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Managed Care and Public Health: Conflict and Collaboration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Sara Rosenbaum  and
Brian Kamoie
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Extract

This article reviews the relationship between managed care and public health. Managed care, with its seemingly infinite structural and organizational variation, dominates the modern American health-care system for the non-elderly U.S. population. Through its emphasis on standarhzed practice norms and performance measurement, coupled with industrial purchasing techniques, prepayment, risk downstreaming, and incentives-based compensation, managed care has the potential to exert considerable influence over the manner in which the health-care system is organized and functions. Given the degree to which the attainment of the basic public health goal of protecting the public against population health threats for which there are known and effective medical interventions depends on the successful interaction between public health policy and the medical care system, the importance of a viable working relationship between public health and managed care is difficult to overstate.

The potential for conflict between public health and medical care is nothing new; indeed, delineating the boundaries of public health to shape and influence medical practice has occupied the energies of policymakers and the medical industry for well over a century.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , Summer 2002 , pp. 191 - 200
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2002

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References

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