¹ The PAN won the gubernatorial elections with 52% of the vote. The PRI obtained 47%. The PAN also won the twelve most important municipalities of the state that include Ciudad Juárez, Camargo, Casas Grandes, Villa Coronado, Cuauhtémoc, Hidalgo del Parral, Jiménez, Madera, Namiquipa, Nuevo Casas Grandes, Ojinaga and Saucillo. The only two important cities won by the PRI were Chihuahua and Delicias. The PAN also won 10 out of 18 deputies, which gave the PAN a majority in the local congress. This result is unprecedented because, although the PAN currently has two governors in power (Baja California and Guanajuato), in neither case does the PAN have a majority in the local congress. The defeat of the PAN in the capital city of Chihuahua can be attributed to two factors. First, the PAN's candidate – an entrepreneur who had been president of the local Coparmex and was a charismatic political figure – withdrew from the electoral race after being nominated, leaving the PAN without a strong candidate to replace him. Second, the PRI's candidate – also an entrepreneur who had been president of the local Chamber of Commerce – had a similar profile to the PANista candidate. Rumour had it that he had supported the PAN before. In an interview he admitted that he won because he had a totally different campaign style and because his strong opponent had withdrawn from the race. ‘Had he not withdrawn, I would have lost.’ Interview with Patricio Martínez, Chihuahua, July 1992.

² In 1989 the PAN lost all municipalities and all but one seat in the local congress. In the federal elections of 1991 the PAN did not win any deputies through majority vote. It is estimated that in 1992 the PRI spent 20 million dollars in its campaign, an amount greater than governor Ann Richards spent in her campaign for the governorship of Texas. See Ureña, José, ‘Gastó el PRI más de 65 mil millones para derrotar al PAN en Chihuahua’, La Jornada, 7 07 1992Google Scholar. The PAN, according to the director general of Francisco Barrio's campaign, spent one million dollars. Interview with Manuel Carrazco, Chihuahua, July 1992.

³ See, for example, Nassif, Alberto Aziz, ‘Chihuahua: De la Euforia a la Indiferencia’, in López, Tonatiuh Guillén et al. , Frontera Norte. Une Década de Político Electoral (México, 1992)Google Scholar; and Cuellar, Mireya, ‘En Chihuahua no habrá otro verano caliente’, La Jornada, 17 06 1992Google Scholar. See also the opinion poll published by Nexos where it was predicted the PRI would win by a 2 to 1 margin. Nexos, no. 174, June 1992, pp. 79–84.

⁴ In 1983 the PAN won the seven most important municipalities of the state, which concentrate 75% of the population. In the 1986 elections, the PRI ‘officially’ won the governorship and all but one of the municipalities in one of the allegedly most fraudulent elections of Mexico's contemporary history. See Nassif, Alberto Aziz, ‘Chihuahua y los Límites de la Democracia Electoral’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, vol. XLIX, no. 4 (10–12 1987), pp. 159–226CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lau, Ruben, ‘Las Elecciones en Chihuahua (1983–1986)’, Cuadernos del Norte, Special number (1989)Google Scholar.

⁵ As the candidate of the PRI for the governorship said, with total assurance, a month before the elections, ‘good governments give us votes; bad governments take them away’. Interview with Jesús Macías, Ciudad Juárez, June 1992.

⁶ Between 1988 and 1991, the votes for the PRI in federal elections increased by 45.97% while the PAN only increased its number of votes by 16.22%. In the 1991 elections the PRI obtained in Chihuahua 56% of the vote while the PAN obtained only 32%. The turnout in these elections was 60%, a high turnout when compared with 34% in 1989 and considering that Chihuahua has traditionally been an abstentionist state. See ‘Michoacán y Chihuahua. El Porvenir de la Democracia’, Este País, no. 16 (July 1992), pp. 2–26.

⁷ Besides Francisco Barrio, an entrepreneur who ran as candidate for governor in the 1986 elections, many entrepreneurs ran as candidates for mayors of the most important cities of the state and as candidates for deputies at the local congress.

⁸ Unlike workers and peasants, entrepreneurs have never been included as one of the sectors of the PRI. Moreover, according to the law of chambers, business organisations are formally prohibited from participating in politics and expressing partisan opinions.

⁹ Hernández, Rogelio, Empresarios, Banca y Estado: El Conflicto Durante el Gobierno de José López Portillo 1976–1982 (México, 1988)Google Scholar; Tello, Carlos, La Político Económica en México 1970–1976 (México, 1979)Google Scholar; Nava, Juan M. Martínez, Conflicto Estado-Empresarios en los Gobiernos de Cárdenas, López Mateos y Echeverría (México, 1984)Google Scholar; Fragoso, Juan Manuel, Concheiro, Elvira and Gutiérrez, Antonio, El Poder de la Gran Burguesía (México, 1979)Google Scholar; Saldívar, Américo, Ideología y Político del Estado Mexicano {1970–1976) (México, 1980)Google Scholar; Cordero H., Salvador, Santín, Rafael and Tirado, Ricardo, El Poder Empresarial en México (México, 1983)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Shafer, Robert Jones, Mexican Business Organisations: History as Analysis (New York, 1973)Google Scholar; Luna, Matilde, Los Empresarios y el Cambio Politico: México, 1970–1987 (México, 1992)Google Scholar; Arriola, Carlos, Los Empresarios y el Estado (México, 1988)Google Scholar; Tirado, Ricardo, Las Organizaciones Empresariales Mexicanas: Perflly Control durante los Sesentas (México, 1979)Google Scholar; Tirado, Ricardo, ‘Semblanza de las Organizaciones Empresariales Mexicanas’, Estudios Políticos, vol. 3, no. 1 (01–03, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Story, Dale, Industry, the State, and Public Policy in Mexico (Austin, 1986)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Maxfield, Sylvia, Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics (Ithaca, 1990)Google Scholar.

¹² Camp, Roderic, Entrepreneurs in Twentieth Century Mexico (New York, 1989)Google Scholar.

¹³ There are some works recently written about small and medium-size entrepreneurs in Mexico. Cristina Puga, for example, wrote about the problems small and medium-size entrepreneurs face in organising for collective action. This study is conducted at the national level, and does not explain why in some regions of the country entrepreneurs were in fact able to overcome the problems she analyses, and organised in opposition to the government and the PRI. See Puga, Cristina, Empresarios Medianos, Pequeños y Micro: Problemas de Representación y Organización (México, 1991)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ For an interesting analysis of the entrepreneurs' increasing interest in the promotion of their ideas and values see Heredia, Blanca, ‘Ideas vs Interests? The Mexican Business Community in the 1980s’, Paper presented at the Conference on the Right in Latin America, Columbia University, 04 1990Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Casar, María Amparo, ‘Empresarios y Democracia en México’, in Campos, Rolando Cordera, Delabre, Raúl Trejo, Vega, Juan Enrique (coord.), México: El Reclamo Democrático: Homenaje a Carlos Pereyra (México, 1988)Google Scholar; Loaeza, Soledad, ‘Derecha y Democracia en el Cambio Político Mexicano: 1982–1988’, Foro International, vol. XXX (04–06, 1990)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Tirado, Ricardo, ‘Los Empresarios y la Política Partidaria’, Estudios Sociológicos, vol. V, no. 15 (09–12 1987)Google Scholar; Ugalde, Francisco Valdés, ‘¿Hacia un Nuevo Liderazgo Sociopolítico? Ensayo sobre la Convocatoria Social de los Empresarios’, Estudios Sociológicos, vol. V, no. 15 (09–12 1987)Google Scholar; Tirado, Ricardo, Luna, Matilde and Millán, René, ‘Los Empresarios en los Inicios del Gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid’, Revista Mexicana de Sociología, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (10–12 1985)Google Scholar; Guadarrama, Graciela, ‘Entrepreneurs and Politics: Businessmen in Electoral Contests in Sonora and Nuevo Leon, July 1985’, in Mendoza, Arturo Alvarado, Electoral Patterns and Perspectives in Mexico, Monograph series, no. 22 (San Diego, 1987)Google Scholar; Millán, René, Los Empresarios ante el Estadoy la Sociedad (México, 1988)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Interview with Eduardo Baeza, Mexico City, June, 1992. Eduardo Baeza is not related to Governor Baeza.

¹⁸ See Menéndez, Jorge Fernández, ‘Chihuahua otra vez’, in Nexos, no. 174, 06 1992, pp. 49–53Google Scholar; Loaeza, Soledad, ‘The Role of the Right in Political Change in Mexico, 1982–1988’, in Chalmers, Douglas A., de Souza, Maria do Carmo Campello and Borón, Atilio A. (eds.), The Right and Democracy in Latin America (New York, 1992)Google Scholar; and Guadarrama, Graciela, ‘Empresarios y Política: Sonora y Nuevo León, 1985’, Estudios Sociólogies, vol. 5, no. 13 (01–04, 1987)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Due to the strength of the PAN in Chihuahua, the 1986 elections attracted an unprecedented number of journalists and academics. They reported and condemned the fraud, and called for the annulment of the elections. See Molinar, Juan, ‘Regreso a Chihuahua’, Nexos, no. 111, 03 1987Google Scholar; and Tagle, Silvia Gómez, ‘Los Adjetivos de la Democracia en el caso de las Elecciones en Chihuahua 1986’, Revista Argumentos (06, 1987)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Interview with Raymundo Gómez, an entrepreneur who became director general of Francisco Barrio's campaign in 1986. He is currently a federal deputy for the PAN. Mexico City, November, 1991.

²¹ Interview with Alberto Mesta, former secretary general of the PAN in Chihuahua. Chihuahua, February 1992.

²² Several entrepreneurs who supported the PAN reported their businesses had been audited. In their view, this was a consequence of their political activities. The most noticeable case of how the government retaliated against PANista entrepreneurs is that of Federico Terrazas, one of the few large entrepreneurs who overtly supported the opposition in 1983 and 1986. Terrazas owns Cementos de Chihuahua, one of the largest cement concerns in the country. After 1986, the local government ceased to buy his cement and bought cement from Nuevo Leon. That affected his business considerably and, as a result, in the 1992 elections he not only refrained from overtly supporting the opposition, but he also financially supported the PRI.

²³ One of the reasons behind the high voter turnout in the 1991 mid-term federal elections, was that the PRI implemented a new electoral strategy based on a territorial organisation. The PRI was confident that this strategy would yield the same results as in 1991, but to their surprise, this time the strategy did not work out.

²⁴ Indeed, Barrio made an effort to portray himself as no real threat to the central administration and advertised himself as a pro-Salinas governor.

²⁵ The elections in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí were highly controversial. In both states the opposition alleged there were too many irregularities in the electoral process and called for the annulment of the elections. In both states the electoral conflicts were solved after the elected PRI governor resigned and an interim governor was named. In Guanajuato, where the PAN was the major opposition party, the PANista mayor of the city of León was appointed as interim governor. That happened before the PRIista elected governor assumed power. In San Luis Potosí, where the opposition was composed of a coalition between the PAN and the Navista movement, a PRIista was appointed as interim governor after the governor resigned.

²⁶ The most accepted and commonly used variable to rank firms according to their size is the number of workers they employ. Large firms employ more than 250 workers; medium-size firms employ more than 100 but less than 250 workers, and small firms employ less than 100 workers. See de Geografía y Estadística, Instituto Nacional, Nacional Financiera and ILET, Estadisticas Indmtriales. Information por Tipo de Empresa e Indices de Concentration (Mexico, 1988)Google Scholar.

²⁷ There are important exceptions, of course. Some large entrepreneurs continued to support the PAN. Most of these entrepreneurs have porfirian origins, their fortunes were not created with the help of the post-revolutionary state. These entrepreneurs have traditionally maintained a politically independent position vis-à-vis the government. They also consider that the post-revolutionary government has treated them with contempt. Examples of these entrepreneurs are Federico and Enrique Terrazas, Juan Muñoz, Jaime Creel, Matías Mesta and Miguel Ferníndez. As I mentioned above, Federico Terrazas, who played a decisive role in the opposition in 1986, was pressed by the government and in 1992 he adopted a lower political profile and financially supported the PRI.

²⁸ There are some cases of small and medium-size entrepreneurs who supported the PAN in 1986 and in 1992 supported the PRI. Most of these entrepreneurs, particularly those in the construction business, were granted important concessions by the local government which made their business grow considerably. ‘In 1986, when I supported the PAN, my business was small. Today I am a large entrepreneur and I support the PRI. My business benefited from the construction projects sponsored by the local government.’ Confidential interview.

²⁹ The Comité de Campaña in Chihuahua was chaired by Lic. Rodolfo Martínez, who owns one of the biggest construction firms in Chihuahua. His business depends heavily on government contracts. In Ciudad Juárez, the Comité de Campaña was chaired by Ing. David Arelle, who also owns a big construction firm that relies on government contracts. Most of the largest entrepreneurs in Chihuahua were members of these Comités de Campaña. A notable exception was that of Eloy Vallina, one of the largest entrepreneurs in the state. However, Vallina publicly declared his support for the PRI and one of his high level managers became one of the leading organisers of the PRI's campaigns.

³⁰ See Yemile Mizrahi, ‘Entrepreneurs in the Opposition: Forms of Organisation and Modes of Participation in Chihuahua’, Paper presented at the Conference: Opposition Government in Mexico. Past Experiences and Future Opportunities. University of Texas at Austin, 2–4 April 1992.

³¹ In 1988 Raymundo Gómez – Francisco Barrio's general campaign manager in 1986 – became president of the PAN. One of his most important goals was to reorganise the party structure which was severely weakened after the elections of 1986. He encouraged the ‘professionalisation’ of the party by paying salaries to those officials assuming executive positions. That enabled them to become involved in the party on a full-time basis. Prior to these reforms, all officials worked on a voluntary basis. Gómez also introduced a strict internal discipline and ousted many members of the party.

³² Manuel Carrazco, the general director of the campaign is a small-size entrepreneur who took this position after being invited by Francisco Barrio. Interview, Chihuahua, July 1992.

³³ Coparmex remained active politically, as it has always been. Traditionally, Coparmex has been the most independent and radical business organisation. In Chihuahua, as in many parts of the country, it is led by entrepreneurs who support the PAN. In Chihuahua, Coparmex organised a public forum where the four candidates to the governorship were invited to answer questions by entrepreneurs. It was the first and only event of its kind. Coparmex originally wanted to organise a debate, but the PRI declined.

³⁴ Even in the United States entrepreneurs have been characterised by their support of pragmatism more than by their advocacy of democracy. See Silk, Leonard and Vogel, David, Ethics and Profits: The Crisis of Confidence in American Business (New York, 1976)Google Scholar.

³⁵ See my dissertation, The New Conservative Opposition: The Politics of Entrepreneurs in Chihuahua, University of California, Berkeley (forthcoming, 1994).

³⁶ Heredia, ‘Ideas vs Interests?’, p. 13.

³⁷ As we shall see below, however, their commitment to democracy was divorced from matters related to social justice.

³⁸ Interview with Matías Mesta, Chihuahua, November 1991. This is also one of the reasons why entrepreneurs in general support the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. NAFTA is perceived as a regulatory framework that will ensure the continuity of the policies introduced by the administration.

³⁹ This position entails a potential risk, namely, that the have-nots will democratically decide to affect the interests of the property holders. The position of the entrepreneurs in this respect – and heavily influenced by social Christian doctrine, I believe – has been to offer a good treatment to workers inside the firm, to promote education and economic growth which will have a trickle down effect to the lower strata of society, and publicly to administer resources more honestly and efficiently, so that people see a stake in supporting a more democratic political system. The PAN's political programme in Chihuahua was based on ‘Seven Points’, none of which addressed the problem of poverty, marginality or redistribution of income. On the question of what democracy means to these entrepreneurs see Krauze, Enrique, Por una Democracia sin Adjetivos (México, 1986)Google Scholar. This essay was highly influential for these entrepreneurs. In my interviews, Krauze was often cited as reference.

⁴⁰ Jesús Macías, PRI's candidate for governor, was City Mayor of Ciudad Juárez. He was virtually unknown throughout the rest of the state and was accused of having links – economic and political – with a corrupt public official who escaped to the United States.

⁴¹ Confidential interview. Large entrepreneurs also knew that, in the event of a PANista victory, the PAN would not turn against them for having supported the PRI. Interview with Eduardo Baeza, Chihuahua, July 1992.

⁴² Interview with Guillermo Vega, Chihuahua, November 1991.

⁴³ Interview with David Arelle, La Jornada, 24 May 1992.

⁴⁴ Interview with Patricio Martinez, July 1992. Judging from the experience of Baja California, where the PAN won in 1989, the fears about the capacity of a PANista governor to negotiate with the federal authorities seem unfounded. Governor Ruffo has not had major problems in negotiating with the federal authorities and attracting investment to the state. For large entrepreneurs, the greatest fear is of the curtailment of government's capacity to distribute concessions and special prerogatives with a high degree of discretion. However, large entrepreneurs have direct links with federal authorities and continue to have the power to influence them on their behalf. While they prefer to have a PRIista in government, they are not too affected by a PANista at the local level.

⁴⁵ The opposition has repeatedly accused the PRI of using public funds during its campaigns. Moreover, they have argued that the Comités de Financiamiento de Campaña have been used as a façade to cover up PRI's illegal use of public funds.

⁴⁶ I joined the PRI's candidate for mayor of Ciudad Juárez in one of his campaign rallies, in an extremely poor area of the city. The PRI was not only promising to build roads and pave streets once they were in office, they were actually promising to do these public works while they were in the campaign. When I asked where they obtained the funds to pay for these activities, they answered that the PRI only ‘pressed’ the municipality to take care of these needs. It was obvious that this is only one of the forms in which the PRI uses public funds for its campaigns.

⁴⁷ It appears that the government supports a ‘selective democracy’, willing to recognise few and occasional PANista victories but foreclosing all possibilities of recognising the victories of the PRD. Where the post-electoral mobilisations have proven to be too strong, the PRI has been forced to attend to the demands of the opposition. In Michoacán the governor resigned after he had already assumed power due to the strong mobilisations which made his job impossible. This was a compromise solution that allowed the PRI to attend to the opposition's demands without having to recognise a PRD victory. In the long run, this can prove more damaging to the PRI. The PRD represents a real threat to the government for several reasons. First, its most important leaders defected from the PRI. Second, the party supports economic policies that run against the government's economic strategy. Finally, the PRD has adopted a confrontational position and, in contrast to the PAN, has been reluctant to moderate its position and negotiate with the government. The PAN's strategy to seek good relations with the government has proven successful in that the party has been allowed to win elections, but it also threatens to reduce the independence of the PAN as an opposition political party. In the case where the PAN made a coalition with the PRD, as in Durango, the government appeared reluctant to attend to the opposition's demands after the elections. The government has increased the PAN's stakes to run alone and seek good relations with the government, a situation that divides the opposition and prevents it from joining forces to challenge the government on a united front. This will become more important for the presidential elections of 1994.

⁴⁸ At the national level, there has recently been an important split in the PAN. The members of the so-called Foro Democrático y Doctrinario – a faction within the PAN – left the PAN on the grounds that the party has closed ranks with the government in a way that compromises its principles. They accused the leadership of the PAN of being overly pragmatic: trading off a few victories of the PAN in return for the complacency of the party on other matters of national importance, like the electoral law.

⁴⁹ For an interesting analysis of why entrepreneurs, or the ‘bourgeoisie’ as O'Donnell calls it, supported the ‘democratic experiments’ in many Latin American countries, see Guillermo O'Donnell, ‘Substantive or Procedural Consensus? Notes on the Latin American Bourgeoisie’, in Chalmers, Campello de Souza and Borón (eds.), The Right and Democracy in Latin America.