^{Page 33 note 1} Mohammed Khalifa Rhaiam, Libya's Ambassador to Argentina, explained during a press interview that Colonel Qaddafi had ‘offered unconditional and unlimited support to Argentina… We were prepared to go on supplying arms as long as the confict lasted’. Apart from the SAM-7s, Lybia sent 20 Matra air-to-air missiles for use with Argentina' Mirage jets, AC-2 missiles, and mortars. See The Sunday Times (London), 13 05 1984, and The New York Times, 14 May 1984.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 33 note 2} Britain took this action as a result of the diplomatic crisis which erupted between the two countries when a gunman, within Libya's embassy in London, opened fire on anti-Qaddafi Libyan demonstrators. A British police constable was fatally wounded and 10 protesters were hit. For a detailed account of the various bombing and shooting incidents, see for example, The New York Times, 11–15 03, 23–30 April, and 1–4 May 1984;Google ScholarThe Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 18 and 23–24 04 1984;Google Scholar and ‘Libyan Guns in a London Square’, in The Economist (London), 21 04 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 33 note 3} The Christian Science Monitor, 19 March 1984, pp. 9 and 11.

^{Page 33 note 4} See Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Quaddafi's North African Design’, in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.), 8, 1, Summer 1983, pp. 154–78.Google Scholar

^{Page 33 note 5} In reaction to these two outrages, and given the Reagan Administration's stated mission to stem international terrorism, the United States imposed wide-ranging economic sanctions on Libya in January 1986.

^{Page 34 note 1} The New York Times, 20 03 1984.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 34 note 2} The Guardian (Lagos), 17 01 1986.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 34 note 3} Cf. Rothchild, Donald and Ravenhill, John, ‘From Carter to Regan: the global perspective on Africa becomes ascendant’. in Oye, K. A., Lieber, R. J. and Rothchild, Donald, (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States foreign policy in the 1980s (Boston, 1983), pp. 227–65.Google Scholar

^{Page 35 note 1} See, for example, Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Soviet Policies in Africa’, in African Affairs (London), 79, 316, 07 1980, pp. 297–325.Google Scholar

^{Page 35 note 2} For a detailed analysis of this place of this ideology in the conduct of Libya's external relations, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’, especially pp. 155–61.Google Scholar For an interpretive analysis of the significance of the theory in political thought, see Hajjar, Samir G., ‘The Jamahiriy Experiment in Libya: Qadhafi and Rousseau’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 18, 2, 06 1980, pp. 181–200,Google Scholar and ‘The Marxist Origins of Qadhafi's Economic Thought’, in ibid. 20, 3, September 1982, pp. 361–75.

^{Page 35 note 3} Whitaker, Jennifer S.,‘AfricaBeset’, in Foreign Affairs (New York), 62, 3, 1983, pp. 746–76.Google Scholar

^{Page 35 note 4} Newsweek (New York), 20 07 1981, p. 16.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 36 note 1} For a detailed treatment of this perspective, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’, and Rothchild and Ravenhill, op.cit.

^{Page 36 note 2} To date, Libyan ‘mobs’ have burned down three embassies in Tripoli: those of the United States, France, and, in March 1984, Jordan.

^{Page 36 note 3} Newsweek, 20 07 1981, p. 16.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 36 note 4} Whitaker, loc.cit. p. 757.

^{Page 36 note 5} Lycett, Andrew, ‘Sudan: counting the cost’, in New African (London), 02 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 37 note 1} Anyanya II, the resurrected rebel movement, which was led by John Garang — a member of the Dinka tribe — numbered about 3,000 in 1984.

^{Page 37 note 2} Extracts from Qaddafi's major speech of 2 March 1984, in Tripoli. See The New York Times, 20 March 1984, p. 4.

^{Page 38 note 1} In other words, could not the real target of the attack have been the opposition leader? Luckily, for the members of el-Mahdi's household, the bomb, which fell on his house, failed to detonate.

^{Page 38 note 2} See, for example, The New York Times, 20 March 1984.

^{Page 38 note 3} This attack was called a ‘strange raid’ by Economist, 24 March 1984: ‘Mr Numeiri often cries wolf and blames Colonel Qaddafi when things go wrong. So several conspiracy theories are circulating… Not all western observers accept the TU-22 identification’.

^{Page 38 note 4} Newsweek, 2 04 1984.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 38 note 5} Throughout, not even the authoritative reporters for The New York Times were able to confirm who was really responsible for this air raid ‘which the Sudan, Egypt and the United States say was carried out by Libya’. See, for example, the issue of 26 March 1984, p. 3.

^{Page 39 note 1} Iraq was the only other country known to have any TU-22 aircraft outside the Soviet bloc.

^{Page 39 note 2} See The New York Times, 19 March 1984.

^{Page 39 note 3} Newsweek, 2 April 1984.

^{Page 39 note 4} The New York Times, 20 March 1984.

^{Page 39 note 5} Through Belgium which, in the absence of diplomatic relations between Washington and Tripoli, represents American interests.

^{Page 39 note 6} See ‘2 AWACS Aircraft Sent to Bolster after Raid: a reaction against Libya’, in The New York Times, 19 03 1984, pp. 1 and 8.Google Scholar

^{Page 40 note 1} Ibid. 20 March 1984.

^{Page 40 note 2} The National Alliance for Salvation (N.A.S.), an organisation that grouped together the Sudan's opposition elements, was the prime mover in the coup.

^{Page 40 note 3} The Economist, 20 July 1985, p. 50.Google Scholar See also ‘Sudan's Pact with Libya has Nothing to Do with East–West Rivalry’, in The Christian Science Monitor (Weekly edn.), 24–30 08 1985, p. 26.Google Scholar

^{Page 40 note 4} See ‘Gaddafi Gives New Sudanese Government Condition for Support’, in The Guardian, 9 04 1985, p. 5.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 41 note 1} Quoted in The Punch (Lagos), 18 10 1985, p. 11.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 41 note 2} See Taban, Alfred, ‘Why Sudan Still Simmers’, in The Middle East (London), 11 1985, pp. 28–9.Google Scholar

^{Page 41 note 3} See ‘Sudan: Garang the bogeyman’, in New African, November 1985.

^{Page 41 note 4} According to the Sudanese Minister of the Interior, Abbas Medani, the extremists — who belonged to an underground organisation, the Islamic Jihad — had planned to murder government officials and the leaders of political parties.

^{Page 42 note 1} The Economist, 20 July 1985, p. 50.

^{Page 42 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 42 note 3} For a detailed analysis of why Qaddafi had to withdraw his troops from Chad in 1981, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’.

^{Page 42 note 4} Note that soon after Chad's independence from France in 1960, civil strife erupted between black southerners and Muslim northerners. The conflict has continued ever since, with only an occasional respite. Initially, Oueddei and Habré were allies in the Muslim war against the south, and although under the 1979 Lagos accord, promoted by Nigeria, both leaders agreed to work together (Oueddei as President and Habré as Minister of Defence), they soon quarrelled, and the power struggle has gone on since then, with Libya usually backing Oueddei and France sometimes supporting Habré. In December 1980, Habré fled to the Sudan after failing to unseat the Libyan-backed Oueddei. Soon afterwards, Qaddafi had to withdraw his troops when so requested by Oueddei — despite the announcement that Libya would merge with Chad — and this left the Chadian President more vulnerable than he realised. In June 1982, Habré and his army staged a big comeback to Chad; they defeated Oueddei and sent him fleeing into exile across the Chari river.

^{Page 43 note 1} For detailed reports, see ‘The Colonel Strikes South’, in Newsweek, 22 08 1983;Google Scholar‘The Bitter Life of Chad’, in The New York Times, 4 09 1983;Google Scholar and ‘Chad: one for Gaddafi’, in Time (New York), 22 08 1983.Google Scholar

^{Page 43 note 2} France studiously described the paratroopers as ‘trainers’ and ‘advisers’.

^{Page 44 note 1} By February 1984, the number of Frence troops stood at 3,000. See ‘French Settle in Chad for Long Stay’. in The New York Times, 20 02 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 44 note 2} Ironically, on both occasions, Habré was a leader of the rebel forces that France had opposed.

^{Page 44 note 3} Newsweek, 22 August 1983.Google Scholar

^{Page 44 note 4} Ibid.

^{Page 45 note 1} For the strategic implications of the setting up of the R.D.F. for Africa and the Gulf, see, for example, Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Diego Garcia and Africa's Security’, in Third World Quarterly (London), 4, 1, 01 1982, pp. 104–20.Google Scholar

^{Page 45 note 2} For details, see Newsweek, 22 August 1983.

^{Page 45 note 3} See Time, 15 August 1983.

^{Page 45 note 4} Ibid.

^{Page 45 note 5} Newsweek, 22 August 1983.

^{Page 46 note 1} See The New York Times, 20 February 1984.

^{Page 46 note 2} See New African, March 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 46 note 3} Le Monde, quoted in West Africa (London), 1984, p. 298.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 47 note 1} New African, March 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 47 note 2} Time, 15 August 1983.Google Scholar

^{Page 47 note 3} See Ibid.

^{Page 47 note 4} Ibid.

^{Page 47 note 5} For the previous rôle of the O.A.U. in the Chad conflict, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’.

^{Page 48 note 1} See New African, February 1984: and ‘Chad: talk abd talks’, in Africa Report (Washington, D.C.), 01–02 1984, pp. 24–5.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 48 note 2} Norland, Donald R., ‘Libya's Most Overlooked Misdeed: military occupation of Chad’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 18–24 01 1986, p. 26.Google Scholar

^{Page 48 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 49 note 1} Whitaker, loc. cit. p. 754.

^{Page 49 note 2} Note that the S.A.D.R. was unilaterally proclaimed by Polisario in 1976. In February 1982, at the 38th Ordinary Session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers, it was admitted as the 51st member. The admission, however, proved quited controversial and split the O.A.U. down the middle: those who favoured the move and those who opposed it. For details, see Červenka, Zdenek and Legum, Colin, ‘The OAU in 1982: a severe setback to African unity’, in Legum, (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1982–1983 (London and New York, 1984), pp. A42–56.Google Scholar For an overview of the background and politics of the struggle over the Western Sahara, see, among others, Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, The Western Saharans: background to conflict (London and Totowa, N.J., 1980);Google Scholar and Damis, John, Conflict in Northwest Africa: the Western Sahara dispute (Stanford, 1983).Google Scholar

^{Page 49 note 3} Qaddafi had described the Ndjamena régime at the Tripoli meeting as ‘the rebellious government of Habré’, See Červenka and Legum, op.cit. p. A54.

^{Page 50 note 1} Ibid.

^{Page 50 note 2} See Whitaker, loc.cit.Google Scholar

^{Page 50 note 3} See New African, March 1984, especially pp. 34–5.

^{Page 50 note 4} For the background and details of this stance, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’.

^{Page 51 note 1} Červenka and Legum, op.cit. p. A43.

^{Page 51 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 51 note 3} See, for example, ibid.

^{Page 51 note 4} See the Appendix in ibid. p. A55.

^{Page 52 note 1} Ibid. p. A44.

^{Page 52 note 2} Ibid. p. A55.

^{Page 52 note 3} For instances of this policy in Soviet relations with Africa, see Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Ideology and Pragmation: the Soviet role in Nigeria, 1960–1977’, in Orbis (Philadelphia), 21, 1, Winter 1978, pp. 803–30, and ‘Soviet Policies in Africa’.Google Scholar

^{Page 53 note 1} See, for example, Červenka and Legum, op. cit.

^{Page 53 note 2} Note that President Daniel arap Moi was the incumbent O.A.U. Chairman at the time. If things had gone smoothly, he would have handed over the office to Qaddafi.

^{Page 53 note 3} See Červenka and Legum, op.cit.

^{Page 53 note 4} For details of the offer of 100,000 barrels of light crude oil as the price for Sierra Leone's attendance at the Tripoli meeting, for example, see Africa Now, September 1982.

^{Page 53 note 5} Newsweek, 20 June 1983.Google Scholar

^{Page 54 note 1} See New African, March 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 54 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 54 note 3} See ‘Qaddafy Talks About His Neighbours’, in Africa Report, 05–06 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 54 note 4} For details, see New African, March 1984.

^{Page 54 note 5} See African Report, May–June 1984;Google Scholar and ‘Moroccan Wall is Holding Off the Rebels’, in New York Times, 1 02 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 54 note 6} West Africa, 1984, p. 245.Google Scholar

^{Page 55 note 1} For some background reading on the African bloc at the U.N., see Mazrui, Ali A., Africa's International Relations: the diplomacy of dependency and change (London and Boulder, 1977), ch. 10.Google Scholar

^{Page 55 note 2} The candidature committee decides, often under the guidance of the O.A.U., what individuals to propose for a particular post at the United Nations and what countries will serve on verious committees.

^{Page 55 note 3} See, for example, the text of the full-length press interview with Qaddafi in Africa Now, February 1983.

^{Page 56 note 1} For details, see The New York Times, 25 January 1984.

^{Page 56 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 56 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 56 note 4} See ‘Libya Accused at UN, but US is the Target’, in ibid. 5 April 1984.

^{Page 57 note 1} Ibid.

^{Page 57 note 2} See ‘Sudan Presses UN to Condemn Libya for Air Raid on City’, in The New York Times, 28 03 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 57 note 3} Ibid. 5 April 1984.

^{Page 57 note 4} For a recent analysis of the American predicament at the United Nations–characterised by Ambassador Kirkpatrick as ‘essentially impotent, without influence, heavily outvoted, and isolated’ –see Bernstein, Richard, ‘The United Nations vs. The United States’, in The New York Times Magazine, 22 01 1984, p. 18.Google Scholar

^{Page 58 note 1} The American ‘loyalty test’ was prepared by Ambassador Kirkpatrick's U.N. mission, in ‘closest co-operation’ with the State Department. For details, see West Africa, 1984, p. 790.

^{Page 58 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 58 note 3} See ibid.

^{Page 59 note 1} See, for example, ‘Differences of Opinion Tie UN's Hands in Fight Against Terrorism’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 3 05 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 59 note 2} For a background analysis to this development, see Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Black Africa and Israel: towards a rapprochement?’, in Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1982–83 (London and New York, 1984), pp. A120–32.Google Scholar

^{Page 59 note 3} See ibid. For the ramifications of the Afro–Arab alliance in world affairs, see, for instance, Chibwe, E. C., Afro-Arab Relations in the New World Order (London, 1977);Google Scholar and Wai, Dunstan M., ‘African-Arba Relations: interdepence or misplaced optimism?’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, 2, 06 1983, pp. 187–213.Google Scholar

^{Page 60 note 1} Africa Report, November–December 1983.

^{Page 60 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 60 note 3} See Ogunbadejo, ‘Black Africa and Israel’, p. A121.

^{Page 60 note 4} See ‘Herzog Visits Doe’, in West Africa, 1984, p. 305.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 60 note 5} Africa Report, November–December 1983.Google Scholar

^{Page 61 note 1} Note that Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, and Malawi were the only four African states that never severed their links with Israel, even after the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Egypt re-established ties after the Camp David accord in 1978, and in 1982 Zaïre became the first black African state to resume relations with Tel Aviv. For a detailed analysis of the politics and wider aspects of this policy, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Black Africa and Israel’.

^{Page 61 note 2} Africa Now, September 1982.Google Scholar

^{Page 61 note 3} See, for example, Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Conflict in Africa: a case study of the Shaba crisis, 1977’, in World Affairs (Washington, D.C.), 141, 3, Winter 1979, pp. 219–34.Google Scholar

^{Page 61 note 4} Africa Now, September 1982.

^{Page 61 note 5} Africa Report, March–April 1984.

^{Page 61 note 6} Quoted in West Africa, 1984, p. 299.Google Scholar Note that these points are essentially true. See, for instance, Ogunbadejo, ‘Conflict in Africa’; Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., ‘Why Africa's Weak States Persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood’, in World Politics (Princeton), xxxv, 1, 10 1982, pp. 1–24,Google Scholar and Personal Rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982).Google Scholar

^{Page 62 note 1} See Africa Report, March–April 1984.

^{Page 62 note 2} There are roughly half a million Moroccan Jews in Israel, and even now it is estimated that there may still be as many as 20,000 in Morocco. In May 1984, 11 Israeli Members of Parliament and 24 civic leaders attended a congress of Jews of Moroccan origin in Rabat. Granted, there are no diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco; all the same, King Hassan has been friendlier to Israelis than most of his fellow Arabs. In 1981, he received Shimon Peres, the leader of the opposition Labour Party, and since 1982, Israelis have been allowed to tour Morocco privately. See ‘Morocco and Israel: keep it kosher’, in The Economist, 19 May 1984; and Newsweek, 28 May 1984.

^{Page 62 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 63 note 1} For an extended discussion of this argument, see Ogunbadejo, ‘Qaddafi's North African Design’.

^{Page 63 note 2} As U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger has put it: ‘We have a strategic interest in making sure that Muammar Kaddafi doesn't increase his influence’. Newsweek, 22 August 1983.

^{Page 63 note 3} See, for example, Wells, Rick, ‘Nimeiry Under Siege’, in Africa Report, 05–06 1984, pp. 60–2.Google Scholar

^{Page 64 note 1} In early 1984, for example, a new umbrella opposition force in the South had appealed for a ‘progressive and socialist movement aimed at the liberation of northern as well as southern Sudan’. The Christian Science Monitor, 3 05 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 64 note 2} The Economist, 24 March 1984.

^{Page 64 note 3} See, for instance, The New York Times, 18 and 20 March 1984.

^{Page 65 note 1} The Christian Science Monitor, 4 May 1984.

^{Page 65 note 2} See ‘Try Your Luck in the Snakepit, Mr Chernenko?’, in The Economist, 25 02 1984.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 65 note 3} See, among others, Ogunbadejo, ‘Soviet Policies in Africa’, and Rubin, Barry, ‘The Reagan Administration and the Middle East’, in Oye, , Lieber, , and Rothchild, (eds.), op.cit. ch. 12.Google Scholar

^{Page 65 note 4} Rothchild and Ravenhill, op.cit. p. 362.

^{Page 66 note 1} See Africa Report, March–April 1984.

^{Page 66 note 2} For a detailed treatment of this point, see Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Africa's Nuclear Capability’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 22, 1, 03 1984, pp. 19–43,Google Scholar and ‘Black Africa and Israel’; Chazan, Naomi, ‘The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israeli foreign policy towards South Africa’, in African Affairs, 82, 327, 04 1983, pp. 169–99;Google ScholarStevens, Richard P. and Elmessiri, Abdelwahab M. (eds.), Israel and South Africa: the progression of a relationship (New Brunswick, 1977);Google ScholarAdelman, Kenneth, ‘Israel–South Africa: the club of pariahs’, in Africa Report, 11–12 1980;Google ScholarHusain, Azim, ‘The West, South Africa and Israel: a strategic triangle’, in Third World Quarterly, 4, 1, 01, 1982, pp. 44–73;Google ScholarHauser, Rita, ‘Israel, South Africa and the West’, in The Washington Quarterly, 2, 3, Summer 1979, pp. 75–82;Google Scholar and Mazrui, Ali A., ‘Zionism and Apartheid: strange bedfellows or natural allies?’, in Alternatives (New Delhi), IX, 1, Summer 1983, pp. 73–97.Google Scholar

^{Page 67 note 1} See ‘Arab Aid to Africa is on Course’, in African Business (London), 02 1984, p. 49;Google Scholar and West Africa, 1984, p. 780.Google Scholar

^{Page 67 note 2} See, for example, ‘Israle's 190% Inflation Sparks Debate’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 12 03 1984, p. 11.Google Scholar

^{Page 67 note 3} Israel spends 30 per cent (the highest in the world) of its gross national product on defence. See The New York Times, 29 May, 1984.

^{Page 67 note 4} As G. Henry M. Schuler of Georgetown University's Centre for Strategic and International Studies has argued in ibid. 30 April 1984.

^{Page 67 note 5} For instance, despite the fact that Libya's revenues from oil exports had dropped from $220,000 million in 1980 to $100,000 million in 1983, that did not prevent Qaddafi, even at the expense of the non-availablity of essential consumer goods in Libya, from moving into Chad or of not granting military aid to the Anyanya guerrillas in southern Sudan.

^{Page 67 note 6} See The New York Times, 30 April 1984. French economic interests in Libya, and the corresponding need to keep good relations with Tripoli, have affected the extent and pace of the Government's response to Qaddafi in Chad. Admittedly, France has been involved in trying to keep the country from being overrun; but, so far, President Mitterand has ruled out the possibility of using force to recover the northern portion of Chad. And the growing hostile French public opinion against further intervention there, would, no doubt, steadily increase the nervousness at the Elysée about confronting Qaddafi.

^{Page 68 note 1} See ‘Europe's “Preemptive Rejection”’, in The Christian Science Monitor, 11–17 01 1986.Google Scholar

^{Page 68 note 2} Ibid. 24 May 1984.

^{Page 68 note 3} A widely reported attempt took place in May 1984, when at least 20 gunmen fired on a barracks usually used by the Libyan leader as a residence. After several hours of fighting, loyalist troops overcame the attackers. See The New York Times, 9 May 1984, pp. 1 and 6. At least two other major abortive coups were reported in The Christian Science Monitor, 5–11 October 1985, p. 2.