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Reining in the Pharmacological Enhancement Train: We Should Remain Vigilant about Regulatory Standards for Prescribing Controlled Substances

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Extract

In the March 2010 edition of Mayo Clinic Proceedings, Drs. Rose and Curry declared that resident physicians have an ethical duty to reduce error during periods of fatigue. Problematically, however, they argued this means ingesting a stimulant for performance enhancement and sleep avoidance (hereinafter “PESA”) during a shift when a resident physician is experiencing fatigue as the more ethical choice than forgoing ingesting a stimulant. Rather than accepting enhancement as an unstoppable technological imperative, this article will examine the underlying motivations for enhancement embedded in our culture and the corresponding legal framework relating to stimulant drugs. Although our society seems to be engaged in a pharmacological arms race of efficiency, competition, and self “betterment,” the FDA has not approved stimulant drugs such as modafinil for PESA. As a result, the off-label use of modafinil for PESA means these individuals are part of a large-scale experiment that poses serious immediate and long-term side effects to the individual user as well as society.

Type
Independent
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2011

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