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Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021). The Supreme Court granted Mississippi’s petition for certiorari, after its 15-week ban of abortions was deemed unconstitutional by the lower courts for violating well-established precedent. The Supreme Court’s willingness to address the question as to whether a 15-week abortion ban may sometimes be constitutional suggests this line is on shaky ground.Google Scholar

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*Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (“There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance.”). Some courts have found that regulations that compel commercial speech “‘tend[] to [be] less objectionable under the First Amendment’” than regulations that prohibit such speech. Post, supra note 80, at 980 (quoting Walker v. Bd of Prof’l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., 38 S.W.3d 540, 545 (Tenn. 2001)). “[O]thers believe the reverse.” Id. at 980-981.Google Scholar