The concept of the constitutional revolution has become ubiquitous, but it is applied to all manner of things that are unlike each other in notable ways. It has been generously applied to events in such far-flung places as South Africa, Eastern Europe, Great Britain, India, Canada, Iran, Israel, and the United States. Despite its oxymoronic character, it has the potential to illuminate a much-vexed subject of scholarly inquiry. This article seeks to sharpen conceptual clarity in the way we depict constitutional change, specifically that species of change that entails significant breaks or departures in the workings of the constitutional order.

This article uses two newly collected data sets to investigate the reliance by political actors on the external vetting of judicial candidates, in particular vetting conducted by the nation’s largest legal organization, the American Bar Association (ABA). Using these data, I show that minority and female nominees are more likely than whites and males to receive lower ratings, even after controlling for education, experience, and partisanship via matching. These discrepancies are important for two reasons. First, as I show, receiving poor ABA ratings is correlated with confirmation failure. Second, I demonstrate that ABA ratings do not actually predict whether judges will be “better” in terms of reversal rates. Taken together, these findings complicate the ABA’s influential role in judicial nominations, both in terms of setting up possible barriers against minority and female candidates and also in terms of its actual utility in predicting judicial performance.

The social construction of judicial power is a complicated process, especially in hybrid political regimes. We argue that off-bench resistance against blatant interference supported by vibrant social networks is an important manifestation of judicial autonomy. By drawing on evidence from field research, media coverage, and the existing scholarly literature, we clarify the logic of off-bench judicial resistance against external interference, outline a taxonomy of five strategies of resistance in hybrid regimes, and explain the political implications of off-bench judicial behavior.

The emergence of constitutional review in France has attracted substantial attention from scholars of public law. Yet little has been written about the political implications of the expansion of rights-based review on the part of France’s highest administrative jurisdiction, the Conseil d’Etat. The argument is made in this article that repeat litigation by French lawyers defending the cause of immigrants is an important site for observing the symbolic power of legal forms. The analysis focuses on cases challenging immigration-related administrative regulations and shows how the process of repeatedly adjudicating these issues has focused attention away from litigants and their claims at the same time that it has reinforced the centrality of the Conseil d’Etat and its formalist jurisprudence in administrative governance. This detailed examination of the practical operation of France’s highest administrative jurisdiction leads to the surprising conclusion that this distinctly nonadversarial form of adjudication has contributed over the long term to institutionalizing a juridification of immigration-related administrative policy making.

Do elected judges and prosecutors change their behavior to reflect public opinion after they receive information about constituent preferences? In this article I use a unique measure of public opinion—votes on an initiative to legalize marijuana—to examine the responsiveness of prosecutors and trial court judges to a strong, issue-specific, constituency-level opinion signal. I find that, at least in recent drug cases in Colorado, both prosecutors and judges changed their sentencing behavior after receiving that signal. Prosecutors responded only to local-level opinion, while judges responded to both local and statewide opinion.

Over the past 30 years many observers of the federal courts have expressed concern over mounting dockets, arguing that the taxing workloads for federal judges could have a variety of negative consequences, including difficulties in judicial recruitment and retention. However, assessing the plausibility of those and similar claims requires the use of appropriate measures of judges’ workload. We introduce scholars and practitioners to new measures of caseload for the district courts available from 1964 through 2012. We detail the methodology for constructing our measures and then assess changes in caseload over time, both within and across courts. We argue that, in most cases, the preferred measure of caseload incorporates weighted filings and accounts for the service of senior status judges and vacancies. We conclude by pointing scholars toward additional research avenues that can be undertaken with our publicly available data.

The declaratory theory is that “judge-made law” is discovered, not created. This article describes a scenario in which there develops a legal system such that the declaratory theory is true and shows that judges in the scenario could literally discover what they could justifiably call law. Positivist objections to the theory are rebutted. If true, the declaratory theory has implications for contemporary systems that combine legislation and judge-made law.