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Result-Based Compensation in Health Care: A Good, but Limited, Idea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Extract

David Hyman and Charles Silver are quite right. Opinion 6.01 in the American Medical Association's (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics is difficult to defend. Ties between compensation and outcomes need not mislead patients into thinking that results are guaranteed; they are widely used in other fields with considerable success, even if they have some disadvantages; they can potentially bring patients more actively into decision-making about whether and from whom to purchase which medical care; and, if carefully tuned, they can promote quality by aligning providers’ welfare more closely with patients’.

The purpose of this commentary is thus not to disagree with the fundamental thesis that result-based compensation arrangements (RBCAs) can be appropriate and useful in the health-care setting. Rather, the objective is to “cut the next swath,” so to speak. While Hyman and Silver are right that RBCAs have potential to do good, they may be overly optimistic about benefits, while underestimating the potential limitations and hazards.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2001

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