^{page 399 note 1} Some recent studies of political economy have focused more on debates concerning the development of capitalism and class formation than on the maturation of the post-colonial state and the political side of this process. These include Leys, Cohn, Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism, 1964–71 (Berkeley, 1974);Google ScholarSwainson, Nicola, Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918–1961 (Berkeley, 1980);Google ScholarKitching, Gavin, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: the making of an African bourgeoise (New Haven, 1980);Google ScholarStichter, Sharon, Migrant Labor in Kenya: capitalism and African responses, 1895–1975 (London, 1981);Google Scholar‘Kenya: the agrarian question’, in Review of African Political Economy (London), 20, 1981;Google Scholar ‘Debate on Dependency in Kenya’, in ibid. 17, 1980; and Heyer, Judith et al. , Rural Development in Tropical Africa (London, 1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 399 note 2} For a discussion of the attempted coup and events leading to it, see Africa Now (London), 09 1982;Google ScholarStamp, Patricia, ‘Kenya's Year of Discontent’, in Current History (Philadelphia), 03 1983, pp. 102–27;Google Scholar‘Kenya: the politics of repression’, in Race and Class (London), xxiv, 3, 1983;Google Scholar and Furedi's, Frank political analysis in the Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (London), forthcoming.Google Scholar

^{page 400 note 1} Some might argue that the K.P.U. was a ‘radical’ populist party articulating many of the same demands put forth in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. Cf. Mueller, Susanne D., ‘The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class’, in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Ottawa), 15, 3, 1981, pp. 459–97.Google Scholar From this perspective, the K.P.U. might be regarded as a struggle between an emerging bourgeoisie (largely Kikuyu) attempting to consolidate its hold over the State and the economy, and its petit-bourgeois opponents (led by Luos) from parts of the country where capitalism was less developed – e.g. Central Province versus Nyanza.

^{page 400 note 2} Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: participation and opposition (New Haven and London, 1971), p. 51.Google Scholar

^{page 400 note 3} The terms ‘centre’ and ‘residual sector’ or ‘periphery’ were coined by Aristide R. Zolberg to suggest that although dominant party régimes might have a certain institutional presence in the geographic capital of a country, they simply did not have enough resources to make themselves felt in the ‘periphery’ – ‘The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa’, in The American Political Science Review (Washington, D.C.), LXII, 1, 03 1968, pp. 70–87, and Creating Political Order: the party-states of West Africa (Chicago, 1966), pp. 128–34.Google Scholar This argument fails to distinguish between the distribution of resources for economic development and the rather more limited set needed to control political opposition, both in the towns and the countryside. This article suggests that precisely because of the statist nature of most African economies, and the highly inequitable distribution of the fundamental resources of sanctions and patronage, it is impossible to argue that the institutions of party and state have been confined to a narrow geographic domain within these societies. It maintains, rather, that the régime in effect ‘penetrates’ the entire countryside – no matter how rural, backward, and distant from the capital – precisely because districts and individuals are dependent on the state for so very much: for development funds, jobs, trade licenses, loans, famine relief, the ability to register party branches, to hold public meetings, and so on. This sort of penetration ‘counts’ because of the régime's monopoly over these fundamental resources; there are no alternative institutions which individuals, geographic areas, or opposition parties can use to survive economically, to accrue the resources they would need to effectively compete with the régime or to ignore it.

^{page 401 note 1} Wallerstein, Immanuel (ed.), Social Social Change: the colonial situation (New York, 1966), p. 2.Google Scholar

^{page 401 note 2} Burke, Fred G., ‘Public Administration in Africa: the legacy of inherited colonial institutions’, in Journal of Comparative Administration (Beverly Hills), I, 3, 11 1969, p. 356.Google Scholar

^{page 401 note 3} Ibid. p. 375.

^{page 401 note 4} There is some dispute as to the nature of the legislative legacy. Some have emphasised its verbal vigour. See especially Gertzel, Cherry, The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963–68 (Nairobi), 1969.Google Scholar Others have dwelled on its importance — e.g. Kipkorir, B. E., ‘Kenya's Colonial Legacies’, in East Africa Journal (Nairobi), 12 1971, pp. 10–14.Google Scholar See also the review of Gertzel, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 10, 3, 10 1972, pp. 481–4, by Susanne D. Mueller.Google Scholar

^{page 402 note 1} Kipkorir, loc. cit. p 11.

^{page 403 note 1} Called the ‘second colonial occupation’ by several Cambridge historians.

^{page 403 note 2} Letter of 16 May 1930, p. 16, Kikuyu Association; Kenya National Archives, PC/CPB/5/I.

^{page 404 note 1} When colonial administrators were petitioned directly by Associations which were attempting to bypass the ‘proper channels’ of the Council, it was suggested in ibid. that ‘the reply should be addressed to the signatory by name and the Association should not be mentioned’.

District Commissioners were advised that ‘the proper media of discussion with natives are… the Local Native Council meetings and locational barazas’. Letter of 17 October 1936, p. 9; K.N.A., PC/NZA2/565. For example, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association was informed by the District Commissioner that he had been unwilling to receive their deputation because they had bypassed ‘your proper and constitutional method of bringing these matters to my notice [which] is through the Local Native Council.’

^{page 404 note 2} For example, as the Provincial Commissioner informed the Secretary-General of the Kavirorido Taxpayers Welfare Association on 30 December 1977: ‘I have read your minutes with interest and I have no objection to your approaching any member of the Local Native Council to ask that these matters be set down on the agenda for discussion at one of its meetings, provided that the point you wish to discuss is clear. No good purpose will be served by discussion of so general a subject as “the working of the Lands Trust Ordinance”, but if there is any particular point…it will be open for any member of the Local Native Council to ask that the matter be discussed.’ K.N.A., PC/NZA2/565.

^{page 404 note 3} Kipkorir, loc. cit. p. 10.

^{page 405 note 1} The question of the relative strength or weakness of Kenya's emerging class of capitalists is much disputed in the literature mentioned on p. 399, fn. I.

^{page 405 note 2} Rosberg, Carl G. Jr and Nottingham, John, The Myth of ‘Mau Mau’: nationalism in Kenya (New York, 1966), p. 46.Google Scholar

^{page 405 note 3} K.N.A., PC/CP3/5/1, Kikuyu Association, 1921–1931, letter from Senior Commissioner to Hon. Chief Native Commissioner, 20 January 1928, p. 10.

^{page 406 note 1} Apollo L. Njonjo, ‘Kenya: the crisis of succession and the armed forces’, January 1971, p. 14.

^{page 406 note 2} Chem Lim Kim notes that, in part, ‘the high costs of status loss may be attributed to the fact that political positions traditionally confer high prestige and control access to wealth’–‘Toward a Theory of Individual and Systemic Effects of Political Status Loss’, in The Journal of Developing Areas (Macomb, Ill.), 01 1971, p. 194.Google Scholar

^{page 406 note 3} Ibid. p. 205.

^{page 406 note 4} House of Representatives. Official Report (Nairobi), 18 07 1963, col. 1086.Google Scholar

^{page 406 note 5} Letter from R. E. Wainwright to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Security and Defence, Prime Minister's Office, Nairobi, 9 July 1963.

^{page 406 note 6} Similar decisions were taken, in the years that followed, to retain the Societies Ordinance which governed the registration of political parties and their branches; the Public Order Ordinance, which governed the holding of public meetings and gathering; and laws having to do with sedition, detection, and many other restrictions.

^{page 407 note 1} Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, Carl G. Jr (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964), p. 665.Google Scholar

^{page 407 note 2} The fact that the colonial state sometimes attempted to discourage entrepreneurship amongst Africans did not keep them from arising, but merely slowed down their emergence. See M. P. Cowen, ‘Differentiation in a Kenya Location’, East African Universities Social Science Conference, Nairobi, 1972, and Throup, David, ‘The Governorship of Sir Phillip Mitchell in Kenya, 1944–52’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1983, chs. 1 and 10.Google Scholar

^{page 408 note 1} The phraseology ‘the new party appeared to be to the left’ is used because with hindsight it might be that the policies were simply a populist variant of post-independence nationalism.

^{page 409 note 1} All political parties and their branches are required to apply indiuidually to the Registrar within 28 days of their formation. The applications for registration must include the objects of the society, the class(es) of persons to whom membership is restricted, the titles, names, occupations, and addresses of the officers, 15 matters concerning the organisation which are to be set forth in the society's rules or constitution, and a separate notification as to its location and postal address. Numerous general clauses give the Registrar the right of refusal on the grounds that the society would be prejudicial to ‘good order’ or otherwise repugnant or inconsistent with ‘any law for the time being in force in Kenya’. Furthermore, once registered, the Registrar may call on a society to demonstrate proof of its existence or to furnish him with its rules, a true list of its office-bearers, a list of the meetings held by the society in the preceding six months, and ‘such accounts, returns and other information as may be prescribed’. A failure to respond to these requests is an offense under the Ordinance, and is punishable by a fine or the cancellation of a society's regulations. See Laws of Kenya, Revised Edition (Nairobi, 1962), The Societies Ordinance, ch. 108, and also the Societies Rules.Google Scholar

^{page 410 note 1} East African Standard (Nairobi), 24 06 1966, p. 3, and 2 May 1966, p. 1;Google ScholarKenyatta, Jomo, Suffering Without Bitterness (Nairobi, 1968), p. 344.Google Scholar The question of why the K.P.U. was registered at all is of some interest. The Government may have believed that it would be easier to control the opposition once it was out in the open, or that it would stigmatise and thereby neutralise its effect by confining it to a one-tribe party, or even that it would be useful for ‘outside consumption’ to convey an ‘image of democracy’. In any case, it was immediately clear that the registration of the K.P.U. as a national party was, at best, an invitation of ‘limited admission’, to use the phraseology of Palombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966), p. 404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 410 note 2} See source for Table 1.

^{page 410 note 3} When the opposition emerged, non-residents still had to obtain permits to enter all Districts within the North-East Province, large parts of the Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces, and many parts of the Central Province.

^{page 411 note 1} Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 412 note 1} Applications were also rejected on the grounds that ‘the interests of peace, welfare and good order would be likely to suffer prejudice’ if the particular organisation were registered. K.P.U. files.

^{page 412 note 2} The Kenya Gazette, 1966–1969.

^{page 412 note 3} Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 413 note 1} The administration could control the holding or conduct of political meetings of almost any size under the Public Order Ordinance. Meetings of 50 or more persons required licenses which could be withheld or cancelled after they were issued; meetings of between 10 and 50 persons were governed by certain provisions which gave the administration power to control their conduct, and even to call for their prevention or cessation if considered likely to cause a ‘breach of the peace’, a term that was never defined. The Penal Code specified a series of vaguely defined circumstances under which an assemblage of three or more persons could be considered ‘unlawful’. See Laws of Kenya, Revised Edition, 1962, chs. 56 and 63.

^{page 413 note 2} The data come from files of licenses that were issued and refused. If anything, the bias is underrated, since only clearly designated ‘party meetings’ were counted, and not those at which K.A.N.U. members were going to speak, according to the agenda presented in the license.

^{page 414 note 1} Letter from K.P.U. Secretary to District Commissioner, 22 April 1967.

^{page 414 note 2} Ibid.Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 415 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 415 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 415 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 415 note 4} Many of the K.P.U. officials who were detained from 1966–9 were not well-known ‘big men’. This may have served as a warning to local organisers that no one was too little to go to jail.

^{page 416 note 1} ‘Bogus Kenya Elections (by A. Oginga Odinga) President KPU’, p. 2.

^{page 416 note 2} Some authorities did not wait for the law to be passed. In June 1966, the Rift Valley Provincial Advisory Council ‘expelled three of its members for being supporters of the KPU’; East African Standard, 7 06 1966, p. 3.Google Scholar

^{page 416 note 3} Gertzel, Cherry, ‘Local-Central Relations in Kenya’in Collected Seminar Papers on Autonomy and Dependence in Parochial Politics (London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 10 1968–03 1969), No. 7, p. 96.Google Scholar

^{page 417 note 1} Kenya Gazette, LXVIII, 9 August 1966–1967 November 1969.

^{page 417 note 2} ‘Kenya Constitutional Changes, Succession to President’, Public Opinion Poll, 18, Nairobi, Kenya Research Services, June 1968, p. 14.

^{page 417 note 3} See Ghai, Yash P., ‘The Government and the Kenya Constitution’, in East Africa Journal, iv, 8, 12 1967, pp. 9–14;Google Scholar and Scotton, J. F., ‘Judicial Independence and Political Expression in East Africa – Two Colonial Legacies’, in East African Law Journal (Nairobi), vi, 1, 03 1970, pp. 1–9.Google Scholar

^{page 417 note 4} McAuslan, J. P. W. B., ‘Constitutional Changes in Kenya’, in Collected Seminar Papers on Post-Independence Constitutional Changes (London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 10 1967–03 1968), No. 5, p. 84.Google Scholar

^{page 418 note 1} See Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey, 1969 (Nairobi, 1969), p. 120;Google Scholar and Bienen, Henry, ‘The Economic Environment’, in Hyden, Goran, Jackson, Robert, and Okumu, John (eds.), Development Administration: the Kenjean experience (Nairobi, 1970), p. 49.Google Scholar

^{page 418 note 2} 386,000 versus 221,900; Economic Survey, 1969, pp. 120–1.

^{page 418 note 3} Rothchild, Donald, ‘Kenya's Africanization Program: priorities of development and equity’, in The American Political Science Review (Washington, D.C.), LXIV, 3 09 1970, pp. 749–59.Google Scholar

^{page 418 note 4} Ibid. pp. 738–49; Development Plan, 1970–74, pp. 116–17; National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi, 1968), pp. 257–61;Google Scholar and Republic of Kenya, High Level Manpower Requirements arid Resources in Kenya, 1964–70 (Nairobi, 1965).Google Scholar

^{page 419 note 1} Rothchild, loc. cit. p. 750. As of June 1968, according to Who Controls Industary in Kenya?, p. 194, ‘85 per cent of all foreign aid received by’ Kenya had come from Great Britain. Most of the foreign-owned companies were British and many of them were subsidiaries of the U.K's largest firms.

^{page 419 note 2} Republic of Kenya, Code of Regulations (Nairobi, 1900).Google Scholar

^{page 419 note 3} Ibid.Gertzel, op. cit. p. 167.

^{page 419 note 4} Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 419 note 5} National Assembly. Officiol Report (Nairobi), 19 04 1968, col. 2178.Google Scholar

^{page 419 note 6} Letter from a K.A.N.U. politician to Tom J. Mboya.

^{page 419 note 7} National Assembly. Official Report, 30 September 1966, col. 260.

^{page 419 note 8} Ibid. 16 June 1967, cols. 1055–6.

^{page 419 note 9} Ibid.

^{page 420 note 1} Confidential intervew, 1971–2.

^{page 420 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 420 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 421 note 1} These figures come from Hakes, Jay, ‘Patronage and Politics in Kenya: a study of backbencher membership on statutory boards’, 1969, mimeographed, p. 10.Google Scholar Kenyatta increased the number of Cabinet members to 50 shortly after the formation of the K.P.U.

^{page 421 note 2} Republic of Kenya, Report of the Maize Commission of Inquiry (Nairobi, 06 1966), pp. 150–3.Google Scholar

^{page 421 note 3} Some M.P.s who had been especially vocal dissidents, actually lost their positions prior to the formation of the K.P.U.

^{page 421 note 4} Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 421 note 5} For a discussion of this, see National Assembly. Official Report, 16 December 1966, col. 2882.

^{page 422 note 2} Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 423 note 1} Field notes from Malcolm Valentine, 1969.

^{page 424 note 1} These were Anyieni, Bonaya, Choge, Gichoya, Jilo, and Khalif. Kioko won in 1966 and 1969, Oduya in 1966 but not in 1969, while Godana, Kaggia and Lorema all lost both in 1966 and 1969.

^{page 424 note 2} The K.P.U.'s ability to win two seats in the Kamba areas of Machakos in 1966 may have stemmed from an incorrect calculation by the Government about what would happen there, or from a conscious decision that it was less costly to allow a genuine electoral contest than to repress popular candidates in an area that was heavily represented in the army.

^{page 424 note 3} Okumu, John, ‘The By-Election in Gem: an assessment’, in East Africa Journal, vi, 6, 06 1979, p. 16.Google Scholar

^{page 425 note 1} Mboya, Tom in East African Standard, 20 May 1969, p. 7.Google Scholar

^{page 425 note 2} Confidential interview, 1971–2.

^{page 425 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 425 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 426 note 1} As the development of capitalism under Kenyatta coincided with a boom economy, it could be argued that the ‘trickle down’ effect was widespread enough to limit K.P.U.'s competitive appeal.

^{page 426 note 2} Zolberg, loc. cit. pp. 70–1.

^{page 427 note 1} Coleman and Rosberg (eds.), op. cit. p. 659. They also argue that ‘in most instances the really determinative factor in the orientation of the present party elites to the political order has been their exposure to bureaucratic centralism during the colonial period’.

^{page 427 note 2} Cf. Coleman, James S., Nigeria: background to nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), pp. 79–90.Google Scholar

^{page 427 note 3} Mhone, Guy C. Z., ‘The Case Against Africanists’, in Issue: quarterly journal of opinion (Los Angeles), II, 2, Summer 1972, p. 9.Google Scholar