In the preceding part of this paper we considered what may be called the substantive provisions of section 330 of the Lunacy Act, 1890. We now pass on to the adjective part of the section. Suppose that a medical man, against whom an action for damages for the alleged false imprisonment of an alleged lunatic has been raised, is in a position to satisfy the Court or a Judge that “there is no reasonable ground” for imputing to him “want of good faith or reasonable care,” when and how shall he avail himself of his statutory privilege? Upon these important points section 330 displays the vagueness that is almost a characteristic of modern legislation. The only information that it gives us is that an application to stay proceedings may be made “summarily” (a term of which no definition is offered or even suggested) to “the High Court,” and that “the Court or a Judge” may grant or refuse the application “upon such terms as to costs or otherwise” as the said Court or Judge may think fit. Now, in the absence both of any clear light from the section itself and of any authoritative judicial interpretation of it, the maxim Omnis definitio in jure periculosa est applies with peculiar force, and consequently the following observations are offered with some hesitation.