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Coercing Future Freedom: Consent and Capacities for Autonomous Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

M. Carmela Epright
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Extract

In this paper I examine some of the significant moral concerns inherent in cases of treatment refusal involving patients with psychotic disorders. In particular, I explore the relevance of the principle of autonomy in such situations. After exploring the concept of autonomy and explaining its current and historical significance in a health care setting, I argue that because autonomous choice depends for its existence upon certain human functions such as the ability to reason, judge, and assess consequences, patients cannot be said to be making free and autonomous decisions if these capacities are compromised. I contend further that because psychotic disorders have the potential to compromise these functions in the future, it is appropriate, in some limited cases, to coerce patients with psychotic disorders to undergo treatment in order to preserve their future decisionmaking capacities and to protect their ability to recognize and respect the autonomy of others.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 38 , Issue 4 , Winter 2010 , pp. 799 - 806
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2010

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References

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