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Frozen Embryo Disputes Revisited: A Trilogy of Procreation-Avoidance Approaches

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Judith F. Daar
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Extract

In recent years, courts have increasingly found them-selves arbiters of disputes in the emotionally charged area of assisted reproductive technologies. Legal disputes are hardly surprising in the world of infertility medicine, where millions of patients spend billions of dollars in efforts to have a child. Increasingly, these efforts produce embryos that are frozen for later use, at once maximizing a couple's chances for success and minimizing the medical intrusiveness that necessarily accompanies most forms of assisted reproductive technologies. But with over 100,000 embryos in frozen storage in the United States and a divorce rate of 40 to 50 percent, it is not surprising that disputes over the disposition of these embryos are arising, causing the legal landscape surrounding these technologies to continue to expand.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , Summer 2001 , pp. 197 - 202
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2001

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References

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