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Are All Abortions Equal? Should There Be Exceptions to the Criminalization of Abortion for Rape and Incest?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

I. Glenn Cohen
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Extract

There was a moment in the 2012 campaign, when Mitt Romney attempted to “pivot” to the center and get away from the statements of those like Todd Akin who made comments about how in cases of “legitimate rape,” the victims’ bodies “have ways to try and shut that whole thing down.” The way Romney did it was to make clear that while he was against abortion, he would, of course, make an exception for women who had been raped or whose pregnancy was the result of incest. This has become something of a moderate orthodoxy to those who oppose abortion. Abortion should be criminalized, yes, but with these exceptions carved out. This shibboleth has found its way not only in the public position taken by many Pro-Life politicians, but also in legislation across several U.S. states, and even the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits federal funding for abortion, makes an exception for these kinds of abortions

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 87 - 104
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2015

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