company.

Page 121 note 1 This point was made as early as 1968 by Dobrska, Z., ‘Criteria for Public Investment in Manufacturing: five Tanzanian case studies’, Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, Paper 68.25, pp. 53–65.Google Scholar

Page 121 note 2 Svendsen, Knud Erik, ‘Decision-Making in the National Development Corporation’, in Cliffe, Lionel and Saul, John S. (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania: an interdisciplinary reader, Vol II, Policies (Nairobi, 1973), p. 95.Google Scholar In November 1968 a separate contract for operating and managing the factory was signed between the N.D.C. and a subsidiary of the main German firm, namely Kloeckner-Humbold-Deutz-Chemie-Anlagenbau GmbH. A lump sum of D.M. 225,000 was paid before the factory started, and thereafter annually 4 per cent of the profits after depreciation but before tax was deducted, up to a maximum of D.M. 600,000. But even if the factory lost money, the Kloeckner expatriates would get their salaries and allowances, and the subsidiary firm would get D.M. 300,000.

Page 122 note 1 The failure to install a supplementary boiler to provide steam was one of several technical weaknesses at the plant identified by the National Industrial Development Corporation consultants from India early in 1975. It was made even more necessary by the fact that only 1,400 tons of sulphuric acid could be stored, so that if the plant for phosphoric acid stopped, then the production of sulphuric acid also had to halt once its tanks were filled.

Page 122 note 2 The original site became a naval base which could have been placed elsewhere. Retrospectively, it is clear that the N.D.C. should have cancelled the whole project if they had really tried hard and failed to get the Cabinet to agree to the harbour location. It is obvious that, at least initially, there could only be one petro-chemical complex in Tanzania, and that logically the fertiliser factory should have been built next to the already constructed refinery in Dar es Salaam.

Page 123 note 1 In 1974 the c.i.f. prices at Tanga in U.S. $ per metric ton were as follows: rock phosphate, 86; sulphur, 100; sulphate of potash, 197; and liquid ammonia, 450. The feasibility study of 1968 had been based on the figures of 19, 27, 57, and 50 U.S. $, respectively.

Page 124 note 1 Source: Tanzania Fertiliser Company records and statements.

Page 125 note 1 The Daily News (Dar es Salaam), 12 01 1975.Google Scholar