^{page 471 note 1} The control of the central Government over these areas was always quite weak; in particular, Gojjam always proved a difficult area to control even for Haile Selassie. Reforms affecting land taxes carried out after the liberation were de facto not applied in Gojjam, with the latest rebellion occurring in 1968. See Markakis, John, Ethiopia: anatomy of a traditional polity (Oxford, 1974), pp. 376 ff.Google Scholar; and Schwab, Peter, Decision-Making in Ethiopia: a study of the political process (London, 1972), pp. 158 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 472 note 1} The development of mechanised commercial farms can be traced through a number of publications which assess the conditions of the Ethiopian agricultural sector at different times. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Developmemt, ‘Current Economic Position and Prospects in Ethiopia’, 1965, pp. 3 ff; Nekby, Bengt, CADU: an Ethiopian experiment in developing peasant farming (Lund, 1971,), pp. 16 ffGoogle Scholar; and Stanford Research Institute, ‘The Resources and Economy of Ethiopia’, S.R.I. Project 6350, Report No. 13, February 1969. The figure of 5,000 is simply an educated guess, because there is no precise record of how many of these farms existed, how many hectares they covered, or how much they produced. Even the nationalisation of land has so far produced no reliable figures.

^{page 472 note 2} See ‘Role of Commercial Banks in Ethiopia's Economic Development’, in Gill, Gerard (ed.), Readings on the Ethiopian Economy (Addis Ababa, 1974)Google Scholar, especially pp. 338–42, and ‘Development Banking in Ethiopia’, ibid. pp. 343–53.

^{page 473 note 1} Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Economic Progress of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 1955)Google Scholar.

^{page 473 note 2} Ethiopia Today: an illustrated review of economic development (Addis Ababa, 1972), contains several profiles of industries. While the companies listed do not probably constitute a representative sample, they are the most important, and few of them are owned or managed by Ethiopians.

^{page 473 note 3} For the early history of C.E.L.U., see Seyoum Gebre Egziabher, ‘The Development of Some Institutions Concerned with Labour Relations in Ethiopia’, Department of Public Administration, Haile Sellassie I University, 1969; and Zack, Arnold, ‘Trade Unionism Develops in Ethiopia’, in Butler, Jeffrey and Castagno, A. A. (eds.), Boston University Papers on Africa: transition in African politics (Boston and New York, 1968)Google Scholar.

^{page 474 note 1} This view of the role of C.E.L.U. is found for the first time in the resolutions passed at the general meeting in September 1975, and marks a sharp break with the previous moderate position of the unions.

^{page 475 note 1} Office of the Dean of Students, ‘Report on Student Support’, Haile Sellassie I University, May 1969; also ‘Report on the Social Situation of H.S.I.U. Studen’, Department of Sociology, 1970.

^{page 475 note 2} See Markakis, op. cit. pp. 543–59.

^{page 475 note 3} The first student paper, called News and Views, provided little more than Campus gossip. In 1967 it became the Struggle, and while still published under the control of a Faculty adviser, was outspoken in its political assertions – although not always clear in its ideology – and, as a result, was periodically censored and banned.

^{page 476 note 1} The first issue of Struggle in March 1967, for example, described the role of the student in these terms: ‘The future of the old country that still refuses to convince itself that its past glory is merely history now lies in his hands. He is at the head of a march and his choice is either to consolidate the constituents of this march from scattered, unequal individuals into a whole united body, or to exploit this situation and become as prosperous and fat as many Ethiopians have already become.’

^{page 476 note 2} Salaries in the civil service are considered very high in terms of multiples of income per capita. See International Labour Organisation, Report to the Imperial Government of the Exploratory Employment Policy Mission (Geneva, 1973), pp. 52–5Google Scholar.

^{page 476 note 3} The enlisted men in Asmara presented in February a list of 22 demands, most strictly economic: basic salary, food allowances, pensions, medical care. A few were strictly corporate, such as the demand that the children of military personnel be favoured in job applications. The rest were minor local grievances, for example: ‘the medical colonel is selling medicine’.

^{page 477 note 1} See the Educational Sector Review, Education: a challenge to the nation (Addis Ababa, 1973)Google Scholar.

^{page 477 note 2} The leaders of C.E.L.U. in March 1974 stressed that their demands were economic, and that politics had little to do with them. Beyene Solomon, the chairman, explained in an interview with Africa (London), May 1974, p. 18, that the general strike had been planned in 1973, and was ‘completely independent of any other events in the country’. A spokesman for the Ethiopian Teachers' Association explained to The Ethiopian Herald (Addis Ababa), 16 March 1974, that their strike was caused above all by the issue of parity between the salaries of civil servants and teachers which had been under discussion for years.

^{page 477 note 3} The Ethiopian Herald, 9 April 1974.

^{page 478 note 1} A typical example is the answer to the i6 demands submitted by C.E.L.U. in February. On 6 March, knowing that a general strike had been called for the next day, the Cabinet promised that the demands would be answered within 3–6 months. After a four-day general strike, the Cabinet had taken no decisions, but simply agreed to present to Parliament within one month legislation concerning strikes and dismissals, to study within two months regulations on minimum wages, and to instruct ‘concerned departments’ to issue guidelines about salary adjustments. The Ethiopian Herald, 12 March 1974.

^{page 478 note 2} A glimpse of the rôle of Asrate Kassa and his view of the events can be found in Legum, Cohn, Ethiopia: the fall of Haile Selassie's Empire (New York, 1975), especially pp. 30 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 478 note 3} The Ethiopian Herald, 6 March 1974.

^{page 478 note 4} Ibid. 54 March 1974.

^{page 478 note 5} Ibid. 10 August 1974.

^{page 479 note 1} An official account of this process is found in the Provisional Military Administrative Council, The Ethiopian Revolution (Addis Ababa, 1975), especially pp. 10 ff. This publication presents the revolution as the result of careful planning, but even so recognises that it was a long time before a clear decision on the line to follow was reached, and that many different alternative courses of action were considered.

^{page 479 note 2} For the initial policy statement of the Co-ordinating Committee, see The Ethiopian Herald, 9 July 1974.

^{page 480 note 1} Ibid. 13 September 1974.

^{page 481 note 1} See the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Declaration on Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), 7 February 1975.

^{page 482 note 1} Resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions, 16 September 1974, mimeographed.

^{page 482 note 2} Statement of the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions, 5 June 1975 mimeographed.

^{page 482 note 3} Resolutions passed by the Special Session of the General Assembly of C.E.L.U., 19–23 September 1975, mimeographed.

^{page 483 note 1} For more information on the students' rôle, see Ottaway, Marina, ‘Land Reform and Peasant Associations in Ethiopia: a preliminary assessment’, in Rural Africana (East Lansing), Spring 1976Google Scholar.

^{page 483 note 2} Resolutions passed by the General Meeting of the Ethiopian Teachers' Association, held in Jimma, August 1975, mimeographed.

^{page 484 note 1} Arrighi, Giovanni, ‘International Corporations, Labour Aristocracies, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa’, in Arrighi, Giovanni and Saul, John S., Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York and London, 1973), p. 141Google Scholar.