Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2008
It has become the common wisdom among students of sub-Saharan Africa since the publication of the so-called Berg Report that the poor performance of agriculture in the continent is a result of the economic policies pursued by most governments.1 Their intervention in the economy, according to several authors, has systematically favoured those living in the towns and cities at the expense of the vast majority in the rural areas. Urban bias is allegedly the consequence of the inability of the state to resist pressure from urban constituencies. Robert Bates, in particular, has been influential in disseminating the view that these policies are chosen because they have a political rationality, even if they are economically irrational.3 His central contention has been that state allocations in Africa have favoured urban at the expense of rural constituencies because the former are able to exert more influence on decision-makers.
1 See the World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action (Washington, D.C., 1981), commonly named after Elliot Berg, the co-ordinator of the African strategy review group.Google Scholar
2 Among a vast literature, see Bates, Robert, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the political basis of agricultural policies (Berkeley, 1981);Google ScholarLofchie, Michael F. and Commins, Stephen K., ‘Food Deficits and Agricultural Policies in Tropical Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 20, 1, 03 1981, pp. 1–25;Google ScholarEicher, Carl K. and Baker, Doyle C., Research on Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a critical survey (East Lansing, 1982);Google ScholarSandbrook, Richard, ‘The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa’, in World Development (Oxford), 14, 3, 1986, pp. 319–32;Google Scholar and Bienen, Henry S., ‘Domestic Political Considerations for Food Policy’, in Mellor, John W., Delgado, Christopher L., and Blackie, Malcolm J. (eds.), Accelerating Food Production in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore and London, 1987), pp. 296–308.Google Scholar Individual country-studies with this argument include, Lele, Uma, ‘Tanzania: Phoenix or Icarus?’, in Harberger, Arnold C. (ed.), World Economic Growth: case studies of developed and developing nations (San Francisco, 1984), pp. 159–95;Google ScholarWaterbury, John and Gersovitz, Mark (eds.), The Political Economy of Risk and Choice in Senegal (London, 1987);Google Scholar and Herbst, Jeffrey, ‘Societal Demands and Government Choice: agricultural producer price policy in Zimbabwe’, in Comparative Politics (New York), 20, 3, 1988, pp. 265–88.Google Scholar
3 See Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa,Google Scholar and Bates, Robert H., Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge, 1983).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 See, for example, Herbst, loc. cit., and Chazan, Naomi, Mortimer, Robert, Ravenhill, John, and Rothchild, Donald, Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Boulder and London, 1988).Google Scholar
5 Migdal, Joel S., Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, 1988).Google Scholar
6 Among a burgeoning literature, see Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi (eds.), The Precarious Balance: state and society in Africa (Boulder and London, 1988);Google ScholarErgas, Zaki (ed.), The African State in Transition (Basingstoke and London, 1987);CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Jean-François, , Bayart, , L'Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Paris, 1989).Google Scholar
7 On patrimonialism, see René Lemarchand, ‘The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems’, in Rothchild and Chazan (eds.), op. cit. and Bayart, op. cit. pp. 99–113 and passim.
8 The similarity between this situation and that prevailing in other countries in West Africa is underscored by Freud, Claude, Quelle coopération? Un Bilan de l'aide au développement (Paris, 1988), pp. 125–50,Google Scholar and by Pearson, Scott R. et al. , Rice in West Africa: policy and economics (Stanford, 1981).Google Scholar
9 For an exhaustive discussion of food politics in the colonial period and the early years after independence, see Guyer, Jane I., ‘The Food Economy and French Colonial Rule in Central Cameroun’, in Journal of African History (Cambridge), 19, 4, 1978, pp. 577–97,Google Scholar and ‘The Provident Societies in the Rural Economy of Yaoundé, 1945–1960’, Boston University, African Studies Series, Working Paper No. 37, 1980. The Government's change in attitude as regards food policy is well described by Guyer, Jane I. (ed.), Feeding African Cities: studies in regional social history (Manchester, 1987).Google Scholar
10 See Hart, Keith, The Political Economy of West African Agriculture (Cambridge, 1982).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11 Republic of Cameroon, , 6th Five Year Plan: 1986–1991 (Yaoundé, 1986);Google Scholar Ministry of Agriculture, Bilan diagnostic du secteur agricole de 1960 à 1980 (Yaoundé, 03 1980),Google Scholar and Plan alimentaire à long terme (Yaoundé, 02 1981);Google Scholar and Ministry of Planning, Enquête budget-consommation auprès des ménages (Yaoundé, 09 1987).Google Scholar
12 For an account of Ahidjo's ‘green revolution’ campaign and its impact on agricultural policy, see Delancey, Mark W., ‘Cameroon National Food Policies and Organizations: the green revolution and structural proliferation’, in Journal of African Studies (Los Angeles), 7, 2, Summer 1980, pp. 109–22.Google Scholar
13 The Secteur expérimentale et de modernisation de la riziculture de Yagou was started by the French colonial authorities in 1954, in order to cultivate rice on some 6,000 hectares on the banks of the Logone river. For Semry's early history, see Roupsard, Marcel, Nord Cameroun: ouverture et développement (Paris, 1987), pp. 261–74. It was reorganised in 1971 as a parastatal under the aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture, but kept its old acronym despite the change in titles.Google Scholar
14 The evolution of Semry since 1971 is well described in République française, Ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération au développement, Évaluation socio-économique du projet SEMRY au Cameroon (Paris, 1983) and Roupsard, op. cit. pp. 275–305. Other rice projects include Soderim in the West Province and the U.N.V.D.A. project in North-West Province. They have known the same kinds of difficulties as Semry, but have had only a marginal impact on overall levels of production.Google Scholar
15 See Évaluation socio-économique du projet SEMRY au Cameroon.
16 See the 1984 agriculture census for the production data. The impact of Semry on the economy of the North is described in Roupsard, op. cit. pp. 311–12.
17 Estimates of annual domestic consumption range from 130,000 tons (Semry, 1987) to 99,000 tons in the 1983–4 household budget survey published by the Ministry of Planning in 1987. The standard conversion factor for paddy to rice is 0·66.
18 For a description of this period, see Baris, P., Freud, Claude, and Zaslavsky, J., ‘La Politique agricole du Cameroun de l'indépendance à nos jours’, Paris, 03 1987.Google Scholar
19 The impact of the drought on the northern economy is describedGoogle Scholar in Roupsard, , op. cit.Google Scholar
20 See Semry, op. cit.
21 The C.C.C.E. attached a similar conditionality to a loan for the palm oil parastatal. See ‘Cameroun 1988’, in Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens (Paris), 21 10 1988, p. 2, 827,Google Scholar and ‘Un Cadeau intéressé’, in Jeune Afrique (Paris), 16 11 1988, p. 29. The equalisation fund covered three other products as well: palm oil, sugar, and meat.Google Scholar
22 Such caisses are common in French West Africa – see Pearson et al. op. cit. for descriptions of similar funds in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal.
23 Cameroon Tribune (Yaoundé), 4 02 1988, p. 4.Google Scholar
24 According to the Government's official consumer-price-index data, albeit of questionable quality, the general level of prices has increased faster than those indicated above, so that in real terms most food prices have at best kept up with inflation, while those for rice have decreased.
25 See, for example, Devarajan, Shantayanan and Melo, Jaime de, ‘Adjustment with a Fixed Exchange Rate: Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal’, in The World Bank Economic Review (Washington, D.C.), 1, 3, 05 1987, pp. 447–87,Google Scholar and Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore et al. , The Tortoise Walk: public policy and private activity in the economic development of Cameroon (Washington, D.C., 1983), U.S. Agency for International Development, Aid Evaluation Special Study No. 10.Google Scholar
26 As is well known, depreciation of the currency serves to make foreign imports more expensive and domestic goods cheaper, and many observers have argued that overvalued exchange rates have been a characteristic of ‘urban bias’ policies. By most estimates, Cameroon's foreign-exchange rate has been reasonable during the last two decades, albeit increasingly overvalued since 1986. As a member of the franc zone, Cameroon cannot change the nominal value of the C.F.A., however, and can only affect the purchasing power of its currency through other macropolicies – see Devarajan and De Melo, loc. cit. It is very doubtful if the Government is capable of targeting different policies to promote a real effective appreciation of the currency.
27 These efforts are well described in Guyer, Jane I., ‘Feeding Yaoundé’, in Guyer, (ed.), op. cit.Google Scholar
28 The world-market price for rice is projected to remain at U.S. $250 per ton well beyond 1990, according to the World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary Commodities, Vol. II,Google ScholarFood Products and Fertilizers, and Agricultural Raw Materials (Washington, D.C., 1988), p. 141. This amounts to 75 C.F.A. at the 1989 exchange rate, less than the 78 C.F.A. that Cameroonian peasants receive for a kilo of their paddy.Google Scholar
29 Interviews in Yaoundé, 1988.
30 Semry, op. cit. pp. 37–40.
31 See, for example, Ntangsi, Joe, ‘The Political and Economic Dimenions of Agricultural Policy in Cameroon’, World Bank MADIA [Managing Agricultural Development in Africa] Working Paper, Washington, D.C., 09 1986.Google ScholarNdiva, Kofele-Kale (ed.), An African Experiment in Nation Building: the bilingual Cameroon Republic since reunification (Boulder, 1980), provides a discussion that tends to underplay these factors.Google Scholar
32 Évaluation socio-économique du projet SEMRY au Cameroon.
33 Interviews in Yaoundé, 1988. On Northern involvement in the attempted coup, see Moutard, Gilbert, ‘1983–1984: deux ans de vie tourmentée au Cameroun’, in Afrique contemporaine (Paris), 135, 1985, pp. 34–45,Google Scholar and ‘Quelles chances pour la politique du Président Biya?’, in ibid. 139, 1986, pp. 20–35; and ‘Cameroon's Critical Hours’, in Afrique-Asie (Paris), 05 1984, pp. 18–20.Google Scholar
34 Bayart, L'État en Afrique, p. 84. In addition, see pp. 68–74 for a perceptive analysis of ethnic politics in Cameroon.
35 See Azarya, Victor, Dominance and Change in North Cameroon: the Fulbe aristoracy (Beverly Hills, 1976).Google Scholar
36 On this point, see Schultz, Emily, ‘From Pagan to Pullo: ethnic identity change in Northern Cameroon’, in Africa (London), 54, 1, 1984, pp. 46–63.Google Scholar
37 See Bayart, Jean-François, ‘La Société politique camerounaise, 1982–1986’, in Politique africaine (Paris), 22, 06 1986, pp. 12–13.Google Scholar
38 Interviews in Yaoundé, 1988.
39 Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, pp. 81–95.Google Scholar A general exposition of the public-choice model is included in Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, 1982),Google Scholar and a critique is offered in Cameron, David R., ‘Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources of Economic Stagnation: on Olson's rise and decline of nations’, in International Organization (Cambridge, Mass.), 42, 4, 1988, pp. 561–603.Google Scholar
40 Interviews in Yaoundé, 1988.
41 Interviews in Yaoundé, 1988.
42 The F.A.O. estimates that the C.A.R. and Chad imported, respectively, 6,000 and 17,000 tons of rice in 1986, but this seems slightly too high. Total rice consumption in the C.A.R. is between 3–4,000 tons a year, according to World Bank sources, including on-farm consumption from extensive rain-fed cultivation. Chad consumes between 12–20,000 tons a year; Republique du Tchad, Bureau Interministeriel d'études et de programmation, ‘Étude de la filiere riz’, Ndjamena, June 1988. Rice projects on the Logone and elsewhere possibly produce 4–6,000 tons. The C.A.R.'s imported rice is probably entirely from Douala, much more accessible by road than Semry in Northern Cameroon. A significant proportion of Chad's imports must presumably be Semry rice, however.
43 Interviews in Yaoundé, 1988. One official at the Ministry of Agriculture probably expressed a widespread view when he referred to the caisse de péréquation as the chasse gardée of the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development, i.e. not to be interfered with. Presumably, in a bureaucratic quid pro quo, rent-seeking by officials in the Ministry of Agriculture in another area would not be questioned by the hierarchy in the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development.
44 For example, for information about a much-heralded campaign by the Biya régime to clamp down on smuggling at the Customs, see Afrique-Asie, July 1984, pp. 20–1.
45 Dunn, John, ‘Comparing West African States’, in Dunn, (ed.), West African States: failure and promise. A Study in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, 1978), p. 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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48 See Rothchild, Donald and Chazam, Naomi (eds.), The Precarious Balance: state and society in Africa (Boulder, 1988).Google Scholar