^{page 579 note 1} Comité Inter-états de Lutte contre la Sechéresse dans le Sahel.

^{page 579 note 2} As many as 100,000 persons are estimated to have died of starvation or related causes in these countries. Some 7 million cattle have perished at an estimated loss of over $288 million, while crop losses have been in excess of $183 million.

^{page 580 note 1} Convention portant création du Comité permanent Inter-états do Lutte contre la Sechéresse dons le Sahel, Ouagadougou, 12 September 1973.

^{page 581 note 1} The Gambia was formerly a British colony, and Cape Verde was part of Portuguese Africa. These countries became members of the C.I.L.S.S. in December 1973 and March 1976, respectively. Although Chad was not represented by a Minister at the March 1973 meeting in Ouagadougou, it is recognised as an original member of the C.I.L.S.S.

^{page 581 note 2} Ousmane Silla, a Senegalese sociologist who is presently working as a technical advisor to the C.I.L.S.S., has emphasised the importance of this tradition; Ouagadougou, 29 June 1977.

^{page 581 note 3} Berg, Elliott, ‘The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa’, in The American Political Science Review (Menasha), 54, 06 1960, p. 402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 581 note 4} The Federation of French West Africa, of which Dakar was the capital, consisted of Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey (Benin), Soudan (Mali), Niger, Mauritania, and Upper Volta. Brazzaville was the capital of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa, which included the French Congo, Chad, Central Africa, and Gabon.

^{page 582 note 1} The list includes the Banque ouest africaine de développement (B.O.A.D.), the Commission du bassin du lac Tchad (C.B.L.T.), the Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'ouest (C.E.A.O.), the Communauté économique du bétail et de la viande (C.E.B.E.V.), the Comilé interafricain d'études hydrauliques (C.I.E.H.), the Conseil de l'entente, the Liptako Gourma Commission, the Organisation commune de luite antiacridienne et de lutte antiaviare (O.C.L.A.L.A.V.), the Organisation internationale contre le criquet migrateur africain (O. I.C.M.A.), and the Organisation pour la mise en vallé de la vallé du fleuve Sénégal (O.M.V.S.).

^{page 582 note 2} Interview with Antoine Dakouré, first Regional Co-ordinator of C.I.L.S.S. and former Upper Volta Minister of Rural Development, Ouagadougou, 22 July 1977.

^{page 582 note 3} Senegal is a notable exception to this overall pattern. Its capital, Dakar, doubled as the headquarters of the French West African Federation. As such, education, social services, communications and transportation infrastructure were concentrated in Senegal. Since the dismantling of the Federation at the time of independence, however, Senegal has suffered from the burden of a level of trained manpower and infrastructural development that its domestic economy simply cannot accommodate.

^{page 583 note 1} The Marshall Plan was conceived by the U.S. after World War II as a regional aid package designed to promote political stability in Western Europe by subsidising economic rehabilitation. But there was no wealthy super-power waiting in the wings prepared to finance a large-scale regional development programme for the Sahel. Besides, the European ‘miracle’ was possible largely because a solid industrial infrastructure and an indigenous population with modern technological skills already existed and served as a foundation on which to build.

^{page 583 note 2} Since 1977 the C.I.L.S.S. secretariat has been re-organised, and the salary of the Executive Secretary is now paid by the member-states; this ended a situation in which he owed a dual loyalty to the C.I.L.S.S. and to the U.N.

^{page 584 note 1} If you give a man a fish he can eat for a day; if you give a man a fishing pole he can feed himself indefinitely – without your help.

^{page 585 note 1} The O.E.C.D. was created at the end of World War II to help co-ordinate the reconstruction of Europe with Marshall Plan funds. Its secretariat is in Paris, but the U.S. has always played a prominent rôle in the organisation. Today's membership includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

^{page 586 note 1} United Nations, E.C.O.S.O.C. Resolution 1759 (LIV), 18 May 1973, and General Assembly Resolution 3054 (XXVIII,), 17 October 1973.

^{page 586 note 2} C.I.L.S.S., Conférence des Chefs d'états des six pays touchés par la sechéresse, Ouagadougou,11–12 septembre 1973, p. 7.Google Scholar

^{page 586 note 3} United Nations Development Programme, 24th Session, Implementation of the Medium-Term and Long-Term Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme in the Sudano-Sahelian Region, DP/252, 31 03 1977, p. 6.Google Scholar

^{page 586 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 586 note 5} United Nations, General Assembly, 30th Session, Consideration of the Economic and Social Situation in the Sudano-Sahelian Region Stricken by Drought and Measures to be Taken for the Benefit of that Region, A/10346, 14 11 1975, p. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 587 note 1} The U.N. Trust Fund episode has convinced the Sahelians of the importance of attracting money to their own Special Fund. On 28 April 1977 the C.I.L.S.S. Council of Ministers adopted more elaborate statutes governing their Special Sahel Fund in an attempt to answer the critics who said that the legal requirements for the African-controlled fund were too lax. But the fact remains that the U.N. Fund enjoys a tremendous competitive advantage. It benefits from both the institutional legitimacy of the world body, as well as the momentum gained from already having attracted a substantial amount of money.

^{page 588 note 1} Representatives of 20 countries and about 30 international and non-governmental organisations attended the inaugural meeting of the Club.

^{page 588 note 2} C.I.L.S.S., Conseil des Ministres, 3ème Réunion, Compte rendu des travaux, Niamey, 03 1975, pp. 10–11.Google Scholar

^{page 588 note 3} C.I.L.S.S./Information No. 3, Report on the Conference Inaugurating the Club des amis, Ouagadougou, 15 07 1976, pp. 5–7.Google Scholar

^{page 588 note 4} Henry, Paul-Marc, ‘Le Club des amis du Sahel, un cadre nouveau pour la coopération internationale’, in Revue juridique et politique de l'indépendance et coopération (Paris), 30, 12 1976, p. 399.Google Scholar

^{page 590 note 1} Browne, Robert S., ‘The Demands for a New International Economic Order’, Part I, in Review of Black Political Economy (New York), 7, Spring, 1977, p. 315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 590 note 2} Gosovic, Branislav and Ruggie, Gerard, ‘Origins and Evolution of the Concept’, in International Social Science Journal (Paris), 28, 1976, pp. 642–3.Google Scholar

^{page 591 note 1} This point was made by Elliott Berg in a paper presented at a conference on U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa, Harvard University, April 1977.

^{page 591 note 2} By September 1977 the Paris talks had ended in a deadlock. The industrialised countries refused to concede support for measures that would alter the structure of international economic relations. They rejected the South's demands for a moratorium on repayment of its $200–$250 billion debt burden, and refused to pledge that the prosperous countries would provide an automatic percentage of aid yearly to the poorer nations.

In March 1978 a compromise was reached in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The developing countries will press for measures in line with the reduced demand of debt relief to the poorest of the L.D.C.s. The agreement left open the possibility for the creditor states to adjust the repayment of earlier loans to the easier terms under which development aid is now being granted, instead of simply cancelling them.

^{page 592 note 1} This development was discussed by Hirschelle Challenor in ‘The Dilemmas of a Resurgent Congressional Rôle in the Formation of Foreign Policy’, at a conference on U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa, Harvard University, April 1977.

^{page 593 note 1} The budgeted costs of the roads that are being built by a Dutch firm and the Malian Ministry of Public Works are $34,677.42/km and $24,020/km, respectively.

^{page 593 note 2} The General Assembly adopted Resolutions 3253 (xxix) of December 1974 and 31/180 of 21 December 1976, which urged all member-states and U.N. bodies to intensify their efforts to attain the objectives stated in the relief and recovery programmes formulated by the Sahelian countries. The Economic and Social Council adopted Resolutions 1918 (Lviii) of May 1975 and 2103 (Lxiii) of 3 August 1977, which requested U.N.S.O. to continue both its close co-operation with the C.I.L.S.S., and its efforts to ensure co-operation and co-ordination among the programmes and organisations of the U.N. in the implementation of medium- and long-term assistance programmes for the Sahel.

^{page 594 note 1} The most controversial budget item is the sum of $4,278,000 to cover the cost of purchasing road-building equipment. The Malians protested unsuccessfully, arguing that all of the other private firms they have dealt with furnish such equipment at their own expense.

^{page 594 note 2} Since the actual administrative costs to U.N. agencies range from 12–18 per cent for any given project, the agreement to charge only 4 per cent overhead means that the Office of Project Execution is actually subsidising the construction of roads in Mali from its own budget.