1. The authors believe that the challenge “becomes especially apparent at those points where the boundaries of conventional categories are tested, as with both animals and the unborn.” (16) In support, they cite philosopher John Rawls, who in his A Theory of Justice acknowledges his theory's failure to give an “account of ‘right conduct in regard to animals and the rest of nature.’” (16) Rawls concedes “that a correct conception of [this relationship] would ‘seem to depend upon a theory of the natural order and our place in it.’” (16)

2. 410 U.S. 113(1973).

3. Due to the open-ended manner in which the Court in Roe's companion case defined “health,” critical to the rule that a state cannot prohibit abortion, even post-viability, when the woman's health is endangered, there is a compelling argument that abortion on demand is in fact allowed throughout the entire pregnancy. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). The authors repeat this misinterpretation of Roe by characterizing the decision as conferring “an absolute right to abortion—even throughout the second trimester of pregnancy …” (4) (emphasis added). Ironically, elsewhere they point out another scholar's error in suggesting that Roe restricts abortions primarily to the first trimester of pregnancy. (162 n. 12)

4. One reason for Mensch and Freeman's dissent is their experience in teaching a course in environmental ethics. They “were forced to confront the limits of … conventional sources of moral discourse” and benefited from an “appeal to theological sources.” (2)

5. The fact that religion persists, of course, does not prove that God actually exists. Edward Wilson argues that man created the notion of God to serve a variety of purposes, including coping with the fear of death and providing overpowering validation to ethical codes that man himself had also created. Wilson, Edward O.,Consilience 253–257 (Alfred A. Knopf 1998)Google ScholarPubMed. Significantly, Wilson presupposes that mankind is the product of a naturalistic, evolutionary process. Id. at 241. One wonders if his view of the origin of religion would be shaken by biochemist Michael Behe's compelling argument that naturalistic evolution cannot account for many of the human body's remarkably intricate biochemical systems. Bene, Michael J., Darwin's Black Box (Free Press 1996)Google Scholar. Behe believes that “[t]o a person who does not feel obliged to restrict his search to unintelligent causes, the straightforward conclusion is that many biochemical systems were … planned … the product of intelligent activity.” Id. at 193. This conclusion “flows naturally from the data itself - not from sacred books or sectarian beliefs.” Id.

6. One view of moral assertions is that there can be no such grounding. Mensch and Freeman describe the prototypical philosophy class (“Philosophy 101”) at a secular liberal arts college around 1960: “[M]atters moral were largely relegated to the realm of individual subjectivity, and ethical values were understood not as rational and objective, but as a form of ‘emotivism’ disconnected from the [surrounding] factually verifiable, scientifically apprehensible world…” (28) They mention as well the philosopher Richard Rorty's “antifoundationalism,” (144) which abandons “the search for rationally unassailable foundational assertions as an unrealizable fantasy project.” (80) Such skepticism as Rorty's, (145) the authors believe, not only “raises the specter of pure relativism as to public moral questions,” (144-145) but also seems “to deny the possibility of any ‘public’ dialogue about moral truth at all.” (144) These criticisms apply to the “Philosophy 101” approach as well.

7. Another example discussed is American jurisprudence. One strand, positivism, does not even purport to address questions of morality because “[l]aw [is] simply the command of a particular sovereign in a particular place.” (32) A different strand, the “elaborate conceptual categories of American constitutionalism (like ‘freedom of contract’),” after the assault of the legal realists, was shown to be about nothing “other than the culture of judging.” (30-31 )

8. Consider, for example, this passage (which explains the book's title): “[T]o appropriate to one's cause the aura of the civil rights movement is to demand the unquestioning allegiance of people of goodwill and conscience …. The net effect is to elevate one's cause to a politics of virtue rather than of self-interest.” (9)

9. Posner, Richard A., The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 11 (Harv. U. Press 1999)Google Scholar.

10. See id. at ix, 9. Mensch and Freeman suggest that even infanticide, “so morally repugnant to most of us,” cannot be labeled as really wrong in an absolute sense. (173 n. 36)

11. In a departure from medieval natural law theorists, Grotius (1583-1645) promulgated a version of natural law “wholly premised on Enlightenment rationalism—a secular natural law that would remain true ‘even if God did not exist,’ so great was the capacity of unaided natural reason.” (185 n. 72) The modern natural law theorist Jacques Maritain attacks this “aggressive and self-sufficient Enlightenment conception of reason … [that treats] ‘the individual as a god ….’”(40)

12. The authors elsewhere attribute their focus on Christianity to “the overwhelming presence of Christianity in American culture and the particular Christian character inherent in much of the pro-life position.” (169 n. 26) Recall that the authors inform readers that they are not affiliated with any particular religious tradition. (3)

13. After characterizing Scripture as “notoriously ambiguous on the question of abortion,” the authors cite only one passage, Deut 30:15, that they say is often cited by pro-lifers. (17) This verse has at best a very indirect relevance to the abortion issue. It is regrettable that the authors failed to mention the many passages that bear on God's view of life in the womb. E.g., Psalm 139:13-16; Jer 1:4-5; Luke 1:44 (NIV). A thorough examination of what the Scripture teaches on abortion would also have taken into account Exod 21:22-25 (NIV), a passage that in some translations appears problematic for pro-lifers.

14. The Bible, of course, speaks to many other issues relevant to the abortion controversy, including the sinfulness of sexual relations outside of marriage (relevant to the problem of unwanted pregnancy), the command to show compassion (relevant to how women with unwanted pregnancies are to be viewed and treated), the command to forgive others (relevant to how women who have had abortions are to be viewed and treated), and the command to value all human life and to forgive our enemies (relevant to how abortionists are to be treated).

15. It is in the Bible that God reveals his will. There obviously are non-Christian conceptions of God. It is equally obvious that it matters tremendously which of the various views of God is correct. This is not the place to argue for the validity of the Christian view. Since Politics focuses on the role of Christian theology in the abortion debate, it is appropriate to confine my discussion to the Christian tradition.

16. It is interesting that the authors, who do not profess to believe Christianity to be true, evaluate various individuals and denominations as to whether they adhere sufficiently to the Christian tradition. In the authors' view, those proving sufficiently faithful include John Noonan, (42-45) Francis Schaeffer, (79-81) Karl Barth, (93) Dietrich Bonhoeffer, (93-94) and James Gustafson. (111-112) Those lacking in faithfulness include the God-is-dead theologians, (94-97) Joseph Fletcher, (107-109) and the Presbyterian Church (USA) in the early 1980s (136-137) (the Presbyterians redeemed themselves in the authors' eyes by the early 1990s. (152) Such an evaluation reveals the authors' belief that there is a core content to Christianity that can serve as a standard. But if the core content is not true, why does it matter whether or not anyone adheres to it?

17. I do not mean by this that non-Christian individuals or other religious faiths may not have beliefs that coincide with genuine moral truth. My point is that the only legitimate grounding for truth is in “God says,” with God meaning the Biblical God. I also believe that we Christians, well aware of our own sinfulness, should have sufficient humility to know that we cannot perfectly apprehend the truth that is found only in Christianity.

18. A non-substantive meaning for “the common good” is also consistent with the authors' rejection, previously noted, of consensus as a grounding for moral truth. I am somewhat confused, however, by their frequent negative references to theological absolutism in defending the pro-life position. On one occasion, “hostile” is included in the description, (109) which may suggest that here too it is the mode of argument that is being criticized. (83) Many times, however, the authors refer merely to absolutist religious opposition to abortion. (125, 127, 129, 135) The suggestion is that the authors are criticizing absolute opposition per se. If this is what they mean, I disagree. Surely there are some evils (Nazism?) which demand absolute opposition. Christians who believe that abortion is in this category speak no less with “a distinctive theological voice” (something that earns the authors' praise) than do Christians who feel able to compromise on abortion. (136)

19. If the authors mean as well that Christians should hide their identity as Christians, I do not agree. In addition, as the authors recognize, explicitly theological language may sometimes be necessary. Such occasions could result from “a pluralist reality that … render[s] universalism impossible…” (5) At other times, “prophetic witness” might be called for. (100-101)

20. I believe that there are also faith-based reasons for opposing legal imposition of faith. See Calhoun, Samuel W., Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to Professor Greenawait, 9 J. L. & Relig. 289CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. It will be recalled that this is the second question that the authors would have recommended for evaluation by the liberal and moderate denominations as a step toward avoiding the polarization flowing from Roe.

22. Particularly noteworthy is the authors' warning of the risk of idolatry for churches that too closely depend upon politics. (82, 142)

23. See Calhoun, supra n. 20.

24. Moreover, as a Christian I believe that my God-given reason has been corrupted by sin. I thus have no basis for confidence in any reasoning that I do while trying to block God's influence. Instead, I should always ask God to guide me as I exercise my reason.

25. Didion, Joan, God's Country, The New York Review of Books 68, 76 (11 2, 2000)Google Scholar.

26. Id. at 68.

27. While the authors believe that abortion takes human life, they do not believe that this in itself brands abortion as immoral or demanding legal restriction. Their use of a tort law example to support this view is unfortunate. They relate John Noonan's point that automobile negligence law “rests on the assumption that human lives will routinely be taken (in automobile accidents) for the sake of ‘values more highly prized by the society’ than human life, values realized through the facilitation of transportation.” (46, 108) To me, the vast distinction between accidental death resulting from negligence and the intentional killing that is abortion makes the analogy completely inapt. (They do refer to examples of intentional killing, ending a patient's life (108) and war, (108, 157) but do not discuss either the morality of these killings or whether abortion is similar enough to these two situations to warrant the comparison.)

I also regret the extent to which the authors apparently would depend upon sentiment in evaluating the value of preborn life. They point out that “photographs taken of nineteen-week fetuses are more compelling than those taken at eight weeks, which are in tum more compelling than those of two-week-old embryos.” (15) Such distinctions no doubt reflect normal emotional reactions, but should they drive the determination of when human life should be protected? As the authors point out, John Noonan warns of the danger of relying upon feelings as the criteria for membership in humanity: “‘[i]f feelings are the key, many slave owners have felt it perfectly moral to abuse and even kill their slaves … many Nazis felt no twinge of guilt in exterminating Jews and Poles whom they believed not to belong to the human species ….”’ (45) For an illuminating debate on this subject, see Wilson, James Q., On Abortions, Commentary 21 (01 1994)Google ScholarPubMed; Arkes, Hadley, Abortion Facts and Feelings, First Things 34 (04 1994)Google Scholar; Wilson, James Q. & Arkes, Hadley, Abortion Facts and Feelings II: An Exchange, First Things 39 (05 1994)Google Scholar.