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Reply to David Opderbeck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2023

Kevin P. Lee*
Affiliation:
Intel Social Justice and Racial Equity Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University School of Law, USA
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Abstract

Type
Editorial
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University

Dear Editors:

The proposed revival of Aristotelian teleological metaphysics in David Opderbeck’s The End of the Law? Law, Theology, and Neuroscience lacks proper justification, and such a revival has been challenged by various substantial critiques from different fields of study. The rejection of Aristotelian logic by such prominent philosophers as Gottlob Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, Kurt Gödel, Alfred Tarski, Rudolf Carnap, Willard Quine, and Hilary Putnam is based on its dependence on naïve metaphysical realism. In addition, the theories of general relativity by Einstein and quantum mechanics by Niels Bohr have cast considerable doubt on Aristotelian metaphysics, which has been reinforced by later physicists and philosophers of science, among them Richard Feynman, Stephen Hawking, Bas van Fraassen, P. F. Strawson, Wilfred Sellars, David Chalmers, and James Ladyman.

Moreover, Opderbeck does not engage Martin Heidegger’s thought, which illustrates a close connection between Aristotelian metaphysics and the concept of ontotheology. According to Heidegger, this concept leads Western philosophy to obscure the fundamental mystery and wonder of existence. This view reduces everything to a means to an end and prevents individuals from fully experiencing and engaging with the world around them.

Neither the book nor the other sources cited by Opderbeck engage with the arguments of philosophers of information, such as Luciano Floridi, who propose that Aristotelian conceptions of form, matter, and teleology are insufficient for understanding the complex and dynamic nature of information. Floridi’s philosophy of informational ontology posits that the fundamental nature of reality is informational, which further discredits Aristotelian metaphysics.

Given the critiques from these fields of study and others, it is unlikely that Aristotelian metaphysics will see a revival. Opderbeck’s failure to acknowledge these mainstream arguments and provide a rationale for its perspective is concerning. The author of a serious book that aims to discuss theology, law, and science should recognize these critiques and engage with them.

Footnotes

Editors’ note: All letters are published at the discretion of the editors. Correspondence on this matter is now closed.