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The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal Justice System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Extract

The emergence of post-conviction DNA testing has had profound effects on the American criminal justice system. Although changes in the formal legal landscape are readily noticeable, the DNA exonerations have also produced other consequences that may have potentially more significance. To comprehend and assess the influence of post-conviction DNA testing one must examine more than just the law on the books. After some introductory material, Part I of this essay looks at repercussions DNA exonerations are having on the basic operation of the criminal justice system, Part II examines new statutes that govern procedures for post-conviction DNA testing requests, and Part III briefly considers how these current developments may affect Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Post-conviction DNA testing has evolved in little more than a decade. Before 2000, only two states, New York and Illinois, had statutes that authorized post-conviction DNA testing. In other jurisdictions, no formally authorized procedures existed that allowed inmates to make requests for DNA testing of crime scene evidence.

Type
Symposium
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2006

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