^{page 42 note 1} In terms of methodological concern and theory building, there is a paucity of systematic literature on collective attempts to effect decolonisation. Only two books provide substantial information as to the activities of the Committee of 24, albeit this is not their main focus: Kay, David A., The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960–1967 (New York, 1970),Google Scholar and El-Ayouty, Yassin, The United Nations and Decolonization: the role of Afro-Asia (The Hague, 1971).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an account of more recent events, one must turn to a fragmented and scattered body of literature – a variety of monographs, single-country studies, and historical inquiries – which deal with decolonisation primarily in terms of the distinct features of individual territories.

^{page 42 note 2} But in some cases the active struggle by colonial peoples – e.g. the Mau Mau in Kenya – did force the bargaining situation. Cf. Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (New York 1968), especially p. 147,Google Scholar and Toward the African Revolution (New York, 1967), pp. 95–6, 110–16, and 130–2. For an application of the Fanonian argument, see Wasserman, Gary, ‘The Independence Bargain: Kenya Europeans and the land issue, 1960–1962’, in Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (Leicester), XI, 2, 07 1973, pp. 99–120.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 1} See Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Jr (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass. 1972), passim;CrossRefGoogle ScholarNyc, Joseph S. Jr, ‘UNCTAD: poor nations’ pressure group', in Cox, Robert W. and Jacobson, Harold K. (eds.), The Anatomy of Influence: decision making in international organisations (New Haven, 1973), pp. 334–70;Google Scholar and Walters, Robert S., ‘International Organizations and Political Communications: the use of UNCTAD by less developed countries’, in International Organization (Boston), XXV, 4, Autumn 1971, pp. 8, 8–35.Google Scholar

^{page 44 note 2} The parallel concern of the Special Committee and other branches of the U.N. has been recently documented by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York, 1973), ST/ECA/190, stresses that the distribution of income in the Third World reflects enduring historical relationships, particularly those emanating from former colonial ties.

^{page 44 note 3} In an otherwise balanced treatment, Plano, Jack C. and Riggs, Robert E., Forging World Order: the politics of international organization (New York, 1967), p. 376,Google Scholar state: ‘In some instances UN action has hastened territories to premature independence. In other cases UN policy on colonial questions may have encouraged a resort to violence by native nationalists who felt that creating a threat to peace and security was the best way to gain the attention of the organization.’

^{page 45 note 1} Though a caveat is attached calling for empirical investigation, this is the position o Galtung, Johan, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, in Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), II, 2, Spring 1971, pp. 81–118.Google Scholar

^{page 45 note 2} Countries voting for abstention were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States. David Kay, op. cit. pp. 168–9, notes that President Eisenhower personally made the decision to abstain in response to a direct appeal from Prime Minister Macmillan, contrary to the advice of the entire U.S. delegation. When the Declaration was adopted, Mrs Zelma Watson George, the only black member of that delegation, stood up and applauded.

^{page 45 note 3} The Committee of 24 also assumed the responsibilities formerly assigned to the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Special Committee on South-West Africa, and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories – these subsidiary organs of the General Assembly were then dissolved.

^{page 46 note 1} The Trust Territory of Papua New Guinea became self-governing on I December 1973, and is scheduled to become independent as soon as its elected leaders so desire. Strictly speaking, a variegated assortment of overseas departments and other quasi-colonies could also be included on the list – e.g. Réunion, Tahiti, Guadeloupe, New Caledonia, and Martinique. But thus far attempts to exclude them have succeeded in circumventing the jurisdiction of the Committee of 24.

^{page 48 note 1} This is the Chairmanship of the Special Committee, according to nationality: 1962, C. Jha (India); 1963–1965, Son Coulibaly (Mali); 1966, G. B. D. Collier (Sierra Leone); 1967–1968, J. Malecela (Tanzania); 1969, M. Mestiri (Tunisia); 1970, D. Nicol (Sierra Leone); 1971, G. Nava Carrilo (Venezuela); and 1972–1975, Salim A. Salim (Tanzania).

^{page 49 note 1} See U.N. documents, A/AC.109/PV.903, 911, and 915, and A/AC.109/PV.960, p. 6.

^{page 49 note 2} The Nordic countries have an agreement to rotate their membership in the Committee of 24 as indicated: 1964–6, Denmark; 1967–8, Finland; 1969–70, Norway; 1970–3, Sweden; and 1974–, Denmark.

^{page 49 note 3} See U.N. documents A/8276 and A/8277.

^{page 49 note 4} However, some Third-World delegates contend that internal politics within the West account for the shifting policies on decolonisation. Neither President Nixon nor Prime Minister Heath demonstrated any concern for colonial problems and, in particular, the plight of Africans in Southern Africa. As events would prove later, if the Nixon Administration could wilfully violate international law by breaking sanctions on Rhodesia, it was unlikely to respect a Committee that sought to end minority rule. Similarly, if the Heath Government was willing to resume the sale of arms to South Africa, it would also leave the Special Committee. For the views of the former U.S. member of the Committee of 24, see Finger, Seymour M., ‘A New Approach to Colonial Problems at the United Nations’, in International Organization, XXXI, I, Winter 1972, pp. 143–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 50 note 1} Official Records of the General Assembly: Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 23, A/8423/Rev. I ch. II, para. 8.

^{page 51 note 1} The Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is embodied in General Assembly Resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970.

^{page 51 note 2} The Programme of Action is available in Objective Justice (New York), V, 3, 07/08/09 1973, pp. 17–56; and Stokke, Olav and Widstrand, Carl (eds.), The UN-OAU Conference on Southern Africa, Oslo 9–14 April 1973, Vol. X, Programme of Action and Conference Proceedings (Uppsala, 1973), pp. 17–36.Google Scholar

^{page 52 note 1} For example, although the General Assembly's Resolution of 20 and 21 December 1965 specifically requested international institutions to withhold assistance to Lisbon, the I.B.R.D. granted two loans to Portugal in 1966 – and, indeed, one to South Africa. Subsequently a representative of the World Bank accepted the Special Committee's invitation to discuss this question. In 1973 the Committee of 24 established a six-member working group – Iraq (Chairman), Bulgaria, India, Sweden, Tunisia, and Tanzania – to follow up the activities of the specialised agencies and other institutions associated with the U.N.

^{page 54 note 1} For this view, see El-Ayouty, Yassin, ‘Legitimization of National Liberation: the United Nations and Southern Africa’, in Issue: a quarterly journal of Africanist opinion (Waltham, Mass.), n, 4, Winter 1972, pp. 36–45.Google Scholar

^{page 54 note 2} Cf. Slater, Jerome, ‘The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: the Organization of American States and the Dominican crisis’, in International Organization, XXIII, I, Winter 1969, pp. 71–2.Google Scholar In the attempt to forge collective legitimisation, it is important to note that the U.N. may make positions more rigid, thereby inhibiting accommodation. See Claude, Inis L. Jr, ‘Implications and Questions for the Future’, in Padelford, Norman J. and Goodrich, Leland M. (eds.), The United Nations in the Balance: accomplishments and prospects (New York, 1965), pp. 471–82.Google Scholar

^{page 55 note 1} Hass, Ernst B., Tangle of Hopes: American commitments and world order (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), p. 255.Google Scholar

^{page 55 note 2} U.N. document A/9023, pt. I, p. 81.

^{page 55 note 3} In addition to the Committee of 24, the principal U.N. bodies dealing with Southern Africa are the Council for Naxnibia, the Special Committee on Apartheid, and the Sanctions Committee. There is also an assortment of ad hoc committees to administer various programmes of assistance: the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa; the U.N. Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa; the U.N. Fund for Nasnibia; the work of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees concerned with the education, training placement, and rural settlement of refugees from Southern Africa and the protection of their legal rights; and other programmes of the specialised agencies designed to assist in the implementation of the Declaration.

^{page 57 note 1} African statesmen expressed their preference at Lusaka for peaceful change in Southern Africa. They insisted that discussion with Pretoria would be welcomed, but only provided apartheid was on the agenda, and that South Africa's black population represent themselves.

^{page 58 note 1} Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation: the rise to self-assertion of Asian and African peoples (Cambridge, Mass. 1960);CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Jacobson, Harold K., ‘The United Nations and Colonialism: a tentative appraisal,’ in Kay, David A. (ed.), The United Nations Political System (New York, 1967), pp. 316–17.Google Scholar

^{page 58 note 2} Security Council Resolution 253 (1968).

^{page 59 note 1} U.N. document A/AC.109/400; the report of the special mission is contained in L.804, para. 78, p. 20.

^{page 60 note 1} Niue is an island in the South Pacific under the administration of New Zealand. It lies approximately 300 miles east of the Kingdom of Tonga and 300 miles south-east of the Samoa group. With a population of 5,000 and an area of about 100 square miles, its natural resources are extremely limited. One of the island's most serious problems is the ever increasing emigration to New Zealand – at the time of the mission's visit, there were as many Niueans there as in Niue.

^{page 60 note 2} U.N. document A/AC.109/L.810 Rev. 1, section v, para. 267, p. 47.

^{page 60 note 3} Ibid. para. 268, p. 48.