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Power, M., “Risk and Morality,” in Ericson, R. and Doyle, A., eds., Risk Management and the Responsible Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003): 145–164, at 150. Many firms have begun to use triple bottom line or value statements in their annual reporting, as a way of creating public statements of accountability. Increasingly, various stakeholders (public or special interest groups, investors, and others) are identified by firms as a potential source of risk for planned projects. Having such public statements and a visible risk management scheme is seen as one way to proactively manage risk.Google Scholar

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