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Conflicts in the Biotechnology Industry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Henry T. Greely
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Extract

True revolutions turn the entire world upside down, in ways expected and surprising, profound and mundane. The revolution spawned by advances in molecular biology is no exception. Most of the attention has gone, deservedly, to the possible effects of these advances on medicine, on society, and on our understanding of what it means to be human. But the revolution has already had effects—large and small, good and bad—in other areas. This paper analyzes one aspect of the industry created by that revolution in molecular biology–biotechnology. Specifically, it surveys the various kinds of conflicting interests, both real and perceived, that develop among commercial enterprises, government, and institutions in biotechnology; and it examines the legal implications and public policy concerns of these conflicting interests.

The paper focuses on three different kinds of conflicting interests that confront private and public enterprises competing or collaborating in the biotechnology industry: (1) those among businesses involved within the industry; (2) those in relationships between industry and government; and (3) those in relationships between industry and universities. These types of conflicts raise very different issues, but each stems from circumstances unique to the young biotechnology industry.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , Winter 1995 , pp. 354 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1995

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References

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