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For example, would me-too versions of an antibiotic get the same term extension as an older version? If me-too research is substantially less expensive as well as substantially less valuable from a public health perspective, the failure to exclude me-too drugs would dramatically increase the cost of the proposal. They may put downward pressure on the prices of originator drugs, but prizes of this magnitude would be a very expensive way to try to achieve this. Could existing drugs gain the designation even with very limited effectiveness? See Outterson, et al., id., at 561. Such questions would have critical implications for the cost of the proposal, and again mirror precisely the problem of prize design.Google Scholar

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