¹ Gershenson, Antonio, ‘Economía y elecciones’, La Jornada, ‘Perfil Politico’ supplement, 22 09 1987, p. 12.Google Scholar

² Ibid., p. 11. The Economic Commission for Latin America estimated that real wages in Mexico declined by 36.4% between Jan. 1982 and June 1988; La Jornada, 25 10 1988, p. 12.Google Scholar In contrast, the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales calculated that real wages fell by 76.5% between 1982 and 1988, with an estimated decline of 25.5% in 1988 alone; Uno Más Uno, 28 10 1988, p. 13.Google Scholar

³ In contrast, Argentina's General Confederation of Labour (CGT) led eight general strikes between December 1983 and early 1987 to protest the Alfonsín government's austerity programme, foreign debt policy, relations with the International Monetary Fund and efforts to oust entrenched labour leaders from major unions; New York Times, 16 03 1984, p. 3Google Scholar; 25 Apr. 1984, p. 5; 4 Sept. 1984, p. 9; 14 Oct. 1984, Iv, p. 4; 24 May 1985, p. 7; 30 Aug. 1985, p. 3; 25 Jan. 1986, p. 36; 16 Feb. 1986, Iv, p. 3; 7 Apr. 1986, iv, p. 12; 14 June 1986, p. 5; 27 Jan. 1987, p. 9. See also Pozzi, Pablo A., ‘Argentina 1976–1982: Labour Leadership and Military Government’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 20 (1988), pp. 115, 125–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Manzetti, Luigi and Dell'Aquila, Marco, ‘Economic Stabilisation in Argentina: The Austral Plan’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 20 (1988), pp. 20–1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

Even in Brazil, where unions' mobilising capacity outside industrial São Paolo is limited and where broad public support for the transition to civilian rule in 1985 constrained workers' political options, organised labour called brief general strikes in 1986 and 1987 to protest sharp price increases and growing unemployment; New York Times, 4 03 1986, IV, p. 23Google Scholar; 28 Nov. 1986, p. D5; 29 Nov. 1986, p. 1; 13 Dec. 1986, p. 3; 13 June 1987, p. 33; Payne, Leigh A., ‘The Brazilian Labor Movement and the New Republic’, paper presented at XIV Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, 03 1988.Google Scholar

⁴ Przeworski, Adam and Wallerstein, Michael, ‘The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies’, American Political Science Review, vol. 76 (06 1982), pp. 218, 221, 225–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ See Linz, Juan J., ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes’, in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass., 1975), pp. 264–9.Google Scholar

⁶ President Miguel de la Madrid argued that austerity measures were implemented so as to reduce the social costs of economic adjustment, with special care taken to maintain government social spending (on education, health care, housing, and basic commodities), protect real wage levels and promote job creation. For details, see El Mercado de Valores, vol. 48 (1 01 1988), pp. 6, 12–13, 15, 19–20, 23Google Scholar; (15 Sept. 1988), p. 8. As the subsequent discussion shows, however, these measures were insufficient to prevent the widespread erosion of workers' living standards.

⁷ The concept of a minimum wage was first outlined in article 123 of the 1917 constitution. The 1931 Ley Federal de Trabajo specified that minimum wages were to be set by ‘mixed’ municipal commissions (including labour, business and government representatives), but in 1933 these were replaced by tripartite national and regional commissions. Beginning in 1934 those commissions set minimum wages every two years, with differences in wage levels between rural and urban areas and according to regional variations in the cost of living. In response to higher levels of inflation, reforms enacted in 1974 permitted both minimum wages and contract wages to be set annually; considerable rural–urban and regional variations persisted. However, further legislative reforms in 1985 provided for only three wage zones (centred on Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey), with the provision that wage levels would be adjusted as economic conditions required. In practice, minimum wages were revised every six months from June 1983 until 1987, when they were revised every three months to compensate for high inflation rates. In 1988 the federal labour law was reformed once again to allow either the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, unions representing at least 51% of unionised workers or employers representing at least 51% of the workforce to solicit the revision of minimum wages as required by economic conditions.

⁸ Ros, Jaime, ‘Mexico's Stabilisation and Adjustment Policies (1982–8)’, Labour and Society, vol. 11 (09 1986), table 4Google Scholar, shows that minimum wage adjustments fully compensated for consumer price increases only once (Jan. 1985) between Jan. 1983 and Jan. 1986.

Minimum wage data may substantially underestimate the extent of real wage decline during this period. Carr, Barry, ‘The Mexican Left, the Popular Movements, and the Politics of Austerity, 1982–1985’, in Carr, (ed.), The Mexican Left, the Popular Movements, and the Politics of Austerity (La Jolla, California, 1986), pp. 1–18Google Scholar; Carr cites (p. 3) a study by the Confederación Obrera Revolucionaria showing that as much as 54% of the economically active population earned less than the legal minimum wage in the early 1980s.

⁹ Carrasco, Rosalba and Provencio, Enrique, ‘La política social 1983–1988 y sus principales consecuencias’, Investigación Económica, no. 184 (04–06 1988), pp. 96–7.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Alvarez, Alejandro, ‘Economic Crisis and the Mexican Labor Movement in the 1980s’, in Middlebrook, Kevin J. (ed.), Unions, Workers, and the State in Mexico (La Jolla, California, 1989), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

¹¹ Alvarez, Alejandro, La crisis global del capitalismo en México, 1968–1985 (México, D.F., 1987). pp. 50–3, 55, 58–9.Google Scholar

¹² The 1961–70 and 1970–7 growth rates are from The World Bank, World Development Report, 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980), table 2, p. 113.Google Scholar The 1982–7 growth rate is the author's calculation based on data presented in El Mercado de Valores, vol. 48 (15 02 1988), p. 20, and (1 04 1988), p. 29, table 2.Google Scholar

¹³ For analyses of Mexico's emerging development strategy, see Plan National de Desarrollo, 1893–1988 (México, D.F., 1983), pp. 117–49; Buzaglo, Jorge, Planning the Mexican Economy: Alternative Development Strategies (London, 1984)Google Scholar; Ríos, Miguel Angel Rivera, Crisis y reorganización del capitalismo mexicano, 1960–1985 (México, D.F., 1986)Google Scholar; Flores, Alejandro Dávila, La crisis financiera en México (México, D.F., 1986)Google Scholar; Feijóo, José Valenzuela, El capitalismo mexicano en los ochenta (México, D.F., 1986).Google Scholar For de la Madrid's summary of steps taken to implement this strategy, see El Mercado de Valores, vol. 48 (1 01 1988), pp. 3–29.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Camp, Roderic A., ‘The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the Political System’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 20 (1985), p. 98Google Scholar, uses this last term to suggest that virtually all high-level Mexican decision makers have some political skills, even though some individuals’ education, career experience, means of recruitment and sources of influence emphasise professional training and technical expertise.

¹⁵ See La Jornada, 5 10 1987, p. 6Google Scholar; 12 Oct. 1987, p. 1; 16 Oct. 1987, p. 7; 19 Oct. 1987, p. 4; and Uno Más Uno, 21 10 1987, p. 5.Google Scholar

¹⁶ New York Times, 8 07 1988, p. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The PIRE called for a sharp reduction in government deficit spending, lower import tariffs and fewer barriers to trade, exchange rate adjustments, the reduction or elimination of public consumption subsidies in diverse areas and wage controls designed to limit inflationary pressures.

¹⁸ Uno Más Uno, 10 June 1983; quoted in Nassif, Alberto Aziz, ‘El estado mexicano y la Confederación de Trabajadores de México: Modelos de desarrollo, estructura corporativa y discurso ideoloógico’, PhD diss., Instituto Nacional de Antropología y Historia, 1985, p. 342.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For details, see Proceso, no. 351 (25 07 1983), pp. 20–3Google Scholar; no. 399 (25 June 1984), pp. 12–15; Uno Más Uno, 18 01 1984, p. 3Google Scholar; 26 June 1984, p. 3.

²⁰ A labour-government crisis management agreement was signed in June 1983, but without the wage indexation clause and with the CTM abstaining; Aziz, , ‘El estado mexicano’, p. 340.Google Scholar

²¹ Carr, , ‘The Mexican Left’, p. 5Google Scholar; Alvarez, Alejandro, ‘Crisis in Mexico: Impacts on the Working Class and the Labor Movement’, in Carr, (ed.), Tbe Mexican Left, the Popular Movements, and tbe Politics of Austerity, pp. 54–5.Google Scholar

²² Centro Nacional de Información y Estadísticas del Trabajo and Junta Federal de Conciliación y Arbitraje internal documents.

²³ Carr, , ‘The Mexican Left’, pp. 8, 13, 15–18Google Scholar; Alvarez, ‘Crisis in Mexico’, pp. 53, 56; Prieto, Ana María, ‘Mexico's National Coordinadoras in a Context of Economic Crisis’, in Carr, (ed.), The Mexican Left, the Popular Movements, and the Politics of Austerity, pp. 90, 92–3.Google Scholar The estimate of two million participants in the October 1983 paro is cited in Carr, , ‘The Mexican Left’, p. 17.Google Scholar

²⁴ El Día, 26 02 1979, p. 7Google Scholar; de Trabajadores de México, Confederación, Memoria, Reunión nacional para la reforma económica (México, D.F., 1978), pp. 15–16, 202–10, 219–23.Google Scholar

²⁵ The document entitled ‘Los trabajadores ante la situación económica nacional: Opciones para el desarrollo’ was published in El Día, 11 04 1985, p. 12Google Scholar; 12 Apr. 1985, p. 12; 13 Apr. 1985, p. 12.

In 1984 the CTM controlled as many as 400 enterprises in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, retailing and transportation; Carr, , ‘The Mexican Left’, p. 6.Google Scholar

²⁶ The de la Madrid administration promised increased funding for union-owned consumer cooperatives, worker housing and worker training programmes; expanded access to basic commodities; preferential access to credit and an increase from 8 to 10% in worker profit-sharing. For details, see El Día, 30 04 1985, pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

²⁷ La Jornada, 1 12 1987, p. 3Google Scholar; 2 Dec. 1987, pp. 1, 8; 3 Dec. 1987, p. 1.

²⁸ La Jornada, 4 12 1987, pp. 1, 28–9.Google Scholar

²⁹ La Jornada, 5 12 1987, pp. 1, 5, 14Google Scholar; 6 Dec. 1987, pp. 1, 8.

³⁰ Author's interview with former government labour official, 22 Oct. 1988, Mexico City.

³¹ La Jornada, 7 12 1987, pp. 1, 16Google Scholar; 8 Dec. 1987, pp. 1, 14; 9 Dec. 1987, p. 1; 11 Dec. 1987, pp. 11–12; 12 Dec. 1987, p. 11; 15 Dec. 1987, p. 1.

³² El Mercado de Valores, vol. 47 (21 12 1987)Google Scholar, ‘Pacto de Solidaridad Económica’ supplement. For additional details concerning the plan's purposes and its early implementation, see El Mercado de Valores, vol. 48 (1 02 1988), pp. 3–7Google Scholar, and New York Times, 1 03 1988, p. 43.Google Scholar See also Whitehead, Laurence, ‘The “Economic Solidarity Pact” in Comparative Perspective’, paper presented at ‘Mexico's Alternative Political Futures’ conference, Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California – San Diego, 03 1988.Google Scholar

³³ El Mercado de Valores, vol. 48 (1 09 1988), pp. 3–6Google Scholar; (15 Oct. 1988), p. 32; Uno Mś Uno, 17 10 1988, p. 32.Google Scholar Following the accession of Salinas de Gortari to the presidency on 1 Dec. 1988, the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica was renewed again through July 1989.

³⁴ El Mercado de Valores, vol. 48 (1 09 1988), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

³⁵ The pact's failure to improve more effectively labour's general economic welfare sparked a number of political protests. These initiatives included the formation of a ‘National Resistance Front’ by opposition political parties and dissident labour unions; Excélsior, 19 02 1988, p. 1Google Scholar; 29 Mar. 1988, pp. 1, 12; 17 May 1988, p. 1; El Cotidiano, no. 22 (03–04 1988), p. 51.Google Scholar

³⁶ New York Times, 13 06 1988, p. 30.Google Scholar

³⁷ On the difficulties in securing business compliance with the pact, see Mexico Journal, no. 26 (4 04 1983), p. 13.Google Scholar

³⁸ Political culture interpretations of Mexican politics would offer an alternative explanation of organised labour's quiescence during this period. From this perspective, organised labour's political behaviour is strongly influenced by cultural orientations that discourage aggressive demands. As part of a national political culture that seemingly emphasises the importance of enduring sociopolitical hierarchies, authority relationships and personal loyalties, both labour leaders and workers fail to press socioeconomic demands or initiate widespread labour mobilisation in favour of political and economic change as a result of psychological predispositions to conform to existing cultural norms. See Padgett, L. Vincent, The Mexican Political System, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1976), pp. 119–21, 125, 131, 147, 233, 314Google Scholar, and Hansen, Roger D., The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore, Maryland, 1971), pp. 142, 165, 183–97, 224.Google Scholar However, there are a number of difficulties with this ‘culturalist’ explanation. At the most general level, there are important problems in arriving at meaningful national generalisations regarding the impact of political culture on labour behaviour given the possibility of significant regional or subnational variations in value structures and the ordering of relevant political orientations. The ‘culturalist’ approach also appears to understate considerably the significance of both individual protests and group mobilisations in the historical development of the Mexican organised labour movement, including anti-austerity protests led by dissident labour unions in 1983 and 1984.

³⁹ Mexican labour law distinguishes between federal-jurisdiction economic activities and local-jurisdiction economic activities. Federal-jurisdiction activities are generally nationally important industries, including railroads, mining – metallurgy, petroleum and petrochemicals, textiles, electricity generation, sugar, rubber, steel, cement, automobile manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and so forth. Union formation in local-jurisdiction industries is regulated by local (state-level) conciliation and arbitration boards.

⁴⁰ For a stimulating analysis of the impact of state structuring on interest representation, see Schmitter, Philippe C., ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, in Pike, Frederick B. and Stritch, Thomas (eds.), The New Corporatism: Socio-Political Structures in the Iberian World (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1974), pp. 85–131Google Scholar; and Collier, Ruth Berins and Collier, David, ‘Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating “Corporatism”’, American Political Science Review, vol. 73 (12 1979), pp. 967–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴¹ Zazueta, César and de la Peña, Ricardo, La estructura del Congreso del Trabajo: Estado, trabajo y capital en México (México, D.F., 1984), table 11.11.Google Scholar Union membership as a proportion of the economically active population grew steadily from the 1940s through the 1960s (1940, 9.3%; 1950, 9.8%; 1960, 11.5%; 1970, 15.2%) before levelling off in the 1970s; Secretaría de Industria y Comercio, Directión General de Estadística, Anuario estadístico, 1941–71. No data are available to evaluate the impact of economic crisis and widespread unemployment on union membership, but some decline is to be expected.

⁴² Zazueta and de la Peña, La estructura del Congreso del Trabajo, tables 11.4, vII.I.

⁴³ Ibid., table vII.12.

⁴⁴ Ibid., table vII.18. The CTM's membership in the automobile manufacturing industry increased in the 1980s as it won control over newly-established export facilities in central and northern Mexico.

⁴⁵ For an analysis of this problem, see Middlebrook, Kevin J., ‘The Political Economy of Mexican Organized Labor, 1940–1978’, PhD diss., Harvard University, 1982, pp. 109–16.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Zazueta and de la Peña, La estructura del Congreso del Trabajo, table VII.12.

⁴⁷ The term was coined in the late 1940s following the government's imposition of Jesús Díaz de León as secretary general of the Mexican Railroad Workers' Union (STFRM). Díaz de León was an enthusiast of Mexican popular rodeos and horsemanship (charrería). He had been nicknamed ‘El Charro’, and his forcible takeover of STFRM offices in 1948 became known as the charrazo. The term charro was subsequently applied to government-imposed labour leaders and opposition labour and political groups later used the term more generally to refer to undemocratic and corrupt ‘official’ union leaders.

⁴⁸ See Roxborough, Ian, Unions and Politics in Mexico: The Case of the Automobile Industry (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 23–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁹ Prieto, Jorge Mejía, El poder tras de las gafas: Hacia un análisis del cetemismo y Fidel Velázquez (México, D.F., 1980), pp. 51–2, 57, 59–60, 75–6Google Scholar. No serious biography of Velázquez exists, but Mejía Prieto provides some details concerning Velázquez's life and beliefs.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 41, 52, 183–5, 208.

⁵¹ Ramírez, Ramón, El movimiento estudiantil de México, 2 vols. (México, D.F., 1969), vol. 2, pp. 214–20, 462–7.Google Scholar

⁵² Middlebrook, Kevin J., ‘Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico’, in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C., and Whitehead, Laurence (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore, Maryland, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 132–3.Google Scholar

⁵³ Prieto, Mejía, El poder tras de las gafas, pp. 57–8, 101, 112, 223.Google Scholar Mėjía Prieto presents some circumstantial evidence (p. 93) to suggest that the Mexican government's harsh response to Velázquez's support in the early 1930s for such radical tactics as the general strike may have led him to moderate his tactics.

⁵⁴ Author's interviews with government labour officials closely identified with the CTM, Oct. 1987 and Oct. 1988, Mexico City.

⁵⁵ On the Salinas de Gortari luncheon, see Excélsior, 16 10 1987, p. 1Google Scholar; on Salinas de Gortari's support for labour law reform, see Uno Más Uno, 8 10 1987, pp. 1, 9Google Scholar; 29 Oct. 1987, p. 2.

⁵⁶ New York Times, 8 11 1988, p. 5.Google Scholar The arrest of top petroleum union leaders in January 1989 clearly signalled Salinas de Gortar's willingness to challenge union autonomy in order to implement his programme of economic restructuring; New York Times, 11 01 1989, p. 6Google Scholar; 12 Jan. 1989, pp. 1, 6; 15 Jan. 1989, pp. 1, 6.

⁵⁷ For a discussion of future trends in the labour force and some of their possible consequences, see Whitehead, Laurence, ‘Mexico's Economic Prospects: Implications for State–Labor Relations’, in Middlebrook, (ed.), Unions, Workers, and the State, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar