Sophie's choice has not been confined to cinema: in August 2004, up to a dozen mothers were faced with Sophie's choice when Chechnyan rebels took control of a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, allowing a few mothers to leave, but taking only one child and leaving the others behind: Murphy, K., “Forced to Choose – Her Boy or Girl,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 4–5, 2004: 1.Google Scholar

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