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Dietary Supplements: Reports Reviewed by Tia Powell and Barbara A. Noah
Institute of Medicine, Dietary Supplements: A Framework for Evaluating Safety (Washington, D.C., 2005)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2021
Extract
The Institute of Medicine’s 2005 publication, Dietary Supplements: A Framework for Evaluating Safety, is authoritative and thorough, and thus representative of other reports by the Institute of Medicine (IOM). What makes this report particularly interesting, however, is the rich political subtext that exists in the interstices of the report, popping up here and there in brief comments and barely suppressed yelps of exasperation. To understand this context, it is useful to reflect for a moment on the special nature of the IOM and its relationship to government.
IOM is part of the National Academy of Sciences, and is a private, non-governmental organization that does not receive direct federal funding for its work. Rather, IOM studies are often funded by contract with governmental entities that request reports on particular topics. As a case in point, the dietary supplement study was requested and paid for by the FDA.
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- Reviews in Medical Ethics
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- Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2005
References
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“Definition of certain foods as dietary supplements, 21 U.S.C. § 321, is amended by adding at the end the following: The term dietary supplement: (1) means a product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet that bears or contains one or more of the following dietary ingredients: (A) a vitamin; (B) a mineral; (C) an herb or other botanical; (D) an amino acid; (E) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by increasing the total dietary intake; or (F) a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination of any ingredient described in clause (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).” 21 U.S.C. § 321 ff 2000. The statute further defines dietary supplements as products that are labeled as “dietary supplements” and are not represented for use as a conventional food or as a sole item of a meal or the diet. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff).Google Scholar
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Id. at 26–27. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are working to collect more comprehensive data on supplement use.Google Scholar
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