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Transnational Business and US Diplomacy in Late Nineteenth-Century South America: W. R. Grace & Co. and the Chilean Crises of 1891

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 November 2012

MARK RICE
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Abstract

The final decades of the nineteenth century were marked by diplomatic confrontations between Chile and the United States. In 1891 the killing of US Navy sailors in a riot in Valparaíso threatened to provoke armed conflict, an event known as the Baltimore Crisis. This article investigates how William Russell Grace, the head of a merchant firm based in New York, played a central role in negotiating between Chile and the United States. By placing his activities in a transnational framework, Grace responded to the demands of multiple nation-states in the Americas. Observing changes in Grace's transnational economic infrastructure can help to identify larger long-term shifts in diplomacy and power on South America's Pacific coast in the late nineteenth century, especially Chile's emergence as a regional hegemon. The actions of Grace also raise larger questions regarding the power of business in the Americas in the late nineteenth century, especially with regard to growing US interests in the region.

Spanish abstract

Las últimas décadas del siglo XIX estuvieron marcadas por confrontaciones diplomáticas entre Chile y los Estados Unidos. En 1891, la muerte de personal de la naval norteamericana en un disturbio en Valparaíso amenazó con provocar un conflicto armado (un evento conocido como la Crisis de Baltimore). Este artículo investiga cómo el empresario W. R. Grace jugó un papel central en la negociación entre Chile y los Estados Unidos. Al ubicar sus actividades dentro de un marco transnacional, observamos que Grace respondió a las demandas de múltiples estados nacionales en Latinoamérica. El examinar los movimientos en la infraestructura económica transnacional de Grace puede ayudar a identificar cambios de más largo plazo en la diplomacia y el poder en la costa del Pacífico de Sudamérica a fines del siglo XIX (especialmente el surgimiento de Chile como una hegemonía regional). Asimismo, las acciones de Grace señalan cuestiones mayores en relación al poder del comercio en Latinoamérica en ese periodo, especialmente en cuanto a los crecientes intereses norteamericanos en la región.

Portuguese abstract

As últimas décadas do século XIX foram marcadas por confrontos diplomáticos entre o Chile e os Estados Unidos. Em 1891, o assassinato de marinheiros da Marinha estadonidense durante uma revolta em Valparaíso ameaçou provocar um conflito armado – um episódio conhecido como a Crise de Baltimore. O artigo investiga como o empresário W. R. Grace desempenhou um papel central nas negociações entre o Chile e os EUA. Ao situar suas atividades em um quadro transnacional, observamos que Grace respondeu às demandas de diversos estados-nações nas Americas. Ao analisar as mudanças em sua infrastrutura econômica transnacional, podemos identificar alterações diplomáticas e relativas ao poder mais amplas na costa pacífica da América do Sul durante o final do século XIX, em especial quanto à emergência da supremacia regional chilena. Ademais, as ações de Grace levantam questões maiores relacionadas ao poder das empresas nas Américas no final do século XIX, particularmente em relação aos crescentes interesses americanos na região.

Keywords

US–Chilean relationsChilean politics and governmenttransnationalismBaltimore Crisisbusiness imperialismWilliam Russell Gracerelaciones exteriores Estados Unidos–Chilepolíticas chilenas y gobiernotransnacionalismoCrisis de Baltimoreimperialismo comercialWilliam Russell Gracerelações internacaionais Estados Unidos–Chilepolítica e governo chilenotransnacionalismoa Crise de Baltimoreimperialismo empresarialWilliam Russell Grace
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , November 2012 , pp. 765 - 792
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

1 For a detailed description of the riot, see Goldberg, Joyce S., The Baltimore Affair (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), pp. 1–19Google Scholar.

2 The causes and consequences of the Baltimore Crisis are investigated in Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair; Valdivieso, Germán Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’ (Chile: Ediciones Altazor, 2002)Google Scholar; Sater, William, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp. 51–68Google Scholar; Pike, Frederick B., Chile and the United States, 1880–1962: The Emergence of Chile's Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States Diplomacy (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1963), pp. 66–93Google Scholar; LaFeber, Walter, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 130–6Google Scholar; and Schoultz, Lars, Beneath the United States: A History of U. S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 91–106Google Scholar. A collection of primary sources with legal commentary can be found in Franco, José Miguel Barros, Apuntes para la historia diplomática de Chile: el caso del ‘Baltimore’ (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1950)Google Scholar.

3 See Clayton, Lawrence A., Grace: W. R. Grace & Co., the Formative Years, 1850–1930 (Ottawa, IL: Jameson Books, 1985), pp. 204–23Google Scholar; and James, Marquis, Merchant Adventurer: The Story of W. R. Grace (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1993), pp. 244–62Google Scholar.

4 Seigel, Micol, ‘Beyond Compare: Comparative Method after the Transnational Turn’, Radical History Review, 91 (Winter 2005), p. 63Google Scholar.

5 Quiroz Norris, Alfonso W., ‘Las actividades comerciales y financieros de la Casa Grace y la Guerra del Pacífico, 1879–1890’, Histórica, 7: 2 (1983), pp. 214–54Google Scholar; Alexander, C.de Secada, G., ‘Arms, Guano, and Shipping: The W. R. Grace Interests in Peru, 1865–1885’, Business History Review, 59: 4 (1985), pp. 597–621Google Scholar; Miller, Rory, ‘The Making of the Grace Contract: British Bondholders and the Peruvian Government, 1885–1890’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 8: 1 (1976), pp. 73–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Quiroz, Alfonso W., Corrupt Circles: A History of Unbound Graft in Peru (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008), pp. 170–80, 195–202Google Scholar; Clayton, Grace, pp. 107–75.

6 The assertion that British firms acted as agents of informal imperialism in nineteenth-century Latin America was argued in Gallagher, John and Robinson, Ronald, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review, 6: 1 (1953), pp. 1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other historians led by D. C. M. Platt have argued that British firms acted quite independently of their country's diplomatic goals and were also limited in their influence on the domestic affairs of Latin America; see Platt, D. C. M., ‘Introduction’, in Platt, (ed.), Business Imperialism, 1840–1930: An Inquiry Based on British Experience in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 1–14Google Scholar. A more recent and nuanced assessment of the influence of foreign business in Latin America can be found in Miller, Rory, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 234–45Google Scholar. Miller argues that British firms rarely exercised direct influence on the domestic politics of Latin America, but they did play an influential role in developing economic dependence in the region. These debates are reflected in the economic history of Chile during the nitrate boom. The argument that foreign business had limited political influence in Chilean and international politics in the era of the nitrate boom can be found in Blakemore, Harold, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, 1886–1896: Balmaceda and North (London: Athlone Press, 1974)Google Scholar. A different view is presented in O'Brien, Thomas F., The Nitrate Industry and Chile's Crucial Transition, 1870–1891 (New York: New York University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. O'Brien argues that foreign firms did enjoy a degree of influence and encouraged Chilean economic dependence during the nitrate era.

7 I do not wish to suggest that scholars of US–Latin American relations have ignored debates over the influence of ‘business imperialism’. Historians have long investigated the influence of US business in Latin America, but such studies have usually examined business influence through the perspective of resource extraction of commodities like bananas, copper and oil. These many rich studies, too numerous to list here, have also tended to focus on the twentieth century. Other studies have investigated US influence in Latin American financial policy: see, for example, Rosenberg, Mark B., The Changing Hemispheric Trade Environment: Opportunities and Obstacles (Miami, FL: Florida International University, 1991)Google Scholar. O'Brien's, Thomas F. two books, The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)Google Scholar, and The Century of U. S. Capitalism in Latin America (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), provide excellent accounts of the influence of US business in Latin American affairs. However, as their titles suggest, these investigations focus mainly on the twentieth century.

8 James, Merchant Adventurer, pp. 7–32, 111–24; Quiroz, ‘Las actividades comerciales’, pp. 220–4.

9 Hunt, Wallis, Heirs of Great Adventure: The History of Balfour, Williamson and Company Limited, vol. 1 (London: 1951), pp. 67–70Google Scholar.

10 O'Brien, Thomas F., ‘Chilean Elites and Foreign Investors: Chilean Nitrate Policy, 1880–1882’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 11: 1 (1979), pp. 101–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Quiroz, ‘Las actividades comerciales’, pp. 214–54; Secada, ‘Arms, Guano, and Shipping’, pp. 597–621.

12 Miller, Rory and Greenhill, Robert, ‘The Fertilizer Commodity Chains’, in Topik, Steven, Marichal, Carlos and Frank, Zephyr (eds.), From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 228–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Chile's privitisation of nitrate holdings and subsequent policy is also explored in O'Brien, The Nitrate Industry, pp. 42–62.

13 Clayton, Grace, p. 135; James, Merchant Adventurer, pp. 244–5.

14 Clayton, Grace, p. 141–75; Miller, ‘The Making of the Grace Contract’, pp. 99–100.

15 For analysis of Grace & Co.'s activity in the 1880s and 1890s in relation to the Peruvian national economy, see Clayton, Grace, pp. 275–301; and Thorp and Bertram, Peru, pp. 23–4, 33–4, 41–3. Grace & Co. founded the Cartavio Sugar Company in 1891 and had gained significant ownership over the textile mill in Vitarte by 1902.

16 Vicary Gibbs to Herbert Gibbs, 20 Aug. 1891, Gibbs MSS 11040/2, London Metropolitan Archive. Grace & Co. and Gibbs were traditional rivals, but both firms found their economic interests in Peru intertwined following the War of the Pacific, and the Graces helped Gibbs to obtain the rights to the Peruvian Corporation's guano export concessions. Negotiations over the Peruvian Corporation's pending questions with Chile often took place in Grace & Co.'s Valparaíso office between Edward Eyre and representatives of Gibbs: see Valparaíso to London, 26 Aug. 1892, Gibbs MSS 11470/14, London Metropolitan Archive. The Grace–Gibbs negotiations with Chile are also described in Charles E. Mansfield to Lord Rosebery, 15 Sep. 1892, FO61/394, UK National Archives (hereafter UKNA). Mansfield was the British minister to Lima, Rosebery the British foreign secretary. References to material in the Gibbs MSS and UKNA were supplied by Rory Miller.

17 See William R. Grace (hereafter WRG) to Michael P. Grace (hereafter MPG), 13 Dec. 1889, Letter Book 17, W. R. Grace & Co. Papers, Rare Books and Manuscript Library, Columbia University (hereafter Grace Papers), in which Grace discusses his meeting with US Secretary of State James G. Blaine, with regard to the Peruvian debt negotiations; and WRG to Edward Eyre (hereafter EE), 10 Jan. 1890, Letter Book 17, Grace Papers, in which Grace discusses a second meeting with Blaine on 28 Dec. At the meeting Blaine offered to help with the debt settlement, but Grace discouraged him, advising that the Chileans would react negatively to diplomatic action by the United States. In WRG to EE, 6 June 1890, Letter Book 18, Grace Papers, Grace talks of another meeting with Blaine to discuss political tensions between Peru and Chile that resulted from the debt settlement.

18 Clayton, Grace, p. 206; James, Merchant Adventurer, p. 247.

19 For an analysis of the negotiations between the bondholders, Michael Grace and Chile, see Miller, ‘The Making of the Grace Contract’, pp. 77–96. The two countries were unable to negotiate a solution to the Tacna–Arica question of the Treaty of Ancón until 1929, when Peru reacquired Tacna from Chile by winning a plebiscite and paying an indemnification. For further analysis see Skuban, William E., Lines in the Sand: Nationalism and Identity on the Peruvian–Chilean Frontier (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007)Google Scholar.

20 Hugh Fraser to Lord Salisbury (Foreign Secretary), 14 Aug. 1887, FO 61/372, UKNA.

21 Financial News, 3 Oct. 1887.

22 WRG to George Duvall (Valparaíso), 16 Aug. 1889, Grace Papers.

23 WRG to EE (Lima), 31 Dec. 1890, Box 66, Folder 19, Grace Papers.

24 Sater, Chile and the United States, pp. 9–30.

25 Pike, Chile and the United States, pp. 47–66; Millington, Herbert, American Diplomacy and the War of the Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 85–95, 106–35Google Scholar; Sater, Chile and the United States, pp. 31–50.

26 Burr, Robert N., By Reason or By Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 138–40, 167–70Google Scholar.

27 Sater, Chile and the United States, pp. 51–3. Sater details how, in the mid-1880s, US Navy officials expressed worry over Chile's ability to mount naval attacks in California and Oregon.

28 Clayton, Grace, pp. 71–2, 114–15; Flint, Charles R., Memories of an Active Life: Men, and Ships, and Sealing Wax (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1923), pp. 85–8Google Scholar.

29 Ibid., pp. 181–8, 194–6.

30 James, Merchant Adventurer, pp. 246–7; Flint, Memories of an Active Life, pp. 148–58.

31 James, Merchant Adventurer, pp. 215–24.

32 Flint entered the Brazilian rubber trade before its peak boom years between 1900 and 1910. However, Brazilian rubber exports had steadily increased in volume and value since 1860. In 1890, Brazil exported 15.5 million kilos of Amazonian wild rubber. For analyses of the Brazilian rubber boom and bust, see Weinstein, Barbara, The Amazon Rubber Boom, 1850–1920 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Barham, Bradford L. and Coomes, Oliver T., Prosperity's Promise: The Amazon Rubber Boom and Distorted Economic Development (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996)Google Scholar; and Frank, Zephyr and Musacchio, Aldo, ‘Brazil in the International Rubber Trade, 1870–1930’, in Topik et al. (eds.), From Silver to Cocaine, pp. 271–99Google Scholar.

33 Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Politics, pp. 192–239.

34 LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 130–6.

35 Hardy, Osgood, ‘The Itata Incident’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 5: 1 (1922), pp. 195–226CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair¸ pp. 47–51; Bravo, El Incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 38–41.

37 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 30–1.

38 Hardy, Osgood, ‘Was Patrick Egan a “Blundering Minister”?’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 8: 1 (1928), pp. 65–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sater, Chile and the United States, pp. 59–60.

39 James, Merchant Adventurer, pp. 246–8.

40 For a detailed analysis of the social and economic background of the Congressionalists, see Zeitlin, Maurice, The Civil Wars in Chile (or the Bourgeois Revolutions that Never Were) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 174–92Google Scholar.

41 Flint, Memories of an Active Life, pp. 64–72; Clayton, Grace, p. 214. Clayton argues that at the outbreak of the war, Flint emerged as an aggressive backer of Balmaceda while using the US press to discredit Grace's connections with the Congressionalists.

42 William F. Wharton to Patrick Egan, 21 July 1891, Microfilm 77, Roll 37, State Department Records Division, Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, US National Archives (hereafter USNA).

43 Prudencio Lazcano to Minister of Foreign Relations, 18 July 1891, vol. 482, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Archivo Nacional de Chile (hereafter MRE).

44 Espinosa, Julio Bañados, Balmaceda, su gobierno, y la revolución de 1891, vol. 2 (Paris: Garnier, 1894), p. 408Google Scholar.

45 Montt to Minister of Foreign Relations in Iquique, 30 July 1891, vol. 482, MRE.

46 Both Hardy and Clayton indicate that Grace provided no material or financial support to the Congressionalists. Hardy examines and refutes rumours of potential Grace support for the Congressionalists in ‘The Itata Incident’, pp. 202–3, n. 47; also see Clayton, Grace, pp. 209–14. Clayton argues that Flint worked to stoke rumours implying that Grace had arranged for arms purchases for the Congressionalists, but he also concludes that Grace had not done this.

47 WRG to Grace & Co. Valparaíso office, 11 May 1891; WRG to Attorney General W. H. Miller (Washington), 11 Sep. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

48 WRG to MPG, 11 Sep. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers, outlines the details of these meetings. Grace's activity is also detailed in Montt's reports: see Montt to Minister of Foreign Relations, 7 Sep. 1891, vol. 482, MRE.

49 In a letter to Pedro Montt dated 3 Sep. 1891 (Box 66, Grace Papers), Grace congratulates Montt on the end of the civil war and offers his services. Montt responded to Grace on 15 Oct. 1891 (Catalogued Correspondence, Montt, Pedro, Grace Papers) thanking him for his letters of introduction.

50 WRG to Augusto Matte, 8 Sep. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

51 Holloway to WRG (New York), 7 Sep. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

52 See communications regarding final negotiations and the dismissal of charges related to the Itata Incident: WRG to Attorney General W. H. H. Miller, 16 Sep. 1891; WRG to Montt, 16 Sep. 1891; WRG to Miller, 17 Sep. 1891; WRG to Montt, 17 Sep. 1891; WRG to R. F. Tracy, 12 Oct. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers. Also see telegrams talking about the upcoming trial regarding the Itata Incident: WRG to Montt, 29 Sep. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers. These negotiations are also documented by Montt in Pedro Montt to Minister of Foreign Relations, 30 Sep. 1891, vol. 482, MRE.

53 This information is revealed in WRG to Montt, 21 Sep. 1891; WRG to Julio M. Foster, 22 Sep. 1891; WRG to Montt, 22 Sep. 1891; WRG to Julio M. Foster, 23 Sep. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

54 EE (London) to WRG, 18 Nov. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

55 MPG (London) to WRG, 11 Nov. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers. Michael Grace indicated that Eyre was travelling to Paris to meet with Matte to ‘induce him to assist us in connection with the Chilean monies’. Upon returning from his meeting with Matte, Eyre indicated that Chile would not make a decision on the Grace Contract until the installation of a permanent government at the end of 1891. However, Matte also promised Eyre that he would speak with the Chilean political leadership on the need to negotiate with Michael Grace and Peru: EE (London) to WRG, 18 Nov. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

56 Statistics provided in Miller and Greenhill, ‘The Fertilizer Commodity Chains’, p. 240. In 1890 Chile exported a total of 921,600 metric tons of nitrate. 122,000 metric tons, or roughly 13 per cent, were exported to the United States.

57 Clayton, Grace, pp. 260–2.

58 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 61–5; Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, p. 70.

59 Montt (Washington) to WRG (New York), 31 Oct. 1891, Catalogued Correspondence, Montt, Pedro, Grace Papers.

60 WRG (New York) to Grace & Co. Valparaíso office, Oct. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

61 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 65–75; Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 75–6.

62 WRG to Patrick Eagan [sic] (Santiago), 25 April 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers. In the letter, WRG offers assistance to Egan.

63 Details of Grace & Co.'s favourable impression of Egan found in Clayton, Grace, p. 208.

64 WRG to W. S. Eyre (hereafter WSE), 4 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers. See New York Herald, 26 Jan. 1892, pp. 4–7; 27 Jan. 1892, p. 3; and 28 Jan. 1892, p. 3. Grace responds to Eyre's request to ‘try to influence the Gov. and the press’ and states that he ‘personally visited my friend Ballard Smith the Chief Editor of the World [sic]’. Correspondence with the press in early November 1891 is also detailed in WRG to MPG (London), 4 Nov. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers. In this letter, Grace informs his brother Michael that the trading house has ‘formed a connection with the “World” [sic] by which our Valparaiso [sic] friends can cable anything of consequence’.

65 Egan (Santiago) to Blaine (Washington), 19 Nov. 1891, Microfilm 10, Roll 39, RG 59, USNA.

66 WRG to Blaine (Washington), 2 Nov. 1891; WRG to Montt (Washington), 2 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

67 WRG to William H. H. Miller, 4 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

68 WRG to Blaine (Washington), 6 Nov. 1891; WRG to Montt (Washington), 9 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

69 WRG to John W. Foster (Washington), 24 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

70 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 93–9; Trumbull's negotiations are documented in Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 107–10, 115–6.

71 WRG to Montt (Washington), 4 Dec. 1891; WRG to Montt (Washington), 5 Dec. 1891; WRG to Montt (Washington), 8 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

72 Evans, Robley D. and Kipling, Rudyard, A Sailor's Log: Recollections of Forty Years of Naval Life (New York: D. Appleton, 1901), p. 271Google Scholar; quotation from p. 275.

73 Grace's influence in the New York press is noted in James, Merchant Adventurer, p. 258.

74 WRG to Daniel Morrison (Valparaíso), 4 Nov. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

75 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 4 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers, emphasis in original. Grace's efforts to influence the press through his valuable information source in the Valparaíso office are detailed in WRG to MPG (London), 4 Nov. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

76 WRG to Ballard Smith (New York), 4 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

77 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 9 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

78 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 81–3. Grace assesses Harrison's goals in WRG to MPG (London), 12 Feb. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers. Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 125–6, argues that Harrison pushed for conflict as a political strategy for re-election and was disappointed by the eventual arbitration.

79 John R. Grace (Lima) to WSE (Valparaíso), 8 Dec. 1891, Box 81, Grace Papers.

80 WRG to MPG (London), 8 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers; for more information on Tracy's report, see Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 83–5.

81 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 9 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

82 WRG to Montt (Washington), 11 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

83 WRG to Montt (Washington), 14 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

84 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 5 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

85 WRG to Elkins, 18 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

86 Discussions between Grace and Montt leading up to the dinner can be found in WRG to Montt (Washington), 11 Dec. 1891; WRG to Montt (Washington), 14 Dec. 1891; and WRG to Montt (Washington), 16 Dec. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers. Montt later reported to his superiors on his conversations with Blaine at the dinner party.

87 Grace's activity is detailed in Montt's report to Santiago: Montt (Washington) to Matta (Santiago), 27 Dec. 1891, vol. 482, MRE.

88 James, Merchant Adventurer, pp. 259–60.

89 Egan (Santiago) to Blaine (Washington), 29 Dec. 1891, Microfilm 10, Roll 40, RG 59, USNA.

90 Harrison's negative reaction to Grace's lobbying is reported in ‘Chile's Arrogant Tone’, New York Times, 2 Jan. 1892, p. 1.

91 This desire is not only reflected in Grace's communications, but was also mentioned in the press: see New York Herald, 28 Dec. 1891, p. 4.

92 New York Herald, 30 Dec. 1891, p. 4.

93 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 30 Nov. 1891, Box 66, Grace Papers.

94 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 99–100; Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 61–4.

95 WRG to Montt (Washington), 12 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

96 WRG to Montt (Washington), 14 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

97 Egan (Santiago) to Blaine (Washington), 21 Jan. 1892, Microfilm 10, Roll 40, RG 59, USNA.

98 New York Herald, 16 Jan. 1891, p. 3.

99 WRG to Ballard Smith (New York), 19 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

100 WRG to Montt (Washington), 20 Jan. 1892; WRG to Montt (Washington), 21 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

101 Grace detailed communication with the Sun, the Tribune and the Herald regarding news in Chile in WRG to Montt (Washington), 19 Jan. 1892; and WRG to Montt (Washington), 22 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

102 WRG to Montt (Washington), 15 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

103 WRG to W. R. Grace & Co. Valparaíso office, 30 Jan. 1892, Box 81, Grace Papers.

104 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 100–7; Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 109–10. A review of the New York Herald reports of the incident suggest that Montt may have attempted to delay delivering the letter to Blaine, fully understanding the consequences such an action would provoke, and only completed his duty when mandated by his superiors in Santiago. It is difficult to gauge what influence W. R. Grace had in this decision, but if the reports are true, it certainly illustrates Montt's good diplomatic judgment: see New York Herald, 26 Jan. 1892, pp. 4–7; 27 Jan. 1892, p. 3; and 28 Jan. 1892, p. 3.

105 WRG to Montt (Washington), 24 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers. In the letter Grace offers detailed analysis on Blaine's comments.

106 WRG to Grace & Co. Valparaíso office, 30 Jan. 1892, Box 81, Grace Papers. The telegram was written after Montt took action and served as a summary for the Valparaíso office.

107 WRG to Montt (Washington), 23 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

108 WRG to Montt (Washington), 24 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

109 Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair, pp. 124–32. A critical commentary on Harrison's actions can be found in the Nation, 54: 1388, 4 Feb. 1892, p. 82. Bravo, El incidente del ‘USS Baltimore’, pp. 93–7, suggests that the possibility of Argentina allying with the United States in a possible war was also a factor in Chile's decision to accept arbitration.

110 See, for example, the detailed local press reports reprinted in the New York Herald, 28 Jan. 1891, p. 3.

111 WRG to Montt (Washington), 25 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

112 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 30 Jan. 1892; WRG to MPG (London), 12 Feb. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

113 WRG to R. L. Trumbull (Santiago), 12 March 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

114 WRG to John A. McCall (New York), 12 March 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

115 ‘A Little of Everything’, New York Times, 21 Jan. 1892, p. 8.

116 The magazine closely followed and criticised Harrison's and Egan's position towards Chile in 1891 and 1892. Examples include the Nation, 52: 1356, 25 June 1891, p. 509, and 53: 1381, 17 Dec. 1891, p. 457.

117 Nation, 54: 1386, 21 Jan. 1892, p. 42.

118 WRG to E. P. Bailey (Utica, NY), 28 Jan. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

119 WRG to MPG (London), 22 Jan. 1892, Box 71, Grace Papers.

120 WRG to WSE (Valparaíso), 20 Feb. 1892, Box 66, Grace Papers.

121 See, for example, the special edition of NACLA Report, ‘Amazing Grace: the W. R. Grace Corporation’, NACLA Report, 10: 3 (March 1976).

122 Flint's activities are outlined in his biography, Flint, Memories of an Active Life, pp. 88–102; and in Topik, Steven, Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 155–77Google Scholar.