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How and What we perceive by means of Touch, and the Muscular Sense, on the Basis of Sir William Hamilton's Researches

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 February 2018

W. G. Davies
W. G. Davies*
Affiliation:
Joint Counties' Asylum, Abergavenny
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Extract

It was a feature peculiar to the late Sir W. Hamilton's character to avoid writing on any subject, with a view to publicity, until he had mastered everything extant which had previously been written upon it. It is said that when Hamilton, on its first appearance, read Whately's Rhetoric, he accused the author of plagiarism. A mutual friend suggested that Whately most probably had never even heard of the sources supposed to have been laid under contribution. Then why, asked Hamilton, did he presume to write on the subject at all? Now it is just because Hamilton himself was so punctilious in this respect that his researches are of great value to the psychologist. The investigator who masters these, and builds on them, may feel confident that he does not break with the past, but that his conclusions legitimately spring, as all such conclusions should do, positively, out of the capital of knowledge which our forefathers have amassed, and negatively, out of the errors they have committed.

Type
Part I.—Original Articles
Information
Journal of Mental Science , Volume 17 , Issue 77 , April 1871 , pp. 93 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1871 

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References

* Hamilton's Reid Note D* (24) (25) (15).Google Scholar

* Note D* (28).Google Scholar

† Hamilton's Reid Note D***, p. 911.Google Scholar

‡ Hamilton's Reid, p. 866, foot note.Google Scholar

* Note D* (13).Google Scholar

† Note D* (26).Google Scholar

‡ Note A, p. 747.Google Scholar

§ Note A, p. 749.Google Scholar

* Hamilton's Reid, note B, p. 814.Google Scholar

† Note D* (20).Google Scholar

‡ Note B, 808, foot note. Hamilton, in this, follows Kant; he thinks the matter of knowledge comes from without, but the form from within.Google Scholar

§ Hamilton's Reid, p. 866, foot note.Google Scholar

* We do not think that Mr. J. S. Mill has represented Hamilton's doctrine truly in this respect, in his “Examination.”Google Scholar

† For when the sense of Touch and the muscular sensibility are lost, while the power of movement still remains e. g. in a person's arm, its movements can be guided by the sense of sight only.Google Scholar

* Hamilton's Reid. Note C, p. 821 (2).Google Scholar

† Ibid, p. 861, foot note.Google Scholar

* Hamilton s Reid, p. 809. −10 par.Google Scholar

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