See
Ruthardt v. Harvard Pilgrim, No. SJ-2000-003 (May 24, 2000) (memorandum of decision on objections to the amended plan of rehabilitation) (hereinafter “Court Memorandum”). In the Court Memorandum, the court stated, “[t]he very nature of these [receivership] proceedings is such that contract rights necessarily will be affected. See
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S. 574, 582–584 (1885);
Mercado-Boneta v. Administration del Fondo de Compensacion al Paciente, 125 F.3d 9, 16–18 (1st Cir. 1997). ‘An impairment will be upheld if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.’
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 397 Mass. 416, 423 (1986). The priorities created by [Massachusetts General Laws chapter 175] § 180F are reasonable and necessary to serve the important public purpose of protecting the members of HMOs and more broadly the health care system by giving priority to member and provider claims.” Court Memorandum at 2. In addition, the court went on to state that creditors challenging the plan do not have the right to force liquidation of HP, “as they do not have a constitutional right to any particular form of remedy so long as the result provides them with what they would have received in a liquidation,” citing
Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297, 303–05 (1938). Court Memorandum at 3. In their Consolidated Response, the IC and AG had cited
Neblett for the position that so long as the claimants who will receive surplus notes get what they would get in a liquidation, they cannot complain. According to the IC and AG, the creditors “fail to recognize that the choice is not between full payment and a surplus note, but instead between a surplus note and the results of liquidation” and these particular creditors are of the class which “would bear the entire loss in a liquidation.” Consolidated Response at 10,
In re Harvard Pilgrim, No. SJ-2000-003 (Mass. Apr. 18,
2000) (emphasis in original). The IC's and AG's position, therefore, is that because “liabilities exceed … assets,” general unsecured creditors might get nothing if HP were liquidated. Thus, their claims could be essentially valueless and any distribution made in any way satisfies the requirements of the law.
Neblett, however, does not quite say that and in any event, the circumstances in
Neblett are remote from those in the HP case. In
Neblett, the Court had no record before it because the case came up with only the judgment roll. Therefore, the Justices accepted all assertions of fact made by the Insurance Commissioner as accurate. One such assertion was that complaining creditors would receive as much under the plan as in a liquidation. The key difference, however, is that a new corporation which would assume the defaulting insurance companies' debts was formed to take over writing new policies with fewer benefits. Most, but not all, assets of the old corporation went to the new corporation. It was stated (and there was no record to test the statement) that the old corporation had sufficient assets remaining to pay claimants whatever they would have received in a liquidation. Furthermore, an alternative existed. Because liquidation of some of the old corporation's assets was available as an alternative to accepting new policies from the new corporation, the Court found the plan unobjectionable.
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