1. The most adequate definition of the spectrum of available types will be the one which convinces all parties to the conversation that their special concern is fairly understood. The reason for seeking thus to locate correctly the views one does not hold is one expression of nonviolent respect for the dignity of the adversary. Thus in one sense the best typology will be “neutral.” It should facilitate accurate understanding whatever be one's own view, rather than tilting as some typologies do toward making one type more coherent than the others. Cady, Duane, From Warism to Pacifism (Temple U Press, 1989)Google Scholar uses a strategy opposite to mine, squishing all the forms of nonpacifism together on a single spectrum, within what he calls “warism.”

2. For example, I shall not follow James Turner Johnson in calling Sully, a minister of state, a “pacifist,” when his way to “put an end to war” was to have France remake the map of Europe, unselfishly but militarily. Johnson, James Turner, The Quest for Peace (Princeton U Press, 1987)Google Scholar. I consider it odd to call “Utopian,” as Johnson also does, the serious projects of real statesmen.

3. The notion of recourse to “first principles” as a way to bypass the difficulty of closely reading particular data might itself be a method mistake. The general approach taken here drew gratefully on some helpful counsel received in 1988 from Dr. Ted Koontz. This draft does not take account of all the possible further refinements which he suggested.

4. Bainton, Roland H., Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (Abingdon, 1960)Google Scholar. What “properly so-called” means will be part of the unpacking which follows. The simplest meaning of “JW” is that by applying politically relevant criteria one can distinguish between wars which are and those which are not morally justified.

5. Walters, LeRoy, The Just War and the Crusade: Antitheses or Analogies? 57 The Monist 584 (10 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Johnson, James Turner, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War at ch 5 (Princeton U Press, 1975)Google Scholar. Several other works by Johnson (compare below note 27) make him the strongest single source on tne subject of JW in the history of western ethics.

6. These are the two basic always-quoted phrases from Augustine. “Attack” and “injury” are properly political matters, whereas a divine command is on another scale.

7. It may well be that some Christian crusaders respected some of the JW limitations on means. Yet numerous of the medieval statements of limitations in bello expressly applied only to war against Christians.

8. The way Israel today honors the suicidal heroism of Masada, or of the Warsaw ghetto, are examples of this trait. The same can be true of the romantic irredentist nationalism of nineteenth century Poland, Ireland, or Italy. The honor-based military cultures of Iraq or North Korea, which make them “undeterrable” i.e. not rationally amenable to threats of damage, constitute a large portion of the drama of the contemporary threat of war, one which ordinary JW reasoning fails to attend to.

9. Although the matter is not our present concern, the notion of JHWH war when taken seriously can issue in a kind of pacifism, and did so in hebrew history. If what makes a war imperative is the divine command, and if God is able to intervene miraculously to save his people, this must exclude fighting which God has not ordered, and it undercuts the pragmatic argument for self-defense. Compare Yoder, John H., To Your Tents, O Israel The Legacy of Israel's Experience With Holy War, 19 Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, 345 (Summer 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and the works by Barrett and Lind cited there.

10. A fully refined spectrum would need to attend to the further point made by Russell, Frederick, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge U Press, 1975)Google Scholar (see index; especially 38, 119, 252), namely that in the canonical sense “crusade” refers not only to the transcendent value of the cause as God's, but also to the sanction of ecclesiastical formalities. By Russell's canonical definition a bishop or a council must promulgate a promise of indulgences for those who serve in the cause. So within the “holy” category as a worldwide formal/anthropological pattern there would be the specific Christian subset, distinct formally but not actually ethically, namely the “crusade” technically properly (i.e. canoni-cally) so called.

11. Bainton did notice Machiavelli, but he did not dignify that view as a type; Bainton, , Attitudes at 122–27 (cited in note 4)Google Scholar.

12. Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars, at 4 and following pages (Basic Books, 1977)Google Scholar. He traces its history back to Thucydides (ca. 460 BCE). Walzer's use of “scare quotes” around the word “realism” is important. It is one of the marks of those who think that they are “realistic” that they tend in fact to be less critically aware than others would be of their own biases. They identify “reality” with their own reading of things, in addition to being more materialistic than some others are in their understanding of what counts as “things”.

13. I previously used the secular metaphor “blank check” to designate this stance. That image describes well the posture which is asked of the citizen/subject, rather than the criteria which the political decision-maker uses. The “blank check” response has been expected of the citizen/soldier, as his duty, by all of the above types, until very recently. The notion that the individual citizen or soldier could or should have his own judgment about a war's rightness is a relatively recent extension of the JW logic, which we now call “selective conscientious objection” (see below note 66).

14. Grotius, Hugo, The Law of War and Peace originally 1625Google Scholar; the “Prolegomena”, translation by Francis W. Kelsey for the Carnegie Endowment, now in the public domain, was published as a pamphlet 1957 by Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.

15. The first chapter of Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations (Knopf, Third ed 1961)Google Scholar is entitled “A Realist Theory of International Politics.” Yet Morgenthau did not philosophize his realism claim as much as others have. Compare Smith, Michael Joseph, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (LSU Press 1986)Google Scholar.

16. The phrase is from a limerick attributed to Archbishop William Temple. It capsules well Niebuhr's redefinition of the notion of sin, in such a way that activities which are (in some sense) sinful are at the same time morally imperative.

17. One school of catholic moral thought simplifies or pigeonholes this paradox by distinguishing “material evil” (such as harm or pain) from “moral evil” (that which canonically calls for penance). Sometimes “material evil” is called “premoral,” with the thought that moral evaluation must be a later phase. Reinhold Niebuhr rejected this word play as too easy. For him the wrong things we have to do should still be the objects of remorse and should drive us to draw on the Gospel's resources of pardon.

18. The metaphor “inject” is fitting. It says that the political realm is self-contained, and that the moral claims are extraneous to its nature, being introduced from outside.

19. The simpler meaning of “divine right”, the one rendered here, is that God has placed the king above anyone else's scrutiny. The term may however be used (and has been used by some idealists) in another sense, namely to state the claim that the King is accountable to a moral standard above himself which may make him listen less to his courtiers or his constituents. Then the JW discipline would be a part of the king's discharging that right.

20. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (cited in note 12). The first chapter is “Against Realism.”

21. A student more versed in watching violent films than I am claims than Rambo is not the best exemplar of this stance. In favor of my understanding, which I think is that of the nonexpert viewer, I may cite the words with which Playboy explained their naming Sylvester Stallone in 1987 as one of “Twenty-five most important Americans”: “By showing in both Rocky and Rambo that the ordinary American could achieve the goals of justice and dignity by the use of violence he changed the way Americans expected problems to be solved - from compromise and subtlety to directness and force.” But if this characterization is unfair to Stallone I am willing to substitute any other icon like Arnold Schwartzenegger or John Wayne.

22. Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove, 1963)Google Scholar.

23. It may be that to be fair to the glorification of the participants of the heroic but hopeless clashes in the Warsaw ghetto or at Massada they should rather be considered, as I noted above, as subforms of the “Holy” category.

24. One critic has suggested that analysis should distinguish between what it takes to justify a war morally or politically (for example, to a legislature, or to a civil constituency, or in academic political science), and what it takes to motivate men to fight. It might then be argued that once the justification of a conflict has been delivered by valid moral grounds, it is all right then to motivate the soldiers (or the football players) to fight by means of the rhetoric of hatred. The distinction is possible conceptually: I doubt that a community can justify or implement that bifurcation.

25. For the purposes of this review, it has been justifiable thus far to assume that “pacifism,” the polar alternative that all these positions reject, is univocal, since the discussion we are pursuing assumed that. That is however not in fact the case, as we shall see below.

26. Paul Ramsey's very last work, printed posthumously, was Ramsey, Paul, Speak up for Just War or Pacifism (U of Pennsylvania Press, 1988)Google Scholar. His priority concern was to denounce what looked to him like sloppy thinking looking for a place to stand between JW and Pacifism, avoiding the real differences. Yet in so arguing, as before, Ramsey continued to ignore the existence of the other alternatives.

27. Johnson, James Turner, Can Modern War be Just? (Yale U Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War (Princeton U Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton U Press, 1981)Google Scholar; The Quest of Peace (Princeton U Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

28. Childress, James F., “Just War Criteria,” most accessible in Shannon, Thomas J., ed, War or Peace? at 40–58 (Orbis Press, 1980)Google Scholar but also in Childress', own Moral Responsibility in Conflicts (LSU Press, 1982)Google Scholar, see also 39 Theological Studies 427-445 (1978). Childress has often been cited and anthologized, with his basically right thesis about the shared starting point of JW and pacifism; he too attends little to all the other positions present in the culture.

29. Miller, Richard, Interpretations of Conflict (U of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

30. National Council of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace (US Catholic Conference, 1983)Google Scholar. The Catholic bishops in fact pass over in silence the important place of the crusades in Catholic history, as well as the many times when sovereigns baptized and invested by the Church turned a deaf ear to moral concerns.

31. In fact Childress', James “Just-War Criteria,” found in Shannon, Thomas A., ed, War or Peace at 40 (Orbis Books, 1980)Google Scholar claims for the first time to be making sense philosophically of how just war reasoning works.

32. Compare Yoder, John H., When War is Unjust at 40, and n 1 (Augsburg, 1984)Google Scholar. “Necessity” in the JWT properly understood means that even the damage one does within the rules must not be done unless it is indispensable. “Necessity” in this looser sense means you may break rules “if you have to to win.”

33. Shannon, , War at 40Google Scholar (cited in note 31) does this. His argument is briefly cited, Yoder, When War at ch 5 and 68 (cited in note 32). To document adequately still other arguments against the possibility of a decisive “no” would take us too far. Some create new borderline categories like “extreme emergency” or “distress.” Some appeal to the classic distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in hello, arguing that in bello atrocities do not disqualify a good cause.

34. It would take us too far to seek to catalogue the set of variants which seek or seem to stay on the knife's edge between “strict” and “toothless”; they are numerous. Recently for instance the Persian Gulf War was called “imperfectly just” by one Jesuit; “not just but necessary” by a bishop.

35. This term is of course borrowed from another realm, namely from constitutional law. Its applicability is common sensically evident. I first saw the phrase used, as a designation of one's own position, by Malloy, Edward A., CSC, The Ethics of Law Enforcement and Criminal Punishment at 28 (U Press of America, 1982)Google Scholar. As in law, one assumes that most reasonable people would come to the same reading of the meaning of a text and its application to the facts of the case. The classical statement of the need for each criterion to count was Thomas' dictum: bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu.

36. My fullest description of the meaning of and the case for “teeth” is offered in Rouner, Leroy S., ed, Celebrating Peace at 33 (Notre Dame U Press, 1990)Google Scholar and in Lopez, George A. and Christiansen, Drew, eds, Morals and Might in The Credibility and Political Uses of the Just War Tradition (Westview, 1994)Google Scholar. The point is made more briefly Yoder, When War (cited in note 32).

37. John Courtney Murray, S.J. made both of these judgments very clearly and publicly, although only after the fact in Murray, John Courtney, Remarks on the Moral Problem of War, 20 Theological Studies 40 (1959)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Murray represented (in his own mind) a kind of renaissance of Just War thinking after generations of neglect, accompanied by Paul Ramsey and followed by numerous ethicists. This contradicts the picture painted by Daniel Dombrowski according to which the doctrine was effective until not long ago but has just now died. The fact is rather that it was forgotten since the eighteenth century and is now being revived by some.

38. This is the point where US law unjustly favors the integral pacifist who refuses all wars, over against the honest Catholic or Lutheran who applies his communion's JW principles to reject a particular war or a particular tactic. Compare my document collection The Moral Responsibility to Refuse to Serve in an Unjust War, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Working paper 3:WP:9 (1993)Google Scholar.

39. Compare Yoder, John H., Surrender: A Moral Imperative, 48 The Review of Politics, 576 (Fall 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Murray and Ramsey were among the few JW thinkers to face this implication openly.

40. I just said there are six; but for the purpose of the next paragraph “just war without teeth” can be counted as a variant of “realism.”

41. This is a shortcoming of the argumentative tactic of Cady, From Warism (cited in note 1). The variations are multidimensional, rather than being spread across a single scale.

42. Attention to this possible practical political commonality between JW and pacifism is present already in the foundational writings of James Turner Johnson and James Childress. It is popularized in National Conference, The Challenge of Peace at 71Google Scholar and following pages, especially 74. It is analyzed at book-length by Richard Miller, B. in his Interpretations of Conflict (U of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

43. Some prefer the term “teleological” rather than “consequential” as the alternative to the “deontological” category. It is a broader category since it includes taking credit for ineffective intentions. When the FBI and Janet Reno said they “did not intend” to burn down the compound at Waco, although that was the prima facie obvious outcome of the previous steps they had authorized, this was a typical separation between “intention” and consequences.

44. Compare Yoder, John H., A Consistent Alternative View Within the Just War Family, 2 Faith and Philosophy 112 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45. Harris, becomes a type representative in Walzer, Just and Unjust War at 258 and 323 (cited in note 12)Google Scholar.

46. Compare id at 360.

47. Although Michael Novak used the term “moral clarity” in Novak, Michael, Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age (Nelson, 1983)Google Scholar for his argument against the American Bishops' reading of the JWT in their The Challenge of Peace (1983), he does not actually define his dissent with any care in terms of the classical categories. It is not clear that he respects that much either the classical categories or the very notion of a careful casuistry. Novak lists what he calls “gaps” or “unanswered questions” in the JW theory, but then goes on arguing as if the gaps did not matter. To make sense of his argument it would seem that he must be holding to a “sliding scale,” such that a worse enemy makes a cause more just and a more just cause outweigh the value of the other restraints. The same would seem to be the case for George Weigel, who also gives The Challenge a failing grade in Weigel, George, Tranquillitas Ordinis at 257 (and following pages) (Oxford, 1987)Google Scholar, and Catholicism and the Renewal of American Democracy at at 139 (and following pages) (Paulist Press, 1989)Google Scholar, but without ever facing the challenge of showing that the JW tradition has teeth.

48. Compare note 19. One might suggest that as to political criteria “divine right” is “realist”: as to legitimate authority it is “holy”.

49. These latter two specimens are of course the same moral position applied to differing cases.

50. Johnson, James Turner, The Quest for Peace 109, 153, 176 (and following pages) (Princeton U Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

51. My amateur catalog of such designs lists over forty such designs in European history from 1300 to WWI. Compare with note 55 below.

52. Some advocates of this view would say that military action to defend the peace, especially if authorized by some higher agency, should be called “police action” rather than war.

53. Johnson, , Quest at 254Google Scholar (and following pages) (cited in note 50) grants that “utopia” usually has other meanings.

54. Compare Reinhold Niebuhr: “The truest visions of religion are illusions, which may be partly realized by being resolutely believed. For what religions believes to be true is not wholly true but ought to be true; and may become true if its truth is not doubted.” Niebuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society at 81 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932)Google Scholar.

55. See Bok, Sisela, Early Advocates of Lasting World Peace: Utopians or Realists? in Rouner, LeRoy S., ed, Celebrating Peace at 52 (Notre Dame U Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Hemleben, Sylvester John, Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries (U of Chicago Press, 1943)Google Scholar; Termeulen, Jacob, Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organization in seiner Entwicklung (Nijhoff, 1917)Google Scholar.

56. Note the “New Abolitionist Covenant” enunciated and circulated jointly ca. 1980 by five organizations: the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the New Call to Peacemaking, Pax Christi USA, Sojourners, and World Peacemakers. The term “abolition” was chosen by these people not at all because of confidence in the peacemaking potential of the United Nations, nor because of any intent to impose peace on others by force, but as an appeal to the moral power of the American movement against slavery (which they differ from me in considering to have been a success).

57. Here one might use Ceadel's term “pacificism,” Ceadel, Martin, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945 (Clarendon Press, 1980)Google Scholar.

58. The fact that co-operation of such kinds is in fact growingly successful gives the lie to those who would call this view particularly “idealistic”. JW thought is also idealistic, if it counts seriously on sovereign governments to make objective decisions ad bellum, and on belligerent governments and societies, and even on soldiers in the heat of battle, to be scrupulous in bello.

59. Compare World Order in Catholic Teaching, paragraph 235 and following in National Council of Catholic Bishops The Challenge of Peace, 1983Google Scholar.

60. These visions vary as to the actual political form they envision. It might be an ideal central government, or a federation, or a looser decentralized collaboration of theoretically independent entities living with mutual respect and recognition and many interlocking relationships.

61. Compare the writings of Johansen, Robert C., like Toward a Dependable Peace: A Proposal for an Appropriate Security System (Institute for World Order, 1978)Google Scholar.

62. In fact the principle of rejecting massive city bombing on firm moral grounds arose before Hiroshima; it is therefore anachronistic to call it “nuclear”. The argument was made by Bishop George Bell of Chichester in 1944 in the House of Lords, and by Jesuit moral theologian John Ford in a 1944 journal article. The argument was still older than that; it was the topic of a dissertation by John Kenneth Ryan accepted by the Catholic University of America in 1934, Ryan, John K., Modern War and Basic Ethics (Bruce, 1940)Google Scholar. But why does the same kind of negative logic not attach to other atrocities? Why do we not have “genocide pacifism” or “concentration camp pacifism” or “rape pacifism”?

63. Gregg, Richard, The Power of Nonviolence (J. P. Lippincott, 1934)Google Scholar. Compare my review of the theme in my The “Power” of Non-Violence Paper G:WP:2 available from the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

64. When the argument began it seemed that the Gandhian experiences stood alone. With time however there developed the awareness that there had been many such episodes in earlier history: Miller, William R., “Nonviolence” A Christian Interpretation (George Allen & Onwin, Ltd, 1964)Google Scholar and then with time many more cases could be analyzed; compare Sharp, Gene, The Politics of NonViolent Action (Porter Sargent, 1973)Google Scholar.

65. King-Hall, Stephen Sir, Defense in the Nuclear Age (Fellowship Publications, 1959)Google Scholar began the pragmatic argument for nonmilitary defense strategies. Gene Sharp has developed institutions to promote research and education: the Albert Einstein Institution and the Civilian-Based Defense Association. Compare Crowell, George H., The Case for Non-violent Civilian Defense Against External Aggression, Ploughshares Working Paper 90–94Waterloo, Ontario, 1990Google Scholar. Sider, Ronald J., Non-Violence; the Invincible Weapon? (World Publishing, 1989)Google Scholar. New data have come in from the political changes in Manila 1986, and in Eastern Europe in 1989. When seen in relation to the JW grid these new resources change the “last resort” line. They also represent, of course, another specimen of “ways of seeing the world.” Sider alludes to the “Emperor's new clothes” syndrome. The discovery of the power of nonviolence debunks the mythical trust in the power of lethal weaponry to bring about deep change.

66. In Yoder, , When War at 87Google Scholar (and following) (cited in note 32), I cited Martin Luther on the subject. Compare Yoder, , The Moral Responsibility to Refuse to Serve in an Unjust War available from the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (Working Paper 3:WP:9)Google Scholar. As was said in note 38 above, it is an injustice of the US legal system that it honors “absolute” but not “selective” conscientious objection.

67. One estimate said that 70,000 young men went from the USA to Canada in order to avoid service in Viet Nam.

68. This was said in note 25 above. Here, too, Cady, From Warism (cited in note 1) spreads the several kinds of pacifism along a single confusing spectrum. Cady is right in discerning more varieties than the three main streams I distinguish here. Two recent well-argued presentations of the case for pacifism are Holmes, Robert L., On War and Morality (Princeton U Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Dombrowski, Daniel A., Christian Pacifism (Temple U Press, 1991)Google Scholar. Each also uses type distinctions somewhat like mine, but does so in the service of his own advocacy, and neither of them seeks to interpret with understanding all the other views.

69. Niebuhr did in fact suggest, earlier and more perceptively than many, that Gand-hian methods would work in the American setting; Niebuhr, , Moral Man and Immoral Society at 252Google Scholar (and following pages) (cited in note 54).

70. One enormous change in the picture since Niebuhr's time has been the growth in the awareness of the positive power of nonviolent action tactics, argued academically in the many works of Gene Sharp, The Politics (cited in note 64) and popularly in Ronald J. Sider, Non-Violence (cited in note 65). It is too simple to say a priori that very evil powers can never be stopped.

71. Muste, Abraham J., Pacifism and Perfectionism reprinted in Hentoff, Nat, ed, The Essays of A. J. Muste at 308 (and following pages)(Bobbs-Merrill, 1967)Google Scholar; MacGregor, Garth H. C., The New Testament Basis of Pacifism (Fellowship, 1960)Google Scholar.

72. Compare Miller, Nonviolence (cited in note 64).

73. Mumaw, John R., Nonresistance and Pacifism (Herald, 1944)Google Scholar.

74. Smucker, Don E., A Mennonite Critique of the Pacifist Movement, XX Mennonite Quarterly Review 81 (1946)Google Scholar; compare also Littell, Franklin H., The Inadequacy of Modern Pacifism, Spring Christianity and Society 18 (1946)Google Scholar.

75. I speak here of descriptive accuracy; i. e. whether Niebuhr's characterizations of Tolstoy or of Gandhi or of Jesus are right. A moral argument about the substance of any of their views, or of his, would be something else, not belonging in this survey, but touched on by Muste and MacGregor (cited in note 71).

76. Yoder, John H., Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism, XXIX Mennonite Quarterly Review 101 (1955)Google Scholar. Compare Friesen, Duane, Christian Peacemaking and International Conflict; A Realist Pacifist Perspective (Herald, 1986)Google Scholar, who refuses to yield to the Niebuhrians that their claim to be “realistic” is correct.

77. One further effort to change the landscape is the term “pacificism”. It is in some dictionaries. It means something more positive than “antimilitarism”. The British scholar Martin Ceadel, Pacifism (cited in note 57) seeks to make it a distinct category. I have used this term myself in the past, as a way to describe the stance of the popes. I abandoned it because most readers confused it with pacifism, and because most such views can be more precisely characterized as strong subsets of the more restrained mode of the “just war” stance.

78. Most recently in Miller, Interpretations (cited in note 29) and in Ramsey, Paul, Speak up for Just War or Pacifism (Pennsylvania State U Press, 1988)Google Scholar.