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The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: Necessity and Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Gary L. Francione
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Extract

Discourse about the use of animals in biomedical research usually focuses on two issues. The first, which I will refer to as the “necessity issue,” is empirical and asks whether the use of nonhumans in experiments is required in order to gather statistically valid information that will contribute in a significant way to improving human health. The second, which I will refer to as the “justification issue,” is moral and asks whether the use of nonhumans in biomedical research, if necessary as an empirical matter, can be defended as a matter of ethical theory.

If it is not necessary as an empirical matter to use animals in research, then there is no need to inquire about moral justification. Therefore, I examine the necessity issue first. The argument that it is necessary to use nonhumans in biomedical research, though flawed, is at least plausible, unlike our necessity arguments for other animal uses. I then discuss the justification issue and conclude that we cannot morally justify using nonhuman animals in research.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , Summer 2007 , pp. 241 - 248
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2007

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References

For a further discussion of the necessity of various animal uses and of the material in this section, see Francione, G. L., Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000): 1–49. Discussions of the necessity of animal use outside the context of research do not usually ask whether it is necessary to use animals at all for a particular purpose, but whether particular instances of pain or suffering are necessary even if the general use of animals in that context is not necessary. For reasons that I discuss later in this essay and in my other work (see, e.g., id., at 50–80), that understanding of necessity is problematic. In the context of biomedical research, the necessity analysis focuses more on whether it is necessary to use animals at all for this purpose.Google Scholar
For a general discussion of animal welfare laws, including anticruelty laws and statutes such as the Animal Welfare Act, see Francione, G. L., Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).Google Scholar
For a discussion of the variety of uses of nonhumans in vivisection, including product testing and education, see Francione, supra note 1, at 45–49. I do not discuss experiments intended to address health concerns of domestic nonhuman animals as I argue that if we took animal interests seriously, we would not continue to facilitate the production of domesticated nonhumans for human use. See Francione, supra note 1, at 153–154.Google Scholar
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