^{page 431 note 1} Smock, David R. and Bentsi-Enchill, K. (eds.), The Search for National Integration in Africa (New York, 1975);Google ScholarYoung, Crawford, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison, 1976);Google ScholarKasfir, Nelson, The Shrinking Political Arena: participation and ethnicity in African politics, with a case study of Uganda (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976), chs. 2 and 3;Google ScholarKebschull, Harvey G. (ed), Politics in Transitional Societies: the challenge of change in Asia, Africa and Latin America (New York, 1973 edn.), sections I, II, and VI;Google Scholar and Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, 1977), ch. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 1} Lofchie, Michael F. (ed.), The State of the Nations: constraints on development in independent Africa (Berkeley and Loss Angeles, 1971), pp. 273–83;Google Scholar and Nicolas, G., ‘La Société africaine et ses réactions a l'impact occidental’, in Merle, Marcel (ed.), L'Afrique noire contemporaine (Paris, 1968), pp. 226–7.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 2} The relevance of both situations is noted in the section on ‘Competitive Communalism’, by Melson, Robert and Wolpe, Howard, ‘Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: a theoretical perspective’, in The American Political Science Review (Menasha), 64, 4, 12 1970, pp. 1112–30.Google Scholar

^{page 433 note 3} The linguistic distinction is that formulated by Diedrich Westermann. In both Ghana and Togo there are also ‘intermediary’ languages spoken, e.g. by the ‘Central Togo cluster’ of peoples. Cf. Cornevin, Robert, Histoire du Togo (Paris, 1969), pp. 88–96.Google Scholar

^{page 434 note 4} Islam is a minority religion with 12% in both countries; and in Togo, where the Germans restricted Christian missionaries to the south until 1912, Islam is found primarily in the north. Togo has 27% Christians and 50% animists; for Ghana the figures are 43% and 38%, respectively. The north-south disparity can be seen in the following data for Ghana: the Northern and Upper Regions have 8% Christians and 75% animists, while in all the other Regions to the south, Christians constitute at least 40% and animists less than 50%; in the coastal capital, Accra, there are 61% Christians and only 19% animists. Sources: Walter Birmingham, Neustadt, I., and Omaboe, E. N. (eds.), A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol. 2 (London, 1967), p. 249, Tables 7.1 and 2;Google Scholar and Prouzet, M., La République du Togo (Paris, 1976), p. 11.Google Scholar

^{page 436 note 1} Income per capita in the Plateaux and Maritime Regions of Togo is three times higher than in the north, according to Zachriah and Nair, op. cit. pp. T9 and T58; Prouzet, op. cit. p. 12, gives the following figures in CFA francs: Lomé, 38,000; Plateaux, 35,000; Centrale, 32,000; La Kara and Savanes, 24,000. Educational disparities are indicated in literacy rates for those aged 12 upwards, i.e. Maritime 27% and Plateaux 24%, compared with the northern Regions: Centrale, 10%; La Kara, 12% and Savanes; 7%. See also Yagla, W. O., L'Édfication de la nation togolaise (Paris, 1978), pp. 37–59;Google ScholarDecalo, Samuel, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: studies in military style (New Haven and London, 1976), pp. 90–1;Google ScholarKodjo, M., ‘Éléments pour une sociologie politique togolaise’, Diplôme d'études supérieur, Paris, 1967;Google Scholar and Rauss, R., ‘Les Disparités régionales du Togo’, dissertation, Université de Nice, 1976.Google ScholarAs regards Ghana, Ewusi, K., ‘Disparities in Levels of Regional Development in Ghana’, in Social Indicators Research (Dordrecht), 3, 1976, pp. 88–9Google Scholar, attempted to measure socio-economic development on a numerical scale, with Accra as the base with 1.00. His scores for each Region, with the school attendance for those aged 6 and above (in brackets), are as follows: Accra, 1.00 (65%); Eastern, 0.355 (54%); Central, 0.398 (44%); Western, 0.392 (48%); Ashanti, 0.340 (51%); Brong-Ahafo, 0.265(39%); Volta, 0.306 (47%); Northern, 0.110 (12%); and Upper, 0.071 (11%). See also Smock, David R. and Smock, Audrey C., The Politics of Pluralism: a comparative study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York and Amsterdam, 1975), p. 209;Google ScholarDickson, K. B., ‘Development Planning and National Integration in Ghana’, in Smock, and Bentsi-Enchill, (eds), op. cit. p. 107;Google Scholar and Ladouceur, Paul, Chiefs and Politicians: the politics of regionalism in Northern Ghana (London, 1979), p. 259.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 1} Yagla, op. cit. pp. 28–58; Cornevin, Robert, Le Togo (Paris, 1967), p. 95;Google ScholarDecalo, Samuel, Historical Dictionary of Togo (Metuchen, N. J., 1976), p. 95;Google ScholarHodges, T., ‘Eyadema's Unchallenged Rule’, in Africa Report (New York), 07–08 1977, p. 62;Google ScholarThompson, Virginia, West Africa's Council of the Entente (Ithaca, 1972), p. 76;Google Scholar and Docekal, M., ‘Contribution à l'étude de la signification du tribalisme en Afrique noire: le cas du Togo’, Institute d'études politiques, Bordeaux, 1973, p. 20.Google Scholar

^{page 437 note 2} Cornevin, Robert, Histoire de l'Afrique, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1975), pp. 652–3;Google Scholar Yagla, op. cit. pp. 159–72; and Feuillet, C., Le Togs ‘en géndral’ (Paris, 1976), pp. 81–93.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 1} Koplin, R. E., ‘Education and National Integration in Ghana and Kenya’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, Eugene, 1968;Google Scholar Smock and Smock, op. cit. pp. 202–7; Fischer, Lynn F., ‘Student Orientations Toward Nation-Building in Ghana’, in Paden, John N. (ed.), Values, Identities, and National Integration: empirical research in Africa (Evanston, 1980), pp. 271–84;Google Scholar and Joseph M. Kaufert, ‘Situational Ethnic Identity in Ghana: a survey of university students’, in ibid. pp. 53–74.

^{page 438 note 2} Ladouceur, op. cit. ch. 10; and Kelly, Robert, ‘Political Consciousness and Education in Northern Ghana’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1974, pp. 340–3.Google Scholar

^{page 438 note 3} Smock and Smock, op. cit. p. 309.

^{page 439 note 1} Ibid. pp. 251, 263, and 310ff; Ladouceur, op. cit. pp. 10–13 and 269–70.

^{page 439 note 2} Smock and Smock, op. cit. p. 310.

^{page 439 note 3} Austin, Dennis, ‘Opposition in Ghana, 1947–67’, in Government and Opposition (London), 2, 4, 1967, pp. 540–1Google Scholar, and Ghana Observed: essays on the politics of a West African republic (Manchester, 1976), p. 125;Google ScholarRathbone, Richard, ‘Ghana’, in Dunn, John (ed.), West African States – Failure and Promise: a study in comparative politics (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 27–8; and Smock and Smock, op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 2} Austin, op. cit. p. 125.

^{page 440 note 2} See the data on the socio-economic development levels of the various Regions of Ghana mentioned in fn. 1 on p. 436; also Birmingham, Neustadt, and Omaboe (eds.), op. cit. pp. 90–1 and 95–6, and Koplin, op. cit. ch. 4.

^{page 440 note 3} On the cultural relationship between ethnic groups in Ghana, see Joseph M. Kaufert, ‘Ethnic Unit Definition in Ghana: a comparison of culture cluster analysis and social distance measures’, in Paden (ed.), op. cit. p. 46, Table 3.2. In terms of their cultural attributes the Ewes are somewhat closer to the Akans than are the Gas, and Akan influence on Ewe culture has been particularly strong.

^{page 440 note 4} The Ewes have been slightly over-represented in the student body at the University of Ghana at Legon, and also in teaching and white-collar jobs in general, as well as in the officer corps of the armed forces, albeit less so than the Akans and Gās, respectively. By way of contrast, the Ewes are under-represented in professional grades in the public service, while the Gas are over-represented. For a fuller discussion, see Brown, David, ‘Who are the Tribalists? Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana’, in African Affairs (London), 81, 322, 01 1982, pp. 37–69.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 5} The regional emigration from the Volta Region (15.6%) is slightly less than that for Ghana as a whole (17.9%). The Ewes have migrated mainly to the contiguous Eastern Region, and to the capital, Accra, and in these areas they constitute 11.9% and 14.5% of the population, respectively. Elsewhere, the proportion of Ewes in each Region is less than 4%, similar to that of Akans and Gās within the Volta Region (3.4%). Ewusi, K., Rural-Urban and Regional Migration in Ghana (Legon, 1977), and Gil, Aryee, and Ghansah, op. cit. Table 1.Google Scholar

^{page 440 note 6} Kaufert, ‘Situational Ethnic Identity in Ghana’, Tables 4.3 and 4.4, pp. 69 and 71; Fischer, ‘Student Orientations toward Nation-Building in Ghana’, Table 16.7, p. 279; Koplin, op. cit. Tables 20, 26, and 30, pp. 213, 223, 233, also pp. 261–2. In terms of political behaviour, the 1969 election was the only occasion when the Ewes acted as a united group in Ghanaian politics. At all other times, they have divided on localist and/or other sub-ethnic lines, including their responses to the Ashanti invasions in the last century, to the demands of German and British colonisation, and to the existence of the C.P.P.

^{page 441 note 1} The major surveys of Togolese politics all stress the north-south axis of political competition: Cornevin, , Histoire du Togo and Le Togo: nation-pilote (Paris, 1963);Google Scholar Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Togo, and ‘The Politics of Military Rule in Togo’, in Genéve-Afrique (Geneva), 12, 2, 1973, pp. 62–96;Google Scholar Prouzet, op. cit.; Thompson, op. cit. pp. 75–90 and 111–19; and Yagla, op. cit.

^{page 442 note 1} German Togo had been partitioned in 1919 between France and Britain, under the League of Nations Mandate and later the United Nations Trusteeship. British Togoland, the smaller western section, was administered by the Gold Coast Government as an integral part of that state. While the colonial authorities, and then the C.P.P., sought to ensure that British Togoland remained part of the Gold Coast/Ghana, the Togoland Congress, together with the Comité de l' union togolaise in French Togo, sought to re-unite the two parts of German Togo, either under British jurisdiction, or as an independent unit having some form of association with Ghana. Cf. Coleman, James S., ‘Togoland’, in International Conciliation (New York), 509, 09 1956.Google Scholar

^{page 443 note 1} Brown, loc. cit.

^{page 443 note 2} The unemployed veterans of the French colonial forces, mostly of N.C.O. rank, were led by Bodjolle and Eyadema, aged 31 and 26, respectively. They staged the coup in co-operation with elements in the 250-strong Togolese armed forces who were critical of Olympio's supposedly anti-militarist polieies, not least because he had not agreed that the veterans should be integrated into the Togo army. It may be noted that, although the coup activists were mostly northern Kabré, and the 1963 régime predominantly Ewe, the ethnic correlation was by no means exact: 30 per cent of Olympio's cabinet were of Tem-Kabré origin, while one of the four leaders of the ‘insurrectionist committee’ was an Ewe.

^{page 444 note 1} Sandbrook, Richard, ‘Patrons, Clients and Factions: new dimensions of conflict analysis in Africa’, in Canadian Journal of Political Science (Toronto), 5, 1, 1972, pp. 104–9;Google ScholarPeil, Margaret, Consensus and Conflict in African Societies (London, 1977), pp. 97–9;Google Scholar and Kaufert, P., ‘Migration and Communication: a study of migrant-villager relationships in a rural Ghanaian community’, Ph.D.dissertation, University of Birmingham, 1976, chs. 5, 6, and 10.Google Scholar

^{page 444 note 2} Biarnes, P., L'Afrique aux africains (Paris, 1980), p. 263.Google Scholar The stress on the north-south confrontation element in Togolese politics is explicit in his chapter title, ‘Togo: la revanche des Kabrés’, pp. 260–78. See also Thompson, , op. cit. pp. 79–83, and the references given in fn. I, p. 441, above.Google Scholar

^{page 444 note 3} Smock and Smock, op. cit. p. 70; Callaway, Barbara and Card, Emily, ‘Political Constraints on Economic Development in Ghana’, in Lofchie, (ed), op. cit. p. 69;Google Scholar and Fitch, Bob and Oppenheimer, Mary, Ghana: end of an illusion (New York, 1966), pp. 54–6.Google Scholar

^{page 444 note 4} The C.U.T. did, indeed, commence as an Ewe party, pursuing the goal of unification between 1946 and 1951. However, with the beginning of mass-based elections in 1951, and the recognition that unity was not realisable through the United Nations, the composition and aims of the party were modified.

^{page 445 note 1} About half the adult population in the north voted in the elections; 47.9% for the C.U.T., 39.9% for the U.C.P.N., and 12.1% for independents. The C.U.T., in fact, got 35.5% of its total vote from the north and, in terms of actual figures there, received 11,198 more votes than the U.C.P.N. The C.U.T.'s support amongst the Ewes was by no means monolithic. In 1958 it got the votes of less than half (46.9%) of the registered electors in the south; of the remainder, 14.7% voted for the pro-French P.T.P., and 3.4% for independents, while 35% did not vote. Amenumey, D.E.K., ‘The General Elections in the “Autonomous Republic of Togo”, April 1958’, in Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana (Legon), 16, 1, 1975, pp. 47–66Google Scholar and Kponton, G., ‘La Décolonisation au Togo’, Ph.D. dissertation, Université de ProvenceGoogle Scholar, Marseilles, 1977, pp. 282–332.

^{page 445 note 2} Political leadership amongst the Ewes focused on the ‘Brazilians’ of Anecho and Agoué notably the Olympio, Lawson, Da Souza, and Santos families – although they remained divided. For example, Sylvanus Olympio led the C.U.T., while his cousin, Pedro Olympio, led the P.T.P. until 1955, when he formed the M.P.T. Anani Santos and Andre Dueveidjen were initially allies of Sylvanus Olympio, as leaders of Juvento, but they broke away from the C.U.T. in 1959.

^{page 445 note 3} Sylvanus Olympio was a prominent merchant and employee of the United Africa Company until 1955. According to Kponton, op. cit. pp. 78–81, he developed a mass-based party by using the local networks of the U.A.C., with the result that a large proportion of the CUT. activists, at all levels, were those engaged in commerce. Although Olympio attempted to pursue conservative economic policies designed to favour the commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisies, his restrictions on growth eventually alienated these groups. Lewis, W. H., ‘Togo: Africa's new pressure point’ in Africa Special Report (New Brunswick, N.J.), 5, 4, 1960, pp. 3–6, 12, and 15.Google Scholar

^{page 445 note 4} In the 1956 elections the C.P.P. secured 48.2% of the votes in the Ewe constituencies in Volta, and 53.4% for the Region as a whole. The C.P.P. got 44.6% of the votes in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana, and 43.2% in Ashanti, inclusive of Brong-Ahafo.

^{page 446 note 1} Fitch and Oppenheimer, op. cit. pp. 57–8; and Saffu, E. O., ‘Nkrumah and the Togoland Question’, in Economic Bulletin of Ghana (Legon), 12, 2–3, 1968, pp. 412.Google Scholar

^{page 446 note 2} By 1963, Olympio had alienated the major support-bases of the C.U.T. in the south, both by authoritarianism (including the suppression of Juvento) and by austere economic policies (notably his tax on cocoa and his freeze on civil service salaries and appointments). Prior to the coup, opposition from southern groups was more vocal than that from the north. The most disruptive factional cleavage during 1963–7 was between the two northern Ministers, Antoine Meatchi and Fousseni Mama, both from Sokodé, and it was their clash which precipitated the downfall of the Grunitsky régime which collapsed in the face of popular opposition from both the north and the south. The initial protests came in the form of the Lomé demonstrations of November 1966, and these were followed by the intervention of the predominantly northern military in January 1967.

^{page 446 note 3} The tribalism of the 1966 coup and of the N.L.C. régime are implied in Smock and Smock, op. cit. p. 240. Objections to this view are noted by Brown, loc cit., and by Hutchful, Ernest, ‘Organizational Instability in African Military Forces: the case of the Ghanaian army’, in International Social Science Journal (Paris), 31, 4, 1979, pp. 60618.Google Scholar

^{page 447 note 1} This ideological theme is discussed in general terms, and also in relation to Nkrumah's régime in Ghana, by Finlay, D., Holsti, O., and Fagen, R., Enemies in Politics (Chicago, 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 448 note 1} See the discussion in relation to Dahomey/Benin by Hazoumé, G. L., Idéologies tribalistes et nation en Afrique (Paris, 1972), chs. 1 and 4.Google Scholar On the Togo case, see Docekal, op. cit. especially pp. 27–40. The general point is made by Mafeje, Archie, ‘The Ideology of “Tribalism”’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 9, 2, 08 1971, pp. 253–61.Google Scholar

^{page 448 note 2} Bretton, Henry L., Power and Politics in Africa (London, 1973), p. 118.Google Scholar

^{page 449 note 1} Eyadema's broadcast on Radio Lomé, 13 January 1967, is quoted by Feuillet, op. cit. pp. 63–5.

^{page 449 note 2} Communiqué of a meeting between civil servants and Eyadema in December 1968, quoted in Africa Report, March–April 1969, p. 50.

^{page 449 note 3} The use of animateurs and of the party machinery in promoting demonstrations of support has increased over the years, and by the late 1970s it had taken the form of a full-scale ‘personality cult’ campaign. Cf. Hodges, loc. cit. pp. 61–4.

^{page 449 note 4} Joachim, P., ‘Des Noces d'or pour Eyadema’, in Décennie (Paris), 2, 34, 01 1977?Google Scholar

^{page 450 note 1} Verdier, R., ‘Le Rassemblement du peuple togolais’, in Revue franĉaise d'études politiques africaines (Paris), 145, 1978, pp. 86–97.Google ScholarThe goals and structure of the R.P.T. are examined in Ekué, G., ‘Le Parti unique au Togo’, I.E.P., Aix-en-Provence/Marseilles, 11, 1974.Google Scholar

^{page 450 note 2} On the doubts concerning the credibility of the ‘plot’, and the way in which it was utilised by the Government for its own advantage, see Africa Report, November 1970, pp. 8–11; Africa Contemporary Record: annual survey and documents, 1970–1971 (London, 1971), pp. B452–3Google Scholar, and 1971–1972, p. B691; Thompson, op. cit. pp. 117–18; Africa Confidential (London), 16 10 1970, p. 6;Google Scholar and Decalo, ‘Politics of Military Rule’, p. 92.

^{page 450 note 3} Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa, p. 116.

^{page 450 note 4} Notably, Théophile Mally, ex-Minister of the Interior in Olympio's Government.

^{page 450 note 5} ‘Les Fētes sanglantes de l'armée’, in Politique hebdo (Paris) 11 02 1971;Google Scholar‘On meurt beaucoup dans les prisons togolaises’, in Africasia (Paris), 36, 15–28 03 1971, p. 27;Google Scholar and Africa Contemporary Record, 1971–2, p. B691.

^{page 451 note 1} Eyadema's speech to the R.P.T. Congress, November 1970; quoted in Africa Contemporary Record, 1970–1, p. B453.

^{page 451 note 2} Africa Confidential, 1 April 1977, pp. 5–7.

^{page 451 note 3} Ibid. 3 September 1978; Africa Contemporary Record, 1978–9, p. B785; Vergara, F., ‘Togo: les réves apprivoisés’, in Jeune Afrique (Paris), 993, 16 01 1980;Google ScholarKenissa, C., ‘Ombres et lumiéres’, in Afrique-Asie, 180, 5 02 1979, pp. 17–18;Google Scholar and Schissel, H., ‘Togo: change of economic course’, in New African (London), 05 1979, pp. 78–9.Google Scholar

^{page 452 note 1} Government communiqué, quoted in West Africa (London), 24 10 1977.Google ScholarPubMed

^{page 452 note 2} Africa Contemporary Record, 1977–8, pp. B790, 1978–9, p. B784; Humanité rouge (Paris), 14 09 1977Google Scholar, Sysle, M. ‘Le Vrai visage du pouvoir’, in Afrique-Asie, 138, 27 06–10 07 1977;Google ScholarAfri-Ku-Neng, N. K., ‘La Prison politique fabriqué de mauvais citoyens’, in Jeune Afrique, 870, 9 09 1977, pp. 24–6.Google Scholar

^{page 452 note 3} Jeune Afrique, 25 November 1977, p. 56, and 19 April 1978, pp. 33–7; and New African, April 1979, pp. 31–2.

^{page 453 note 1} Soudan, F., ‘Confession d'un mercenaire’, in Jeune Afrique, 20 09 1978, pp. 50–2;Google ScholarAmnesty International Report (London), ‘Togo’ entry for 1979 and 1980;Google ScholarCasteran, C., ‘Togo: l'opposition dénonce la répression’, in Le Matin (Paris), 28 06 1979;Google ScholarNgosso, S., ‘Togo: la face cachée’, in Sansfrontiére, 25 03 1980, pp. 8–9;Google Scholar and Africa Confidential, 28 02 1979, p. 5.

^{page 453 note 2} Amnesty International Report, 1980, ‘Togo’ entry. The evidence of the British mercenary, David Tomkins, was apparently given in return for payment by the Togolese authorities; his statement is quoted in Jeune Afrique, 20 September 1978, pp. 50–2.

^{page 453 note 3} Lomé, Radio, 13 January 1980.Google Scholar

^{page 454 note 1} For a more detailed discussion of these themes in Ghanaian politics, see Brown, loc. cit.

^{page 454 note 2} Quoted in Smock and Smock, op. cit. p. 249.

^{page 455 note 1} Brown, David, ‘Borderline Politics in Ghana the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 18, 4, 12 1980, pp. 575–609.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 456 note 1} Kraus, Jon, ‘The Political Economy of Conflict in Ghana’, in Africa Report, 25, 2, 1980, pp. 9–16;Google ScholarJeffries, R., ‘The Ghanaian Elections of 1979’, in African Affairs, 79, 316, 1980, pp. 397–414;Google Scholar Emmanuel Hansen and P. Collins, ‘The Army, the State and the “Rawlings Revolution” in Ghana’, in ibid. 79, 314, 1980, pp. 3–23; and Brown, David, ‘The Political Response to Immiseration: a case study of rural Ghana’, in Genéve-Afrique, 18, 1, 1980, pp. 55–74.Google Scholar

^{page 456 note 2} See, for example, the speeches and statements by Rawlings in West Africa, 4 February 1980, pp. 189–92, and 15 June 1981, pp. 1335–8.

^{page 457 note 1} Ibid. 1 December 1979, 25 February and July 1980; also 3, 10, 24, and 22–9 November 1980.

^{page 457 note 2} S. Sutton-Jones, ‘Security and Insecurity in Ghana’, in ibid. 13 October 1980.

^{page 457 note 3} N. K. Bentsi-Enchill, ‘Business as Usual’, in ibid. 10 March 1980.

^{page 457 note 4} Ibid. 7 July 1980, 6 July 1981, and 10 August 1981.

^{page 460 note 1} Compare, for example, the contemporaneous judgement of the Olympio régime in Togo by Lewis, loc. cit., with the virtual unanimity of subsequent works as to the régime's tribalistic, pro-south bias.