¹ Dix, Robert A., Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967), p. 7.Google Scholar

² Harry, Kantor, Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin America (Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1969), pp. 423–4Google Scholar (emphasis added). See also Vernon, L. Fluharty, Dance of the Millions (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957) for some familiar statements about Colombia's oligarchy.Google Scholar

³ Dix, , op. cit., p. 7.Google Scholar

⁴ See Miller, Delbert C., International Community Power Structures (Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 179, for a Caustic warning in this regard for investigations of power structures in Latin America.Google Scholar

⁵ Payne, James L., ‘ The Oligarchy Muddle ’, World Politics, 20 (04 1968), pp. 441–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ The components utilized here are drawn mainly from Payne, loc. cit., with some slight additions.

⁷ Domain refers to ‘the persons whose policies are affected’, i.e. in the arenas that individuals or organizations are being affected. See Lasswell, Harold D. and Abraham, Kaplan, Power and Society A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950). pp. 78–80 and 252–4, for a discussion of the concept ‘arena’.Google Scholar

⁸ Dix, , op. Cit., p. 23.Google Scholar

⁹ Colombia Today, vol. VII, no. 5 (New York, 1972), n.p.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI), Cali and the Cauca Valley (Cali, Colombia, Biblioteca ANDI, n.d.), p. 8.Google Scholar

¹¹ John, Walton, ‘ Development Decision-Making: A Comparative Study of Latin America ’, American Journal of Sociology, 75 (03 1970), p. 849.Google Scholar

¹² The data was collected under the directorship of L. Vincent Padgert in collaboration with Harold Rizo Otero and Jorge Ernesto Holguin.

¹³ See Morris, Janowitz, ‘Social Stratification and the Comparative Analysis of Elites’, Social Forces, 35 (01 1956), for other important reasons for stratifying elite groups.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The rationale for designating primary and secondary occupations of the elites studied stems from the fact that many of the elites who were interviewed often did not utilize the professional training which they mentioned under the category ‘occupation or profession’ in the questionnaire. In order to remedy the situation and to clarify the actual role of the respondent occupationally, the occupations were coded with the use of career patterns, profession and major activities in which the interviewees said they participated. The nine general categories of primary occupations consisted of businessman (divided into five sub-types), politician, professional, labor leader and priest. The five sub-types of ‘ businessman ’ were categorized into industrialist, manager of a major enterprise, financier/ banker and those businessmen involved in communications and commerce. The only basic difference between a manager of a major enterprise and an industrialist is the size of the business operation and the distinction is mainly Colombian. The ‘professional’ category was used to designate lawyers, doctors, economists, educators and engineers. A ‘labor leader’ (dirigente sindical) refers either to an elected officer or a member of the board of directors (junta directiva) of a trade union whether national or local. A politician ‘refers to anyone who has recently been or is an elected or appointed official of the national, departmental or local government. It is interesting to note that no respondent referred to himself directly as a politician. The seven general categories for second did not mirror the primary occupations since some of the primary occupations would not have fit’ into the secondary occupational categories. The agriculturalist/cattleman (agricultor/ganadero) refers to an occupation concerned with the ownership of large portions of land. The ‘public administrator’ is often a political appointee at the local level who has little, if any, influence or prestige. The ‘consultant/director’ refers to a secondary occupation in which an individual sits on as many boards of directors as possible for the express purpose of enhancing his ability to relay information to others concerning investments, the letting of contracts, legislation and the opportunities for ‘deals’. Colombians refer to these individuals as pregoneros (divulgers).

¹⁵ Schulze, Robert O., ‘The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City’, in Morris, Janowitz (ed.), Community Political Systems (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1961), p. 22.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Walton, . op cit., p. 848.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Hoskin, Gary W., ‘Community Power and Political Modernization: A Study of a Venezuelan City’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1967), p. 385.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cole, Blasier, ‘Power and Social Change in Colombia: The Cauca Valley’, Journal of Inter- American Studies, 8 (07 1966), p. 406.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hoskin, , op. cit., p. 424.Google Scholar

²⁰ For a contrary view, see Miguel, Urrutia, The Development of the Colombian Labor Move- ment (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969), p. 35.Google Scholar

²¹ Dix's argument has been challenged recently in a study of political elites in various regions of Colombia by James L. Payne who has stated that ‘recruitment to political office is relatively open in Colombia’ and that ‘the son of a blue-collar worker, small farmer, or school teacher does have a meaningful (but not equal opportunity to reach top public offices’). See Payne, James L., Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 40–1. The major flaw in Payne's conclusion is that his data is based on departmental and municipal party directorate members who are not considered by most Colombians as an ‘upper leadership group’. Clearly, the data presented in Table questions Payne's conclusions while more closely supporting Dix's position with regard to the ‘openness’ of the elite stratification arrangement in Colombia.Google Scholar

²² See Judith, Talbot Campos and John, F. McCamant, Cleavage Shift in Colombia: Analysis of the 1970 Elections (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1972), for a comprehensive evaluation of the 1970 presidential elections.Google Scholar

²³ Deutsch, Karl W., ‘Toward a Theory of Power and Political Structures’, in Peter, Hollis W. (ed.), Comparative Theories of Social Change (Ann Arbor, Michigan, Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, 1965), pp. 65–6.Google Scholar