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Selective Reduction: “A Soft Cover for Hard Choices” or Another Name for Abortion?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Radhika Rao
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Extract

Selective reduction, also known as multifetal pregnancy reduction (MFPR), is the practice of terminating one or more fetuses to reduce a multiple pregnancy, e.g., from quadruplets to twins or a singleton. Selective reduction and abortion both involve the destruction of fetal life, but they are classified by different designations to underscore the notion that they are regarded as fundamentally different medical procedures: the two are performed using distinct techniques by different types of physicians, upon women under very different circumstances, in order to further dramatically different objectives. For these reasons, the two procedures appear to call for a distinct moral calculus, and they have traditionally evoked contradictory reactions from society — sympathetic responses towards selective reduction, which is perceived as a difficult but “responsible” choice vs. stigmatizing or even punitive approaches towards abortion, which is deemed an immoral action.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , Summer 2015 , pp. 196 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2015

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