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Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Daniel P. Sulmasy
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Extract

One of the most important questions in the debate over the morality of euthanasia and assisted suicide is whether an important distinction between killing patients and allowing them to die exists. The U.S. Supreme Court, in rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide (PAS), explicitly invoked this distinction, but did not explicate or defend it. The Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals had previously asserted, also without argument, that no meaningful distinction exists between killing and allowing to die. That court had reasoned that if this were so, it would be discriminatory to allow persons on life support to end their lives by removing such treatment, while those who are not connected to life support would be denied similar access to death.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , Spring 1998 , pp. 55 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1998

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