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Pain Relief, Prescription Drugs, and Prosecution: A Four-State Survey of Chief Prosecutors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Stephen J. Ziegler  and
Nicholas P. Lovrich Jr.
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Extract

The experience of having to suffer debilitating pain is far too common in the United States, and many patients continue to be inadequately treated by their doctors. Although many physicians freely admit that their pain management practices may have been somewhat lacking, many more express concern that the prescribing of heightened levels of opioid analgesics may result in closer regulatory scrutiny, criminal investigation, or even criminal prosecution.

Although several researchers have examined the regulatory environment and the threat of sanction or harm it poses to physicians and patients, few have examined the likelihood of investigation or prosecution stemming from the aggressive use of opioids in physician-directed pain management. Accordingly, in an effort to assess whether the fear of prosecution is realistic and, if so, what factors contribute to its likelihood, we surveyed chief prosecutors in four states about their knowledge, opinions, and attitudes concerning opioids and the prosecution of physicians stemming from the treatment of patients who were either terminally ill or suffering from chronic noncancer pain.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , Spring 2003 , pp. 75 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2003

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