¹ While the Kennedy recognition policy was a marked departure from the policy pursued by the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy effort was not the first U.S. use of, or attempt to use, recognition as a means of promoting democracy in Latin America. See Donald, Marquand Dozer, ‘Recognition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations’, Journal of Inter- American Studies, 8, No. 2 (04 1966), 318–35.Google Scholar

² Edwin, Licuwen, Generals vs. Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 115.Google Scholar

³ Arthur, M. Schlesinger Jr, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, Houghton Muffin, 1965), p. 1001 footnote (my italics).Google Scholar

⁴ The Kennedy policy and its application is described and appraised in Lieuwen, , op. cit., pp. 114–29.Google Scholar

⁵ Slater cites one such piece of evidence: ‘In a famous New York Herald-Tribune article early October 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Martin, speaking directly for the President, made explicit the Administration's more Cautious attitude toward military coups. While reiterating Administration opposition to reactionary militarism, Martin asserted that it incorrect to believe that the “military [are] universal supporters of those who oppose change,” citing Ecuador and Guatemala as examples of “military regimes …[that] have announced reform programs of substantial importance”. In any event, he added, … United States leverage in Latin American political processes was sometimes not very great. Finally, he argued, democracy must have time and soil and sunlight in which to grow … [and] must spring from seeds planted in indigenous soil”.’ Jerome, Slater, ‘Democracy versus Stabilty: The Recent Latin American Policy of the United States’, The Yale Review, 55 No.2 (Winter, 1966), 117.Google Scholar

⁶ Department: of Slate Bulletin, XLIX (16 December 1963), 912–13.

⁷ Ibid., L (29 June 1964), 996.

⁸ Ibid., p. 999.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 996

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 999–1000.

¹⁴ Ibid., LIII (20 December 1965), 995.

¹⁵ Ibid., LVIII (23 April 1968), 533.

¹⁶ Ibid., LII (1 March 1965), 304.

¹⁷ Ibid., LV (19 September 1966), 408.

¹⁸ Ibid., LXI (17 November 1969), 413.

¹⁹ Ibid., LXI (8 December 1969), 515.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 514 (my italics).

²¹ New Directions for the 1970s Toward a Strategy of Inter-American Development, Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 544.

²² Ibid., p. 562

²³ There may be an additional reason—somewhat different from the three listed although somewhat related to them—for the Johnson Administration's abandonment of the Kennedy policy on recognition and promotion of democracy. This reason has to do with Johnson's reaction to Kennedy's Latin America policy in general. Eric Goldman, in his not very kind treatment of President Johnson, asserts: ‘As Vice President, Lyndon Johnson had been largely silent about Latin America, as he was concerning most policies. But he had developed the conviction that what John Kennedy was doing in the area, or permitting to be done, was a thoroughgoing mess.’ Eric, F. Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York, Knopf, 1969), p. 76.Google Scholar

²⁴ Department of State Bulletin, L (29 June 1964), 999.

²⁵ Ibid., LXI (8 December 1969), 516

²⁶ New Directions for the 1970s … Hearings, p. 562.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Robert, F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World (Garden City, Doubleday, 1967), p. 111.Google Scholar

²⁹ Theodore, C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 535–6.Google Scholar

³⁰ Rockefeller Report on Latin America, Hearing, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 14.

³¹ New Directions for the 1970s … Hearings, p. 503.

³² Sorenson, , op. cit., p. 536 (my italics).Google Scholar

³³ New Directions for the 1970s … Hearings, p. 562.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

³⁷ Rockefeller Report on Latin America, Hearing …, p. 11.