^{page 560 note 1} Marx, Karl, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte’, in Selected Works (London, 1968 edn.), p. 105.Google Scholar

^{page 560 note 2} Trimberger, E. K., Revolution from Above (New Brunswick, 1978), p. 7.Google Scholar

^{page 560 note 3} Alavi, Hamza, ‘The Over-Developed Post-Colonial State’, in New Left Review (London), 79, 1972.Google Scholar

^{page 561 note 1} Alavi, Hamza, ‘State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism’, in Alavi, and Shanin, T., Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies (London, 1982), p. 289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 561 note 2} Bernstein, Henry, ‘State and Peasantry in Tanzania’, in Review of African Political Economy (London), 21, 1981.Google Scholar

^{page 561 note 3} Alavi, ‘State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism’.

^{page 561 note 4} Saul, John S., ‘The State in Postcolonial Societies: Tanzania’, in The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York and London), 1979).Google Scholar

^{page 561 note 5} Leys, Colin, ‘The Overdeveloped Post-Colonial State–a Re-evaluation’, in Review of African Political Economy, 5, 1976.Google Scholar

^{page 562 note 1} Beckman, Björn, ‘Imperialism and the National Bourgeoisie’, in Review of African Political Economy, 22, 1981.Google Scholar

^{page 562 note 2} Marx to Annenkov, 1846; Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, Letters on Capital (London, 1983 edn.), pp. 6–16.Google Scholar

^{page 563 note 1} Saul, John S., ‘The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote, and General Amin’ (1976), p. 351, in The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa.Google Scholar

^{page 563 note 2} John S. Saul, ‘The Dialectic of Class and Tribe’, in Ibid.

^{page 564 note 1} Where the mass of the population (80 per cent in Kenya) are engaged in small-holder production, and where the industrial sector remains small (13·6 per cent of G.D.P. in 1980), the possibilities for advanced class consciousness–e.g. worker-peasant alliances–are limited. This is compounded in Kenya by two facts: (1) many ‘allotment-holding proletarians’ remain wedded to a petty-bourgeois consciousness, evidenced in ‘Land-hunger’ – cf. Lenin, V. I., ‘The Development of Capitalism in Russia’, in Collected Works, Vol. 3 (London, 1960 edn.); and (2) the defeat of the Mau Mau rebellion, and its limitation to Kikuyu peasants, undermined the early potential for a liberation struggle to continue beyond independence. In these conditions, for the time being, historically decisive conflicts are likely to take place amongst the petty-bourgeoisie.Google Scholar See Shivji, Issa, ‘Peasants and Class Alliances’, in Review of African Political Economy, 3, May–October 1975, pp. 10–18, for a discussion of revolutionary classes in Africa.Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 2} Marx, 1846; Letters on Capital.

^{page 564 note 3} Leys, Colin, ‘Capital Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependency – the Significance of the Kenyan Case’, in the Socialist Register (London, 1978).Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 4} Banaji, J., ‘Modes of Production in a Materialist's Conception of History’, in Capital and Class (London), 1977.Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 5} Gerry, Chris and Birkbeck, Chris, ‘Petty Commodity Producers in Third-World Cities–Petty-Bourgeois or Disguised Proletarians’, in Frank, Beckhoffer and Brain, Elliot (eds.), The Petite Bourgeoisie – Comparative Studies on the Uneasy Stratum (London, 1983).Google Scholar

^{page 565 note 1} van Zwanenberg, R. M. A., ‘Neo-Colonialism and the Origin of the National Bourgeoisie in Kenya Between 1940–1973’, in Journal of Eastern African Research and Development (Nairobi), 4, 2, 1974.Google Scholar

^{page 565 note 2} Wright, Erik O., ‘Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies’, in New Left Review, 98, 1976.Google Scholar

^{page 565 note 3} E.g.Kitching, Gavin, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: the making of an African petite bourgeoisie, 1905–1970 (New Haven and London, 1980), pp. 445ff.Google Scholar

^{page 565 note 4} Bernstein, Henry, ‘Notes on Capital and Peasantry’, in Review of African Political Economy, 10, 1977, and ‘State and Peasantry in Tanzania’.Google Scholar

^{page 565 note 5} Lloyd, Peter, A Third World Proletariat? (London, 1982).Google Scholar

^{page 566 note 1} Langdon, Steven W., ‘The Political Economy of Dependence: notes toward analysis of multinational corporations in Kenya’, in Journal of Eastern African Research and Development, 4, 2, 1974.Google Scholar

^{page 566 note 2} The struggle might not be that latent. Langdon himself points out that in 1973 there was talk of a new political party being formed in Nakuru, a constituency later represented by the (now detained) radical M.P., Koigi wa Wamwere; see Langdon, Steven W., ‘Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery–the Kenyan Case Re-examined’, in Review of African Political Economy, 17, 1980, for a discussion of the question of a ‘national bourgeoisie’.Google Scholar

^{page 566 note 3} Langdon, ‘The Political Economy of Dependence’, p. 173.

^{page 566 note 4} In-Dependent Kenya (London, 1982), p. 45.Google Scholar

^{page 567 note 1} Alavi, ‘State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism’, p. 290.

^{page 567 note 2} van Zwanenberg, loc. cit. p. 176.

^{page 567 note 3} Statistical Abstract (Nairobi), 1981 and 1982.Google Scholar

^{page 568 note 1} In Swahili, ‘nyayo’ means ‘footsteps’, but has come to represent K.A.N.U.'s ideology of ‘love, peace and unity’, while ‘ngorokos’ (traitors) were ‘anti-nyayo’– in practice, of course, politicians so branded were those opposed to Njonjo's faction.

^{page 570 note 1} Standard (Nairobi), 6 August 1982.

^{page 571 note 1} Amongst the ‘outsider’ petty-bourgeoisie in Nairobi and on the Coast (small traders, hotel managers, cafe owners, fisherman), it was apparent that their response to the coup attempt indicated little support for Moi.

^{page 571 note 2} This strategy seemed to have an effect, since according to the Weekly Review (Nairobi), 10 December 1982, ‘Ministers appear to be going about their business in a perfunctory manner, giving the impression that they are biding their time before the axe falls on them’.

^{page 572 note 1} Weekly Review, 3 December 1982. This editorial was prompted by the news that many primary-school children would go without textbooks in 1983. Thousands of new titles ordered by the Kenya School Equipment Scheme were not printed, because it was more profitable for the mainly foreign-owned publishers to re-issue old titles. At the same time, epidemiological research at the University of Nairobi had suggested that 25 per cent of all 12-year olds suffered from flourosis – a dental disease caused by excess fluoride. The Director of Medical Services, Dr Koinange, criticised Colgate (and the Kenyan Dental Association) for being ‘geared to increasing sales rather than scientific values’.

^{page 572 note 2} International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality: a strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya (Geneva, 1972).Google Scholar

^{page 573 note 1} Hilary N'gweno, owner of Weekly Review Ltd., was the previous owner of Stellascope Ltd., one of the few Kenyan publishing houses, untill this was bought by K.A.N.U. to print the new party newspaper in April 1983.

^{page 573 note 2} The limited social basis of K.A.N.U.'s support was indicated in the 1983 general election voting statistics. Only 2,426,682 (46·59 per cent) of the 5,208,590 registered voters went to the polls. Since there remained a further 966,609 over 18 years of age who had not registered, only 39 per cent of those eligible to vote actually did so.

^{page 574 note 1} Cf. Mulaa, John, ‘Politics of a Changing Society – Mumias’, in Review of African Political Economy, 20, 1981, for an analysis of election results during 1969–1978.Google Scholar

^{page 574 note 2} Weekly Review, 30 September 1983.

^{page 575 note 1} So much so, that in an analysis entitled ‘Challenges of the General Election’, the Weekly Review, 22 July 1983, focused mainly on the implications of the fall of Njonjo!

^{page 575 note 2} Nation (Nairobi), 1 April 1983.

^{page 575 note 3} Weekly Review, 15 April 1983.

^{page 576 note 1} Ibid. 13 May 1983.

^{page 577 note 1} Nation, 20 May 1983.

^{page 577 note 2} For example, Kariuki, G. G., Minister for Lands and Settlement, said, ‘My fear today is that we are meeting here to see and rejoice when one of our brothers, the Editor of the Standard, is being sacrificed by his masters…The Editor and his collaborators should be investigated’ – Daily Nation (Nairobi), 22 July 1982.Google Scholar If this were true, it would strengthen the view that Njonjo had been working with international capital to replace Moi's increasingly unstable régime with one that better secured their interests. However, Githii had a record of opposition to detentions, and had attacked the Preventative Detention Act in 1966, when working for the Daily Nation.

^{page 578 note 1} Newsweek (New York), 3 June 1983.

^{page 578 note 2} Hansard (Nairobi), 13 June 1983.

^{page 578 note 3} Ibid. 20 June 1983.

^{page 579 note 1} Weekly Review, 8 July 1983.

^{page 580 note 1} Ibid. 12 August 1983.

^{page 581 note 1} Ibid. 11 October 1983.

^{page 581 note 2} In August 1982, the police seized from the University Library all books with ‘left-sounding titles’; Sunday Nation (Nairobi), 8 August 1982.Google Scholar

^{page 581 note 3} Weekly Review, 20 May 1983.

^{page 581 note 4} Standard, 2 July 1982.

^{page 581 note 5} By June/July 1982, to call for further detentions, or to warn the University about ‘foreign ideologies’, had for leading politicians become a test of loyalty to Moi. Ministers and M.P.s included references to the threat from dissidents in speeches when opening agricultural shows, giving prizes at schools, attending ‘harambee’ events, etcetera, which indicated how pervasive they believed the danger to be.

^{page 582 note 1} Small-holders now occupy only half of Kenya's arable land, the rest being covered by 3,000 large farms owned by corporations and individuals. Over half of the small-holders occupy 15 per cent of arable land with average plots of under two hectares. In June 1982, the Daily Nation listed charges against land-buying companies, in which the poor had invested much of their savings. These included: political interference and factional squabbles among directors, dishonest recruitment of shareholders to fix votes, illegal sub-division of land, and misappropriation of company funds.

^{page 582 note 2} If another coup was being plotted around 1 August 1982, it would explain why the Army and the General Service Unit took three hours to respond to the seizure of the Voice of Kenya radio station and other installations in Nairobi at around 4.00 a.m. It was 7.00 a.m. before the ‘loyal’ forces arrived to fight back, during which time the rebels had gained temporary control of the city centre.

^{page 582 note 3} The devaluation of the Kenyan Shilling and tighter import controls have not been popular amongst the Nairobi bourgeoisie. Francis Macharia, Chairman of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, issued a statement in mid-December 1982, criticising government decisions on currency and interest rates. He argued that these policies would make it more difficult for Kenyan firms to pay off foreign loans, while increasing the cost of machinery and other inputs. He also questioned wheather cheaper agricultural exports would find expanded world markets, because of the quota system for sales. Joe Wanjui, Chairman of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, made similar points.

^{page 583 note 1} Speech by Ngugi wa Thiong'o in London on 22 October to celebrate Mau Mau Freedom Fighters Day; reprinted in The Guardian (London), 19 November 1982.

^{page 583 note 2} See Murray, Robin, ‘The Chandarias: the development of a Kenyan multinational’, in Raphael, Kaplinsky (ed.), Readings on the Multinational Corporation in Kenya (Oxford and Nairobi, 1978), pp. 284–307.Google Scholar

^{page 583 note 3} Langdon, Steven W., Multinational Corporations in the Political Economy of Kenya (London and New York, 1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 583 note 4} Langdon, Steven W., ‘Multinational Corporations, Taste Transfer and Underdevelopment: a case study from Kenya’, in Review of African Political Economy, 2, January–April 1975, pp. 12–35.Google Scholar

^{page 583 note 5} ‘The Kenya We Want’, Report of the Convention on Social and Economic Development in the Emerging Kenya Nation, Nairobi, 12–17 August 1962.

^{page 584 note 1} Langdon, ‘Multinational Corporations, Taste Transfer and Underdevelopment’.

^{page 584 note 2} Currie, Catherine and Ray, L. J., ‘The Class Location of BAT Contract Farmers in the Kenyan Economy’, Department of Anthropology, University College, London, December 1982.Google Scholar

^{page 584 note 3} See Mueller, Susanne D., ‘The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class’, in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Ottawa), 15, 3, 1981, pp. 459–97;Google Scholar and Leys, Colin, Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism, 1964–1971 (London, 1978).Google Scholar

^{page 585 note 1} There are limits to the patience of the trades unions, though. In January 1984, the Central Organisation of Trade Unions called upon the Kenya Government to cancel wage guidelines in order to enable workers to fight for better pay. This statement, described by the Weekly Review as ‘uncharacteristic of Kenyan Trade Union Leaders’, claimed that the cost of living was running out of control, and that workers cannot be expected to ‘be productive and loyal if their meagre incomes are not protected from being eroded’. Rises of 12 per cent in one week in the prices of milk, sugar, and rice were blamed by C.O.T.U. on government incentive schemes for farmers, most of whom are small-holders. This points to a developing contradiction in Kenya between policies designed to help rural producers and those aimed at maintaining the loyalty of those urban workers who are unionised.

^{page 586 note 1} Though, see cases cited by Lall, S., The Multinational Corporation (London, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 587 note 1} The directorships mentioned in this paragraph are publicly recorded in the Office of the Attorney-General in Nairobi.

^{page 588 note 1} Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, passim.

^{page 588 note 2} Kitching argues, op. cit. that the dependent nature of the Kenyan bourgeoisie dooms to failure any attempts to develop internal capitalist relations that are autonomous from the ‘metropolis’.

This dependency position has been subject to increasing criticism, though – see Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, and also Kaplinsky, Raphael, Henley, J. S., and Leys, Colin, ‘Debate–Capitalist Accumulation in the Periphery: the Kenyan case re-examined’, in Review of African Political Economy, 17, 1980.Google Scholar

A recent example of the difficulties facing small local investors is provided by the liquidation of the Kenya National Transport Company in October 1983. The National Bank of Kenya, Kenatco's largest creditor, foreclosed when it appeared that the parastatal was in difficulties. The other creditors, mainly co-operatives and small investors, will probably never be repaid.

^{page 589 note 1} Hansard, 3 November 1982.