^{page 633 note 1} The military interventions reported herein were collected partially with the support of Contract No. MDA 908–82-C–0303 from the Department of Defense. The views and conclusions contained in this article are those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, whether expressed or implied, of the United States Government. We wish to thank the following Arizona State University students for their assistance in collecting our data: John Anene, Kate Manzo, and Ken Kelleher.

^{page 633 note 2} Ruth, Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983 (Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 11;Google Scholar Africa Coup Project Event Files; May, Clifford D., ‘Military Rule Is Contagious in Africa’, in The New York Times, 6 May 1984;Google Scholar and Young, Crawford, ‘Politics in Africa’, in Gabriel, A. Almond and Powell, G. Bingham Jr., (eds.), Comparative Politics Today (Boston, 1984), pp. 468–9. Sivard defines military control as meeting one of the following conditions: ‘key political leadership by military officers; existence of a state of martial law;extra-judicial authority exercised by security forces; lack of central political control over large sections of the country where official or unofficial security forces rule; control of foreign military forces.’ The last condition does not apply in any of our cases.Google Scholar

^{page 634 note 1} Clifford D.May, ‘Cameroon Is Reported to Execute Coup Plotters After Secret Trials’, in The New York Times, 10 May 1984. Official government sources estimated deaths as less than 100, while other reports put the loss of life between 500 and 1,000.

^{page 634 note 2} This literature is vast. Among the books we have found most useful are: Henry, Bienen (ed.), The Military Intervenes: case studies in political development (New York, 1968);Google ScholarCollier, Ruth B., Regimes in Tropical Africa: changing forms of supremacy, 1945–1975 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982);Google ScholarDecalo, Samuel, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven, 1976);Google ScholarFiner, Samuel E., The Man on Horseback: the role of the military in politics (Baltimore, 1967);Google ScholarFirst, Ruth, The Barrel of a Gun: political power in Africa and the coup d'état (London, 1970);Google ScholarGutteridge, William F., The Military in African Politics (London, 1969);Google ScholarHuntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968);Google ScholarNordlinger, Eric A., Soldiers in Politics: military coups and governments (Englewood Cliffs, 1977);Google ScholarThompson, William R., The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, 1973);Google ScholarClaude, E. Welch Jr., (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston, 1970);Google Scholar and Claude, E. Welch Jr., and Smith, A. K., Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Mass., 1974).Google Scholar

^{page 636 note 1} For a similar argument, see: Morrison, D. G., Mitchell, R. C., Paden, J. N., Stevenson, H. M., and associates, Black Africa: a comparative handbook (New York, 1972), p. 128,Google Scholar and Jackman, Robert W., ‘The Predictability of Coups d'État: a model with African data’, in The American Political Science Review (Washington, D.C.), 72, 1978, pp. 1262–75.Google Scholar

^{page 636 note 2} Morrison et al. op. cit. pp. 177–383; African Research Bulletin (Exeter), 1964–1984;Google Scholar Index to The New York Times, 1960–1984; Keesing's Contemporary Archives (New York), 1960–1984; the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, D.C.), 1960–1982;Google Scholar as well as daily and weekly editions of The New York Times, The Washington Post, and West Africa (London).Google Scholar

^{page 637 note 1} Readers of this article who wish to obtain copies of our event file and codebook should write to Professor Pat McGowan, Department of Political Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, U.S.A.

^{page 637 note 1} Our starting date is 1 January 1956, when the Sudan became independent, and we have used this for Ethiopia and Liberia as well.

^{page 637 note 3} Similar indexes may be found in Jackman, op. cit.; Morrison, et al. op. cit. p. 128; and McGowan, Pat, ‘Predicting Political Instability in Tropical Africa’, in O'Leary, Michael K. and Coplin, William D. (eds.), Quantitative Techniques in Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting (New York, 1975).Google Scholar

^{page 637 note 4} The product moment correlation between T.M.I.S. with and without plots is 0.983, and the Spearman rank order correlation of the two alternatives is 0.982. Empirically, then, they are so similar that it makes no difference which version is used in analysis. Since T.M.I.S. with plots contains more information than when these are omitted, we use that version. Furthermore, the correlation between T.M.I.S. 1960–75 and Jackman's coup index for 29 countries is 0.911, indicating a high degree of reliability. Cf. Johnson, Thomas H., Slater, Robert O., and McGowan, Pat, ‘Explaining African Military Coups d'État, 1960–1982’, in The American Political Science Review, 78, 1984, p. 628.Google Scholar

^{page 638 note 1} Source: Africa Coup Project Event Files, Tempe.

^{page 639 note 1} Evidence to this effect is provided in ibid. p. 626.

^{page 639 note 2} The World Bank, World Development Report, 1983 (New York, 1983), p. 204.Google Scholar

^{page 640 note 1} For an explanation of the simple statistical techniques used in this article, see Floud, Roderick, An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians (Princeton, 1973).Google Scholar

^{page 641 note 1} Standardising T.M.I.S. for length of independence would, in effect, remove from the index presented in Table 1 just what needs to be explained, namely: Why, as time passes, do African states, in general, experience more military interventions?

^{page 641 note 2} It is interesting to note that during the period 1958–1983 Guinea had accumulated 10 T.M.I.S. points, and that when President Ahmed Sékou Touré died on 26 March 1984 a military coup happened on 3 April 1984.

^{page 642 note 1} Source: Africa Coup Project Event Files.

^{page 644 note 1} Works that discuss these differing military traditions are: Bebler, Anton, Military Rule in Africa: Dahomy, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali (New York, 1973);Google ScholarBell, M. J. V., Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa (London, 1965), Adelphi Papers No. 21;Google ScholarColeman, James S. and Brice, Belmont Jr., ‘The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Johnson, John J. (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962);Google ScholarCrocker, Chester A., ‘Military Dependence: the colonial legacy in Africa’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 12, 2 June 1974, pp. 265–86;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFoltz, William J., ‘The Military Factors’, in Vernon, McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy: studies in the determination of foreign policy (New York, 1966);Google ScholarGutteridge, William F., The Military in African Politics (London, 1969);Google ScholarLee, J. M., African Armies and Civil Order (New York, 1969);Google Scholarvan den Berghe, Pierre L., ‘The Role of the Army in Contemporary Africa’, in Africa Report (Washington, D.C.), 10, 3, March 1965, pp. 12–17;Google Scholar and George Weeks, ‘The Armies of Africa’, in ibid. January 1964, pp. 4–21.

^{page 645 note 1} Source: Africa Coup Project Event Files.

^{page 645 note 2} Of course, the francophone states of West and Central Africa were independent earlier than most of their anglophone neighbours.

^{page 646 note 1} Source: Africa Coup Project Event Files.

^{page 647 note 1} Collier, op. cit. pp. 147–8.

^{page 648 note 1} Amin, Samir, ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: origins and contemporary forms’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 10, 4, December 1972, pp. 503–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 648 note 2} O'Kane, Rosemary H. T., ‘A Probabilistic Approach to the Causes of Coups d'État’, in The British Journal of Political Science (London), 2, 1981, pp. 287–308, has argued persuasively that negative price fluctuations in commodity exports are causually related to third-world coups.Google Scholar

^{page 649 note 1} Source: Africa Coup Project Event Files.

^{page 650 note 1} Powers, Charles I., ‘Cameroon: coup virus overcome’ in The Los Angeles Times, 21 April 1984. This is how the rebels described themselves during the brief period they controlled the national radio station in Yaoundé.Google Scholar

^{page 652 note 1} Examples of 15 such studies, just from The Journal of Modern African Studies, are as follows: O'Connell, James, ‘The Inevitability of Instability’, in JMAS, 5, 2, September 1967, pp. 181–91;Google ScholarWelch, Claude E., ‘Soldier and State in Africa’, in JMAS, 5, 3, November 1967, pp. 305–22;Google ScholarClapham, Christopher, ‘The Ethiopian Coup d'État of December 1960’, in JMAS, 6, 4, December 1968, pp. 495–507;Google ScholarFischer, Humphrey J., ‘Elections and Coups in Sierra Leone, 1967’ in JMAS, 7, 4, December 1969, pp. 611–36;Google ScholarLofchie, Michael F., ‘The Uganda Coup–Class Action by the Military’, in JMAS, 10, 1 May 1972s, pp. 19–35;Google ScholarWelch, Claude E., ‘Praetorianism in Common-wealth West Africa’, in JMAS, 10, 2, July 1972, pp. 203–21;Google ScholarLewis, I. M., ‘The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup’, in JMAS, 10, 3, October 1972, pp. 383–408;Google ScholarDecalo, Samuel, ‘Military Coups and Military Régimes in Africa’, in JMAS, 11, 1, March 1973, pp. 105–27;Google ScholarSouthall, Aidan, ‘General Amin and the Coup: great man or historical inevitability?’, in JMAS, 13, 1, March 1975, pp. 85–105;Google ScholarBennett, Valerie Plave, ‘Military Government in Mali’, in JMAS, 13, 2, June 1975, pp. 249–66;Google ScholarWelch, Claude E. Jr., ‘Continuity and Discontinuity in African Military Organisation’, in JMAS, 13, 2, June 1975, pp. 229–48;Google ScholarHiggott, Richard and Fuglestad, Finn, ‘The 1974 Coup d'État in Niger: towards an explanation’, in JMAS, 13, 3, September 1975, pp. 383–98;Google ScholarWolpin, Miles D., ‘Dependency and Conservative Militarism in Mali’, in JMAS, 13, 4, December 1975, pp. 585–620;Google ScholarWolpin, Miles D., ‘Legitimising State Captalism: Malian militarism in third-world perspective’, in JMAS, 18, 2, June 1980, pp. 281–95;Google Scholar and Pachter, Elise Forbes, ‘Contra-Coup: civilian control of the military in Guinea, Tanzania, and Mozambique’, in JMAS, 20, 4, December 1982, pp. 595–612.Google Scholar

^{page 652 note 2} Criticisms of modernisation theory may be found in Foster-Certer, Aidan, ‘From Rostow to Gunder Frank: conflicting paradigms in the analysis of underdevelopment’, in World Development (Oxford), 4, March 1976, pp. 167–80;Google ScholarTipps, Dean C., ‘Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: a critical perspective’, in Black, C. E. (ed.), Comparative Modernization: a reader (New York, 1976);Google Scholar and Wallerstein, Immanuel, ‘Modernization: Requiescat In Pace’, in Social Forces (Chapel Hill, N. C.), 55, 2, December 1976, pp. 273–83.Google Scholar

^{page 652 note 3} As argued by Wallerstein, Immanuel in The Modern World-System: capitalist agriculture and origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century (New York, 1974),Google Scholar and The Modern World-System, II: mercantilism and the European world-economy, 1600–1750 (New York, 1980).Google Scholar

^{page 653 note 1} Kautsky, John H., The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York, 1972), pp. 162–3.Google Scholar

^{page 653 note 2} As discussed in Stavrianos, L. S., Global Rift: the Third World comes of age (New York, 1981), pp. 99–121, 196–204, and 278–308;Google Scholar and Munro, J. Forbes, Africa and the International Economy, 1800–1960 (London, 1976).Google Scholar

^{page 654 note 1} Sources: World Bank, op. cit. pp. 148–9, 188–9, and 204, and Africa Coup Project Event Files.

^{page 656 note 1} World Bank, op. cit. p. 152.

^{page 656 note 2} For a detailed survey of post-independence political and economic developments in Zimbabwe, see The Economics (London), 21 April 1984.Google Scholar

^{page 656 note 3} Walsh, John, ‘Sahel Will Suffer Even If Rains Come’, in Science (Washington, D. C.), 224, 4648, 4 May 1984, pp. 467–71.Google ScholarPubMed

^{page 657 note 1} As discussed in the controversial report, World Bank (I.B.R.D.), Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, D.C., 1981).Google Scholar

^{page 657 note 2} Walsh, loc. cit. pp. 470–1.

^{page 658 note 1} Kautsky, op. cit. pp. 164–5, and O'Connell, loc. cit.

^{page 659 note 1} Johnson, Slater, and McGowan, loc. cit. Table 7, p. 635.

^{page 659 note 2} The World Bank, World Development Report 1984 (New York, 1984), pt 1.Google Scholar

^{page 659 note 3} Maddison, Angus, Phases of Capitalist Development (New York, 1982), pp. 64–73. N. V. Kondratieff, a Russian economist, posited that capitalist development since the mid-eighteenth century was characterised by ‘long waves’ of 40 to 60 years in length, in which a period of economic prosperity was followed by stagnation or noticeably slower growth. Following this scheme, the 25 years after 1945 witnessed economic expansion, while the period 1970 to circa 1995 is, and will be, characterised by slower growth and stagnation. As of 1984, Kondratieff's analysis still holds.Google Scholar

^{page 660 note 1} Kautsky, op. cit. pp. 165–6.

^{page 660 note 2} Ibid. p. 166.

^{page 660 note 3} Ibid. p. 168.

^{page 661 note 1} We are clearly ignoring here the current problems of most N.I.C.s, notably their authoritarian régimes and international debt situations.

^{page 661 note 2} Walsh, loc. cit. p. 471.