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² See Holmquist, Frank and Ford, Michael, ‘Kenya: slouching toward democracy’, in Africa Today (Denver), 39, 3, 1992, pp. 97–111.Google Scholar

³ For example, Chhibber, Ajay and Fischer, Stanley (eds.), Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC, World Bank, 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ For example, Thomas, Vinod et al., Restructuring Economies in Distress: policy reform and the World Bank (Oxford, 1991),Google Scholar and World Bank, Kenya: re-investing in stabilization and growth through public sector adjustment (Washington, DC, 1991).Google Scholar

⁵ For example, Duncan, Alex and Howell, John (eds.), Structural Adjustment and the African Farmer (London, 1992).Google Scholar

⁶ The few published studies of public sector reform and economic adjustment are quite general–for example, Bagolgun, M. Jide and Mutahaba, Gelase, Economic Restructuring and African Public Administration (West Hartford, CT, 1989).Google Scholar

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⁹ The lack of consistent sets of data on total number of employees in each of these categories, as well a their emoluments, leads to conflicting figures in donor studies, government reports, and official statistics. In principle, the national budget only makes financial provision for the personnel emoluments (principally salaries and housing) of the civil service, but in practice it may also include subventions to cover those working in the parastatals and local authorities.Google Scholar

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¹¹ World Bank, Kenya, p. 48.Google Scholar

¹² Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), p. 19. Analysing the growth of teachers from a different perspective, the World Bank, Kenya, p. 48, set the growth rate at 7·5 per cent per annum between 1968 and 1990.Google Scholar

¹³ By 1991 the recurrent expenditure of the Ministry of Education was 40·7 per cent of the total national recurrent budget, and personnel costs took 81·3 per cent of the Ministry's allocation. World Bank, Kenya, p. 51.Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Republic of Kenya, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (Nairobi, 1965).Google Scholar

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¹⁷ Cohen, John M. and Hook, Richard M., ‘Decentralized Planning in Kenya’, in Public Administration and Development (Chichester, Sussex), 7, 1, 1987, pp. 77–93,Google Scholar and Barkan, Joel D. and Chege, Michael, ‘Decentralising the State: district focus and the politics of reallocation in Kenya’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 27, 3, 09 1989, pp. 431–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Initially the strategy sought to transfer central headquarters personnel to the field. But while some progress was made in this effort, it was inevitable that the staffing of larger district-level units would increase the number of subordinate and middle management cadres. For example, new posts, such as assistant district development officer and district statistical officer, were established to staff the new planning units.

¹⁸ Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), p. 20.

¹⁹ World Bank, Kenya, pp. 51 and 54.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 51–2.

²¹ For example, a Ministry of Arid, Semi-Arid, and Waste Land was hived off from the Ministry of Planning and National Development; the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock was expanded into the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock Development, and Supplies and Marketing; and employment matters were catered for by the Ministry of Labour and the new Ministries of Manpower Development and Employment, and Technical Training and Applied Technology.Google Scholar

²² This Africa-wide practice is best explored by Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., Personal Rule in Black Africa: prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1982),Google Scholar and Sandbrook, Richard, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (Cambridge, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ Holmquist and Ford, loc. cit. p. 106.

²⁴ The Public Service Commission interviews and hires staff above job group G, and has the legal responsibility of ratifying the dismissal of staff at lower levels. The Directorate of Personnel Management authorises the establishment for ministries and departments by job group. Responsibility for filling civil service positions rests with the Principal Finance and Establishment Officer of each ministry, together with his supporting Chief Personnel Officer, and legally they are only authorised to hire when established posts are vacant and adequate budget funds have been voted.

²⁵ In this particular case the strategy backfired when the Member of Parliment that the Permanent Secretary planned to run against had the political power to have him removed from office for the illegal creation of jobs.

²⁶ The importance of controlling budget deficits and improving fiscal management is emphasised by Basanti, Rifaat K., ‘Role of Public Expenditure Management in Structural Adjustment Programmes’, in Premchand, A. (ed.), Government Financial Management: issues and country studies (Washington, DC, I.M.F., 1990), pp. 53–72.Google Scholar

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²⁸ See, for example, Ramakrishnan, Subramanian, ‘Budgeting in Africa: focus on reform’, in Economic Reform Today (Washington, DC, 1992), pp. 9–13,Google Scholar and Graybeal, N. Lynn and Picard, Louis A., ‘Internal Capacity and Overload in Guinea and Niger’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29, 2, 06 1991, pp. 275–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ Ways to address the administrative crisis are reviewed in Mutahaba, Gelase and Balogun, M. Jide, Enhancing Policy Management in Africa (West Hartford, CT, 1992),Google Scholar and Mutahaba, Gelase et al., Vitalizing African Public Administration for Recovery and Development (West Hartford, CT, 1993).Google Scholar

³⁰ For an explanation of this apathy and disinterest, see Moris, Jon R., ‘The Transferability of Western Management Concepts and Programs: an East African perspective’, in Stifel, Laurence, Coleman, James S., and Black, Joseph E. (eds.), Education and Training for Public Sector Management in Developing Countries (New York, The Rockefeller Foundation, 1977), pp. 73–83.Google Scholar

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³² Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), p. 3.

³³ Ibid. p. 47.

³⁴ The Government's recognition of these problems, as well as its stated intentions of addressing them, is spelt out in ibid. pp. 43–8.

³⁵ Both the Government and the World Bank agree in ibid. p. 30 that the increasing debtservice costs carried under the recurrent budget are squeezing operation and maintenance expenditures (thereby negatively affecting productivity), even more than the public service wages bill. See also, World Bank, Kenya, p. 65.

³⁶ Kenya, Economic Management for Renewed Growth (Nairobi, 1986), p. 82.Google Scholar

³⁷ Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), p. 30. Also, Stephen B. Peterson, ‘The Recurrent Cost Crisis in Development Bureaucracies’, Harvard Institute for International Development, Cambridge, MA, Development Discussion Paper No. 409, 1991.Google Scholar

³⁸ These reports and recommendations are summarised in Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), pp. 59–64.Google Scholar

³⁹ For example, Selcuk Ozgediz, ‘Managing the Public Service in Developing Countries’, World Bank, Washington, DC, Staff Working Paper No. 583; Wallis, Malcolm, Bureaucracy: its role in third world development (London, 1989);Google Scholar and Taylor, Harry, ‘Public Sector Personnel Management in Three African Countries: current problems and possibilities’, in Public Administration and Development, 12, 2, 1992, pp. 193–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ World Bank, Kenya, p. 54.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), p. 11.

⁴² For the products of an educational system no longer found in East Africa, see Leonard, David K., African Successes: four public managers of Kenyan rural development (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1991).Google Scholar

⁴³ The complexities of these options are reviewed at length in Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), pp. 10–14.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For an overview of the issues and literature, see Grosh, Barbara, Public Enterprise in Kenya: what works, what doesn't, and why (Boulder and London, 1991).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ The difficulty of introducing staffing norms is illustrated by the fact that although the establishment for security personnel might seem at first sight to be unreasonably high, more might well be needed to deal with the situation/population in many areas, as pointed out in Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), pp. 14–17. The same holds true for teacher-pupil ratios by school and topic, since it was the employment of 219,100 by the Teachers Service Commission in 1991 that made such big demands on the public sector wage bill. But disputes exist about the ratios that should be used, particularly because there are so many untrained teachers.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For example, there is a Presidential Commission on Music whose work overlaps with that of the Ministry of Culture, and another on Soil Conservation and Afforestation that could be absorbed by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources and/or the Ministry of Agriculture.

⁴⁷ The duplication exhibited by the Ministry of Agriculture despite the District Focus Strategy is a good example, because staff have not been reduced in either the headquarters or provincial offices, despite being increased in the field as part of the process of deconcentration.

⁴⁸ ‘A Cost-Cutting Cabinet’ and ‘New Geographical Distribution’, in Weekly Review (Nairobi), 22 January 1993, pp. 13–15Google Scholar, and ‘Two More Join the Front-Bench’, in ibid. 29 January 1993, p. 17.

⁴⁹ Kenya Public Service Reform (February Draft), p. 31.

⁵⁰ Official views on this strategy are found in ibid. pp. 65–9. The difficulties of imposing user fees are illustrated by the failures of political will in the health services. See ‘Cost Sharing: new scheme's teething problems’, in Weekly Review, 19 January 1990, and ‘Cost-Sharing in Hospitals Scrapped’, in The Nation (Nairobi), 10 August 1990, pp. 1–2.

⁵¹ Leonard, David K., ‘Structural Reform of the Veterinary Profession in Africa and the New Institutional Economics’, in Development and Change (London), 24, 1993, pp. 227–67.Google Scholar

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⁵⁴ The key issues are analysed in Kenya Civil Service Reform (February Draft), pp. 32–41Google Scholar; World Bank, Kenya, pp. 58–65Google Scholar; and Michael Mills, ‘Kenya: public expenditure review – government employment and personnel expenditures’, World Bank, East Africa Department, Regional Mission in Eastern Africa, Nairobi, 1988.

⁵⁵ President Moi recently increased the salaries of the following: the Chief Justice by 79 per cent, Appeal Court Judges by 82 per cent, High Court Judges by 61 per cent, and other employees of the court system by 10 to 45 per cent. ‘Pay Raise for Judiciary Staff’, in Weekly Review, 29 January 1993, p. 17. Similarly, the Attorney-General raised the pay of government lawyers without waiting for any changes to be made to the overall civil service salary structure. ‘Pay Hikes for Law Officers’, in ibid. 21 May 1993, pp. 11–12.

⁵⁶ Leonard, David K., ‘Professionalism and African Administration’, in IDS Bulletin (Brighton), 24, 1, 01 1993, pp. 74–9.Google Scholar

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⁵⁹ Gordon, op. cit. pp. 13–32.

⁶⁰ The failure to respond to the initial efforts of the donors to get the Government to co-operate with structural adjustment reforms is well summarised in ibid. pp. 23–5.

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⁶⁴ Gordon, op. cit. p. 11. The strong negative effect that ‘rents’ have on the economy is described by Gallager, Mark, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth in Africa (Boulder, 1991).Google Scholar

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⁶⁸ Moris, loc. cit. pp. 73–83.

⁶⁹ In the past the annual reports of the Auditor-General, which catalogued a number of blatantly corrupt practices by public servants, have been ignored. However, they may be taken more seriously following the election of 88 opposition M.P.s in December 1992. See ‘Greater Accountability Expected’, in Weekly Review, 8 January 1993, pp. 24–5.Google Scholar

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⁷¹ See ‘A Notable Change of the Guard’, in Weekly Review, 22 January 1993, pp. 27–8. The strategy of Moi over the past decade has been to move influential officials around so as to create instability and prevent any one faction from becoming too powerful. Widner, op. cit. pp. 138–9.Google Scholar

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⁷⁷ See, for example, Mukandala, Rwekaza Sympho, ‘To Be or Not to Be: the paradoxes of African bureaucracies in the 1990s’, in International Review of Administrative Services (London), 58, 4, 1992, pp. 555–76.Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ The only action the Government took in the face of structural adjustment conditions on public service reform during 1991–3 was to freeze hiring in job groups A—G (resulting in a decline of lower-grade employees of only 1·7 per cent in 1991–2), and to implement limited across-the-board pay increases phased over a three-year period that do not address ‘wage compression’ problems at the upper levels of the public service. An I.M.F. request that the civil service be reduced by 45,000 by the end of November 1993 was countered with an offer of 15,000 that is unlikely to be implemented.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ ‘A Change for the Better’, in Weekly Review, 4 June 1993, pp. 27–8, and ‘Back on Track’, in ibid. 12 June 1993, pp. 20–4.

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⁸⁴ See ‘If Kenya Goes…’, in The Economist (London), 12 June 1993, pp. 69–70.Google Scholar