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The Future of Incidental Findings: Should They be Viewed as Benefits?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Lisa S. Parker
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Extract

The possibility of generating incidental findings — in both research and clinical contexts — has long been regarded as a risk of these enterprises. Should incidental findings (IFs) in research also be regarded as potential benefits? At first glance, it would seem they ought to be. After all, in particular circumstances or given a particular set of values, any piece of information can be beneficial. Therefore, it may seem incoherent or unduly paternalistic to regard IFs only as risks. Moreover, developments in science and technology increasingly transform what was once of uncertain meaning and dubious value into information that is likely to have clear meaning and potential personal value, if not obvious clinical utility. For these reasons, it would seem that in the future, IFs should be treated as potential benefits in the design and regulation of research.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , Summer 2008 , pp. 341 - 351
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2008

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