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Seeking Information: When the Court Wants More

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2022

Natalie C. Rogol  and
Matthew D. Montgomery
Natalie C. Rogol
Affiliation:
Rhode Island College, USA
Matthew D. Montgomery*
Affiliation:
Georgia State University, USA
*
Contact the corresponding author, Matthew D. Montgomery, at [email protected].
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Abstract

The State of the Union represents an opportunity for the president to share policy goals with other political actors. Thus, the State of the Union can proxy how much information the Court has about executive preferences when receiving a case. We find that the less time a president devotes to a policy area, the more likely the Court is to issue a request for a brief in a case dealing with that issue area. This finding indicates that the Court is cognizant of presidential signals of policy preferences and actively seeks to supplement its understanding of the executive’s preferences.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Law and Courts , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , Spring 2021 , pp. 49 - 68
Copyright
© 2021 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

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