Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2022
The austerity policies pursued in several countries during the Eurozone crisis began to call attention to the role played by courts as relevant actors in the context of budgetary and financial stress. The case of the Portuguese Constitutional Court has often been singled out in national and international forums as one characterized by particularly intense activism in this respect. Allegedly, political conflict around austerity policies and the demand for their judicial review had fundamentally changed the role of the Portuguese Constitutional Court and the behavior of its judges. However, after examining these claims empirically, we find that, when properly assessed with scrutiny of comparable legislation in other periods, the judicial behavior on austerity policies exhibits a much less exceptional pattern than often argued. Constitutional review in Portugal seems to respond to institutional arrangements (i.e., those fostering a central role for ideological preferences and party loyalty) and not to specific business cycles.
We are grateful to two anonymous referees, David Klein, António Araújo, Joaquim Pedro Cardoso da Costa, Pedro Lomba, Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro, José Sousa e Brito, and Católica Global School of Law seminar participants for helpful suggestions. The data set assembled by the authors for use in this article is available at http://www.apis.ics.ulisboa.pt. The usual disclaimers apply.