¹ See, for example, Berger, Peter L. and Bobby, Godsell (eds.), A Future South Africa: visions, strategies, and realities (Boulder and London, 1988), pp. 268ff.Google Scholar; Welsh, David, ‘F. W. de Klerk and Constitutional Change’, in Issue: a journal of opinion (Atlanta), xviii, 2, Summer 1990, p. 9Google Scholar; or, in a somewhat different vein, Giliomee, Herman and Schlemmer, Lawrence, From Apartheid to Nation-Building (Cape Town, 1989), pp. 180ff.Google Scholar

² See, for example, André du Toit, ‘Applying the Framework: South Africa as another case of transition from authoritarian rule?’, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) Conference on ‘South Africa in Transition’, Port Elizabeth, 21–23 June 1990; and Sparks, Allister, The Mind of South Africa (New York, 1990), pp. 379ff.Google Scholar The study by Guillermo, O'Donnell, Schmitter, Philippe C. and Laurence, Whitehead (eds.), Transition from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, 1986) is frequently cited.Google Scholar

³ The Washington Post, 7 01 1985.Google Scholar

⁴ For a recent discussion of the issue, see Cronin, Jeremy, ‘Inside Which Circle?’, in Transformation (Durban), 10, 1989, pp. 70–8.Google Scholar

⁵ Government thinking about the new constitution evolved rapidly in 1990, albeit dominated by the search for a mechanism to prevent what was dubbed ‘simplistic majoritarianism’. The Minister for Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen, hinted in February that ethnic groups would still be represented in a new parliament, then suggested in June that groups would be based on language and culture rather than race; The Star (Johannesburg), 29 June 1990. Although the Deputy Minister for Constitutional Development explained to the Foreign Correspondents Association in October that regions and/or parties would have equal representation in one chamber of parliament, and that there would be no groups based on race, language, or culture, this statement was soon contradicted by Viljoen, who reintroduced the idea of group rights (The Washington Post, 4 November 1990).

⁶ The Freedom Charter was adopted in 1955 by the Congress of the People, attended by leaders and members of the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the white radical Congress of Democrats, the South African Coloured People's Organisation, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

⁷ Mboya, Tom, ‘The Party System and Democracy in Africa’, in Wilfred, Carter and Martin, Kilson (eds.), The Africa Reader: independent Africa (New York, 1970), p. 215.Google Scholar

⁸ Wallerstein, Immanuel, Africa –the Politics of Unity: an analysis of a contemporary social movement (New York, 1967), ch. 9.Google Scholar

⁹ Wallerstein, Immanuel, Africa – the Politics of Independence: an interpretation of modern African history (New York, 1961), p. 95.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Carter, Gwendolen M. (ed.), African One-Party States (Ithaca, 1962), p. 2.Google Scholar

¹¹ Carter and Kilson (eds.), op. cit. p. 216.

¹² Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite (London, 1963), p. 73.Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid. p. 75.

¹⁴ According to the 1955 Freedom Charter: ‘Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies which make law; All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country; The rights of all people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex.’ Joining the ANC: an introductory handbook to the African National Congress (Johannesburg, May 1990), p. 56.

¹⁵ ‘Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa’, in ibid. p. 65.

¹⁶ Joining the ANC, p. 5.

¹⁷ Transcript of interview with Nelson Mandela at The Washington Post, 26 June 1990 – not published in its entirety.

¹⁸ Joining the ANC, p. 14.

¹⁹ Interview with Slovo, Joe, General Secretary of the S.A.C.P., The Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 26 07 1990.Google Scholar

²⁰ Estimates of Umkhonto's strength vary greatly, from between 2,000 and 4,000 (Institute of Strategic Studies, Pretoria) to as many as 10,000, of whom 400 or so were operating inside South Africa (according to Howard Barrell, a Zimbabwe-based journalist). See Lodge, Tom, ‘State of Exile: the African National Congress of South Africa, 1976–1986’, in Philip, Frankel, Noam, Pines, and Mark, Swilling (eds.), State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (London, 1988), p. 233.Google ScholarIn addition to Umkhonto personnel, a large number of civilian exiles, including children, were organised by the A.N.C., estimated in the Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 9–15 March 1990, to be as many as 20,000 to 30,000, mainly in Tanzania. The Citizen (Johannesburg), 2 October 1990, reported that the total number of A.N.C. exiles had been estimated by governmental sources to be at least 21,000, of whom about 7,000 were thought to be members of Umkhonto.Google Scholar

²¹ Immediately before the re-launching of the South African Communist Party in July 1990, the Government released information – some of which was later admitted to be inaccurate – concerning a ‘plot’ to prepare for armed struggle, supposedly hatched by members of the S.A.C.P. According to the A.N.C., a recent meeting had discussed issues related to ‘Operation Vula’, although this underground network had been launched previously.Google Scholar

²² The first two of these regional conferences were held on 29–30 September 1990 in Cape Town and Johannesburg.Google Scholar

²³ See, for example, Matiwana, Mizana, Walters, Shirley, and Groener, Zelda, The Struggle for Democracy (Centre for Adult and Continuing Education, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 1989), pp. 9ff.Google Scholar

²⁴ ‘ANC Sends War-Talk Man to Preach Peace’, in Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 16 09 1990.Google Scholar

²⁵ See ‘The Current Conjuncture, Programme of Action and the Restructuring of National Politics’, dated 6 April 1990, a document written and circulated by Mohammed Valli Moosa, the assistant secretary-general of the U.D.F.

²⁶ See, for example, Steve Friedman, ‘People's Power: it's up to the civics’, in Weekly Mail, 27–29 07 1990.Google Scholar

²⁷ ‘The Current Conjuncture’, op. cit.

²⁸ See also Niddrie, David, ‘The Duel over Dual Power’, in Work in Progress (Johannesburg), 67, 06 1990.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Horoya (Conakry), 2204, 10 January 1976, and Diane, Lansana, in World Marxist Review (Toronto), 19, 8, 08 1976.Google Scholar

³⁰ As advocated in the section on ‘Building Organs of People's Power’ in the programme of action adopted by the Western Cape A.N.C. regional conference on 30 September 1990. The distinction between people's and party power was lost in the instruction that ‘Each branch must take some measures to set up an infrastructure for Street committees’.

³¹ The originally scheduled full-scale A.N.C. congress was downgraded to the status of a consultative conference that could discuss policies but not elect leaders. The excuse given was that it would have been unfair to hold a congress before most exiles had returned, but the real reason was probably the desire to delay the day of reckoning because a number of leaders were afraid of losing their membership of the national executive committee.

³² Estimates of the numbers of S.A.C.P. members in the A.N.C.'s national executive committee have varied from just a few to a large majority. See Africa Confidential (London), 31, I, 12 January 1990, and Front File (London), 4, 13, October 1990.

³³ See Colleen, McCaul, ‘The Wild Card: Inkatha and contemporary black politics’, in Frankel, , Pines, , and Swilling, (eds.), op. cit. pp. 146–73.Google Scholar

³⁴ Gavin Woods, ‘Black Violence: a comprehensive analysis’, Inkatha Foundation, November 1989. For a very different analysis, see John Aitchison, ‘The Pietermaritzburg Conflict – Experience and Analysis’, Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1990.Google Scholar

³⁵ Made at a rally held in Durban on 25 February 1990, Mandela's call met with no applause from the audience of over 100,000.Google Scholar

³⁶ The South African Youth Congress, the largest of the U.D.F. affiliates and slated to become the A.N.C.'s Youth League, resolved in April 1990 ‘to isolate Buthelezi, declare him an enemy of the people and urge Mandela not to meet with him’. It also called upon Umkhonto to help people in Natal defend themselves against Inkatha, and demanded the removal of KwaZulu police from the areas where violence was taking place (The New Nation (Johannesburg), 20–26 04 1990).Google Scholar

³⁷ ‘Year of Mass Action for the Transfer of Power to the People’, Statement of the National Executive Committee on the Occasion of the 79th Anniversary of the African National Congress, 8 January 1991, p. II – delivered by Nelson Mandela.Google Scholar

³⁸ Simkins, Charles, The Prisoners of Tradition and the Politics of Nation-Building (South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 30–1.Google Scholar